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ABSTRACT 
Vicarious humiliation as a devaluing intergroup event is a rather common experience, which 
has the potential to adversely influence present and future intergroup relations. Based on an 
extensive literature review and previous research, we hypothesised that highly identified 
group members experience an intensified feeling of humiliation after witnessing an ingroup 
member being humiliated when compared to low identifiers (Hypothesis 1), that the role of 
visual exposure as situational determinant of humiliating events, the appraisals, and the 
emotional patterns elicited, differ between personally and vicariously humiliating events 
(Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3 and 4), and lastly, that vicarious humiliation regulated through 
emotional blends leads to behavioural intentions that influence future intergroup relations 
(Hypotheses 5a to 5c). Evidence for our hypotheses was exploratively and experimentally 
provided in six studies. Results implied that vicarious humiliation is a common experience, 
that visual exposure as situational determinant is more important for personally than 
vicariously humiliating events, and that humiliation is indeed a blended emotion (Study 1, N 
= 1048). Moreover, results showed that highly identified group member feel relatively 
stronger humiliated (Study 2, N = 175), that the appraisal and emotional patterns are related 
to identity processes (i.e., personal and vicarious humiliation) (Study 3, N = 74; Study 4, N = 
359; Study 5 = 376), and that the feeling of humiliation and accompanying emotions regulate 
the relationship between vicariously humiliating events and the intentional responses such as 
avoidance, non-normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion (Study 6, N = 998). 
Overall, our results imply that vicarious humiliation as an emotional experience has the 




The present research studied a phenomenon that we are all familiar with – being humiliated. 
Unfortunately, this is an experience that is rather common as we might not only experience to 
be humiliated personally but also to be humiliated on behalf of others. It is this vicarious 
experience of humiliation that the present research aimed at studying. We firstly explored 
people’s experiences with and understandings of humiliation through a cross-sectional survey 
(Study 1). Results indicated that vicarious humiliation is indeed a rather common experience, 
that personally and vicariously humiliating events differ in terms of the situational 
determinants that characterise these events, and that the feeling of humiliation is experienced 
as a blended emotion. We furthermore tested experimentally the effects of ingroup 
identification, identity processes and the presence of an audience on the appraisal processes 
of and the emotional and motivational responses to vicarious humiliation. We found that 
people who highly identified with the group they share with the humiliated person, 
experienced stronger feelings of humiliation (Study 2), and that being personally humiliated 
and being vicariously humiliated resulted in different appraisal patterns, which consequently 
elicited the different emotional blends of humiliation with self-focused and other-focused 
emotions, respectively (Studies 3 to 5). We were, however, unable to provide evidence that 
the presence of an audience aggravated the appraisal processes and the feeling of humiliation 
(which we attributed to methodological limitations of our studies). That the emotional blends 
of humiliation regulate the behavioural intentions, that people engage in as a result of being 
vicariously humiliated, was demonstrated in our last study (Study 6). More specifically, we 
found that humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions was related to intentions to 
avoid, to non-normatively approach, and/or to socially exclude the humiliator(s) through 
dehumanising them. It is this latter finding that provides evidence for both the role of the 
social context that might determine the appropriateness of certain behaviours (e.g., social 
 xiv 
norms) and for the proposed cycle of humiliation in that humiliated persons are often believed 
to retaliate by humiliating the humiliator(s) in return, which has the potential to provoke 
intergroup conflicts.  
 
Keywords: vicariously humiliating events, the feeling of humiliation, self-focused emotions, 
other-focused emotions, avoidance, approach, dehumanisation, social exclusion, 
intergroup conflict, social media
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Humiliation is an intensely negative experience that undermines the positive view that 
people have or wish to have about themselves. It occurs when people experience a 
discrepancy between how they perceive others as seeing or treating them and how they view 
themselves (Miller, 1993). The experience of humiliation is widely acknowledged to lead to 
psychological distress and weakened social relatedness (Atran & Stern, 2005; Farmer & 
McGuffin, 2003; Gasanabo, 2006; Hartling et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Klein, 1991; 
Lindner, 2006b; Muenster & Lotto, 2010). Distress-related consequences include depression 
(Farmer & McGuffin, 2003), lowered self-esteem and general anxiety (Klein, 2005; 
McCarley, 2009), and suicide (Klein, 1991), whereas weakened social relatedness might 
express itself in domestic violence (Farmer & McGuffin, 2003), shooting rampages 
(Muenster & Lotto, 2010), human-rights abuses (Kaufmann et al., 2011), terrorism (Atran & 
Stern, 2005), wars (Lindner, 2006a; 2006b) and genocides (Gasanabo, 2006; Lindner, 2006a). 
Different from other negative emotions such as shame and guilt, humiliation is 
brought upon us (Klein, 1991). We experience this negative feeling because somebody 
devalues us for who we are, what we represent or what we share with others. Thus, 
humiliation is an interaction-oriented emotion (Coleman et al., 2007) that occurs on 
interpersonal level targeting the personal self, and on intergroup level targeting the social 
self. Intergroup humiliation might result from being humiliated by an outgroup because of 
one’s group membership (i.e., group-membership-based humiliation, see Veldhuis et al., 
2014, p. 2) or from witnessing a fellow ingroup member being humiliated by an outgroup 
(i.e., vicarious humiliation). 
Intergroup humiliation is often referred to as the emotional link between degrading 
events and intergroup conflicts (Atran & Stern, 2005; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Lindner, 




their theorising of intergroup relations (Elison & Harter, 2007; Hartling et al., 2013; Hartling 
& Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002; Saurette, 2005) and in their analyses of real intergroup 
conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda (Gasanabo, 2006; Lindner, 2001), the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in Gaza (Ginges & Atran, 2008), the Holocaust of the second world war 
(Lindner, 2001), or the unrests in Northern Ireland (Stokes, 2006). 
Witnessing a fellow ingroup member being humiliated by an outgroup might be a 
more common experience that people are exposed to in their everyday lives than one would 
assume. Whether we read headlines such as “Trump humiliates CNN reporter” or “South 
Africa suffered a humiliating 3-0 home defeat by Lesotho”, those of us who feel close to 
journalists or who are supporters of the South African national soccer team Bafana Bafana, 
respectively, might feel vicariously humiliated. Or whether we witness “online” humiliation 
(Salter, 2016) on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter where a person is “doxed” (i.e., the 
broadcasting of personally identifiable information about an individual or group, often with 
the intention to harm that person or group; see Douglas, 2016), or where non-consensual 
pornography is published (i.e., the online publication of nude/semi-nude images and/or 
videos of an individual without their consent; see Bates, 2017) by an outgroup, those of us 
who share an ingroup membership with this person might feel vicariously humiliated and our 
relationship to the outgroup will change – often for the worse.  
Vicarious humiliation does not only alienate social groups from each other but also 
has the potential to lead to intergroup conflicts. Given these negative implications for 
intergroup relations and the fact that studies on vicarious humiliation are limited (except for 
the research by Veldhuis et al., 2014), the present research aimed at extending our 
understanding of the why, how and when vicarious humiliation might play a role in intergroup 
conflicts as it has the potential to elicit a variety of negative emotions that regulate responses 




the present research studied the interplay between the situational determinants of humiliating 
events, the appraisals of those situational determinants, the resulting emotional blends of 
feeling vicariously humiliated, and the behavioural intentions to avoid, to normatively and 
non-normatively approach, and to dehumanise and socially exclude the humiliator. 
Consequently, the present research does not only contribute to the knowledge of humiliation 
and the psychological processes that foster or hamper intergroup conflicts but also 
contributes to research on vicarious emotions, which has so far mainly focussed on the 
emotions of empathy and sympathy (Miller et al., 1996), guilt (Lickel et al., 2005), shame 
(Welten et al., 2012), and anger (Yzerbyt et al., 2003).  
 
Organisation of the Thesis 
The present thesis consists of four major parts: the literature review, the current 
research, the studies and the general discussion. The literature review firstly outlines the 
intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) as it provides us with a theoretical framework 
to understand why people can experience emotions on behalf of ingroup members. 
Particularly, the role of ingroup identification in the experience of group-level emotions will 
be addressed. The literature review discusses the conceptualisation of humiliation focusing 
on the situational determinants that characterise humiliating events, how these events are 
appraised (i.e., the appraisals of humiliation), and the emotions that accompany the feeling of 
humiliation. The final part of the literature review outlines the possible behavioural 
tendencies that people intend to engage in as a result of witnessing an ingroup member being 
humiliated, and the emotional blends that are assumed to regulate these behavioural 
tendencies. 
The second part of the thesis provides an overview of the current research by 




the literature review. Each study and its design, that will address the different aims and 
hypotheses, are briefly discussed. Participants and the overall procedure of the studies as well 
as the ethical considerations of the current research, are lastly outlined. 
The third part of the thesis reports six studies that addressed the concept of 
humiliation, and the relationships between humiliating events, emotional blends and 
behavioural intentions. Study 1 explored people’s understandings about and experiences with 
humiliation (Study 1). Study 2 tested experimentally the role of ingroup identification in the 
elicitation of humiliation. Studies 3 to 5 tested the appraisal and emotional patterns evoked 
following a humiliating event, and whether these patterns differ as a result of identity 
processes (i.e., whether a person is personally targeted in a humiliating event or whether a 
person witnesses the humiliation of an ingroup member). Lastly, Study 6 tested 
experimentally the interplay between the emotional blends elicited through vicarious 
humiliation and the behaviours that people intend to engage in. 
The final part of the thesis contains the general discussion. This section starts with 
summarising the general aims of the present research followed by discussing the findings of 
the various studies in relation to previous research. Next, the original contributions that the 
research makes to the knowledge and understanding of vicarious humiliation are discussed. 
More specifically, we discuss how the results of the present research contribute firstly, to the 
conceptualisation of humiliation, secondly, to the understanding of the situational 
determinants of humiliating events, thirdly, to the importance of ingroup identification in the 
elicitation of vicarious humiliation, fourthly, to the association between the appraisal and 
emotional patterns, and humiliation and how these patterns differ between being personally 
and vicariously humiliated, and lastly, to the understanding of the interplay between the 
emotional blends elicited through vicarious humiliation and behavioural tendencies that 




methodological implications of the present research. Lastly, the limitations with regards to 
our participants, the used research designs and measurements as well as the approach applied 
to manipulate the independent variables in the experimental studies are outlined. Based on 







Most research has studied humiliation on the interpersonal level (e.g., Elison & 
Harter, 2007; Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Fernández et al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; 
Negrao et al., 2005; Pulham, 2009). Personal humiliation is most likely elicited when events 
are appraised as lowering one’s self-esteem (Fernández et al., 2015), as being the fault of 
someone else (Klein, 1991), as being unfair and unjust (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) and/or as 
being out of the control of the humiliated person (Elison & Harter, 2007). Moreover, research 
on personal humiliation has demonstrated that this emotion is accompanied by other 
emotions such as anger and shame and often results in the contradicting responses of 
avoidance and approach (Fernández et al., 2015). However, research exploring humiliation as 
an intergroup emotion, and in particular the experience of vicarious humiliation (i.e., 
humiliation on behalf of an ingroup member), is rather scarce.  
One exception is the experimental research conducted by Veldhuis et al. (2014), 
which tested whether individuals can experience humiliation, powerlessness, and anger 
vicariously when they observe other ingroup members being ostracised. The results revealed 
that witnessing another ingroup member being socially excluded elicited indeed the feelings 
of humiliation, anger and powerlessness, which did not differ from being personally excluded 
(Veldhuis et al., 2014; Study 2). Yet, witnessing a member of the outgroup being socially 
excluded did not elicit the same degree of humiliation, which suggests that feeling humiliated 
on behalf of others is limited to ingroup members (Veldhuis et al., 2014; Study 3). Moreover, 
the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014) demonstrated that observing an ingroup member being 
socially excluded did not only elicit the feeling of humiliation but also the feeling of anger, 
thereby stressing that feeling vicariously humiliated blends with other emotions, as it has 




Although the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014) demonstrate how social exclusion as 
situational determinant elicits both personal and vicarious humiliation (Studies 2 and 3) and 
that vicarious humiliation, similar to personal humiliation, is a blended emotion (e.g., blended 
with anger, Studies 1, 2 and 3), further research is necessary to extend our understanding of 
vicarious humiliation and its implications for intergroup relations and conflicts. 
Consequently, the present research provides additional insights by exploring (1) the role of 
ingroup identification in vicarious humiliation, (2) the situational determinants of vicarious 
humiliation, (3) whether situational determinants are specific for personal or vicarious 
humiliation, (4) appraisals, (5) emotional blends, and whether personal or vicarious 
humiliation evoke different emotional patterns, and (6) the responses to the humiliation that 
are critical for current and future intergroup relations.  
To elaborate in detail on these research objectives, we first need to unpack what 
enables people to experience emotions on behalf of others? Most explanations on why people 
can vicariously experience group-based emotions depart from the social identity approach 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). For instance, Lickel et al. (2005) demonstrated 
that participants felt vicarious shame because of the social identity shared with a wrongdoer 
(see also Welten et al., 2012), whereas emotional closeness with the wrongdoer predicted 
vicarious guilt. Different from vicarious shame and vicarious guilt, which result from 
witnessing an ingroup member doing something wrong, vicarious humiliation results from 
observing an ingroup member being wronged by an outgroup member. Despite these 
differences, the experience of vicarious humiliation – similar to any other intergroup emotion 
– requires that the person who witnesses the other person being humiliated by an outgroup 
member shares the same group membership with this person and that this group membership 




identification processes lead to people’s experience of group-based emotions has been 
conceptualised by the intergroup emotion theory (Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015). 
 
The Role of Ingroup Identification in Vicarious Humiliation 
The intergroup emotion theory, which builds on the social identity approach (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), proposes that self-categorisation and social identification 
processes evoke emotions in people in response to events that are appraised as affecting their 
ingroup, even if the individual is not personally involved in these events (Seger et al., 2009; 
Smith & Mackie, 2015). Therefore, the elicitation of group-based emotions requires that 
individuals identify with a social group, which is most likely when contextual factors shift 
social relations from being interpersonal to intergroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In fact, the 
intergroup emotion theory proposes that group-based emotions differ from personal emotions 
(Smith & Mackie, 2015) as they are determined by respective social categories that are 
socially shared (Ray et al., 2008; Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015). For instance, 
comparing emotions felt by participants when thinking of themselves as members of a 
particular social group with emotions felt by the same participants when thinking about 
themselves as unique individuals showed that the profiles of emotions differed (Seger et al., 
2009). 
Moreover, group-based emotions do not only depend on whether individuals identify 
with a social group but also what social group they identify with. For instance, Ray et al. 
(2008) showed that participants who were led to think of themselves as Americans showed 
more respect and less anger towards police compared to participants who were made to think 
of themselves as students. Therefore, making salient one or another group membership 




Furthermore, group-based emotions are shared emotions among ingroup members 
(Seger et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2015). When self-categorising as a group member, 
people tend to feel the way they perceive or expect their group to feel (Smith & Mackie, 
2015; Turner et al., 1987). For example, when university students think about an upcoming 
increase of study fees they may react emotionally with anxiety and anger towards the 
university management even though some of these students might not have a problem (or 
rather their parents) to pay the university fees. 
The intensity of group-based emotions depends on the intensity with which people 
identify with the group (i.e., ingroup identification; see Seger et al., 2009). Although 
individuals might belong to the same social group, they differ in the degree to which they 
identify with this group. This is because for some group members self-categorisation is more 
central to their self as compared to other group members, and therefore, they gain stronger 
cognitive and emotional significance from being a group member (Smith & Mackie, 2015). 
For these group members, the experience of group-based emotions should be intensified as 
they are more likely to engage in intergroup appraisals and hence experience the elicited 
emotions stronger (Smith & Mackie, 2015). Similarly, it is the high identifiers who are more 
likely to match their own emotions with those that they believe are, or expect to be, typically 
experienced and shared by other ingroup members (Moons et al., 2009).  
The positive relationship between ingroup identification and the experience of group-
based emotions has been shown in several studies for positive emotions such as joy and pride 
(Combs et al., 2009). It has also been demonstrated for negative emotions, such as other-
focused anger, particularly after an unfair treatment of a fellow ingroup member, which did 
not only intensify this negative feeling but also the identification with the ingroup (Gordijn et 




It is, however, not always the case that ingroup identification and group-based 
emotions are positively related. For instance, research has shown that highly identified group 
members reported less group-based guilt as compared to low identifiers (Doosje et al., 2006; 
Maitner et al., 2006). Following their ingroup’s transgression, highly identified group 
members tend to appraise the transgression as more justified and positive, and therefore, feel 
less group-based guilt about what their group has done to others (Doosje et al., 2006; Maitner 
et al., 2006). Defending the transgressions of the ingroup might be an identity management 
strategy in that high identifiers are more defensive and more willing to protect the ingroup 
when their ingroup’s unfavourable behaviour is made salient to them, thereby protecting their 
positive social identity by feeling less guilty (Doosje et al., 1998). 
A similar trend could be assumed for group-based humiliation in that individuals who 
identify strongly with their ingroup reject this feeling because they want to protect their 
ingroup and keep their social identity positively distinct (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, 
humiliation does not only differ from guilt because it results from others’ actions (similar to 
anger) but also because it affects the essence of the self (Wagner et al., 2009). More 
specifically, highly identified group members who belong to a group that transgressed against 
an outgroup, for instance in the past, might not experience these norm violations as an attack 
on the essence of their social self because they can singularise these transgressions as an 
exception from the norm and thus maintain their positive distinctiveness (therefore the 
negative relationship between ingroup identification and group-based guilt; see Doosje et al., 
2006; Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Highly identified group members who experience group-
based humiliation, on the other hand, might not be able to apply such identity management 
strategies because the experienced discrepancy between how they perceive others as seeing 
or treating (members of) their ingroup and how they view their ingroup (Miller, 1993) affects 




ingroup identification and vicarious humiliation, in that highly identified group members 
experience an intensified feeling of humiliation after witnessing an ingroup member being 
devalued by an outgroup than low identified ingroup members. 
Most research on humiliation distinguishes between humiliation as an event (as 
described above) and humiliation as a feeling (e.g., Lindner, 2007). Humiliation as an event 
refers to situations where a person experiences a discrepancy between how she or he 
perceives others as viewing or treating her or him and how she or he views her- or himself 
(Lindner, 2007; Miller, 1993), whereas humiliation as a feeling is defined as a negative, self-
conscious emotion (Elison & Harter, 2007). Although the term humiliation is interchangeably 
used to describe an event and the feeling (Elshout et al., 2017), humiliation as event and 
humiliation as feeling refer to distinct – yet interrelated - psychological processes.  
 
Humiliation as Event: The Situational Determinants 
There are different situational determinants (i.e., features) in a humiliating event that 
evoke the above-mentioned cognitive discrepancy as these determinants lead to a violation in 
how a person wants to be treated, how a person defines her or his position or status that she 
or he perceives to occupy, how a person outlines her or his social context of which she or he 
believes to be part of, and how a person describes the knowledge or competencies that she or 
he believes to have. Klein (1991) and Lazare (1987) suggested that the situational 
determinants of humiliation can be grouped as follows: (1) being attacked, (2) being reduced 
in size, (3) social rejection or exclusion, (4) being found or made deficient, and (5) being 
visually exposed.  
Being attacked refers to negative treatments, another person’s attempt to inflict hurt 
and act in an aggressive and hostile manner, either verbally or physically. It transgresses the 




humiliation due to attack results from the discrepancy between how a person is treated by 
others and how she or he expects to be treated. Being ridiculed, scorned, insulted, mocked, 
harassed, criticised and bullied are examples of behaviours that can be perceived as an attack 
as they refer to negative and aggressive actions (Elison & Harter, 2007; Hartling & Luchetta, 
1999; Klein, 1991; Lazare, 1987).  
Any event where a person’s position is reduced in size is another situational 
determinant (Klein, 1991). It includes any act of degradation or disrespect where one is 
belittled, devalued or made to feel inferior (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017). 
Humiliation results in this case from the discrepancy between the position (or status) that the 
person is placed in by someone else and the position that she or he perceives to hold. 
Examples include situations where a person’s self-esteem, social status, dignity, pride or 
confidence are lowered or made inferior (Gilbert, 1997; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 
1991; Lazare, 1987; Lindner, 2016). 
Humiliation may also be the result of social rejection or exclusion (Jonas et al., 2014; 
Veldhuis et al., 2014). Humans are social beings and readily form relationships with others as 
social connectedness is important to our well-being (Putnam, 2001). The need for belonging, 
acceptance and love are essential human motivations (Baumeister et al., 2005). When social 
connections are broken or denied, a person suffers deep and painful emotional harm 
(Claypool & Bernstein, 2014; Uskul & Over, 2014) such as humiliation (Jonas et al., 2014). 
Social rejection or exclusion causes a discrepancy between the person’s belief of being part 
of a group and realising that she or he is not part of the group. For instance, the results of the 
studies conducted by Veldhuis and colleagues (2014) showed that both being socially 
excluded and witnessing somebody else being socially excluded, elicited humiliation.  
Another situational determinant is being found or made deficient (i.e., incompetency) 




recognised by another person as competent and perceiving oneself as being adequate or 
competent in a certain domain. Previous research studying personal accounts of humiliation 
found that participants often reported being humiliated by others as a result of perceived 
inadequacy in a certain domain (Elison & Harter, 2007). For instance, an analysis of media 
accounts of high-profile school-shooting cases revealed that the shooters reported that they 
constantly experienced to be humiliated by their peers because of their inadequate 
appearances, social or athletic behaviour (Elison & Harter, 2007).  
Lastly, being visually exposed (i.e., the publicity of the humiliating event) is 
considered another situational determinant for humiliation (i.e., the presence of other people 
who either witness the event or the humiliated person perceives that others will find out about 
the event; Klein, 1991). Important to note is that visual exposure is also considered as an 
aggravator of the previously outlined situational determinants. In other words, visual 
exposure can also be a condition under which the experience of humiliation is intensified. For 
instance, when people perceive themselves publicly attacked, reduced, excluded or made 
deficient, they report stronger feelings of humiliation compared to being privately attacked, 
excluded, etc. (Fernández et al., 2015). On the other hand, a person does not need to share the 
values or beliefs that the humiliator is using to devalue her or him, the fact that the 
devaluation is in front of others who are now seeing the person as less is what provokes the 
humiliation (Hall, 2013). For example, a person might be humiliated in front of others for not 
being able to speak English fluently. Simply being publicly demeaned might be sufficient to 
elicit humiliation, regardless of whether or not the humiliated person thinks that there is 
anything wrong at all with not being able to speak a certain (and often second) language 
fluently. It is, however, not only the presence of others that elicits or intensifies the 




compared to an audience without laughter, following the same insult (Mann et al., 2017; 
Otten et al., 2017).  
We speculate that these outlined situational determinants characterise humiliating 
events irrespective of whether these events are experienced as personal humiliation or as 
vicarious humiliation. That is, the composition of a personally humiliating event does not 
differ from the composition of a vicariously humiliating event in that it requires the 
humiliator to attack, to reduce, to exclude or to make the humiliated person or group feel 
deficient or incompetent. For example, as shown in the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014), 
regardless of whether participants were personally or vicariously excluded, in both events the 
situational determinant of exclusion prompted humiliation. However, we would propose that 
the aggravating influence of visual exposure on these situational determinants differs between 
personally and vicariously humiliating events. This is because the composition of a 
personally humiliating event differs from the composition of a vicariously humiliating event 
with regards to the audience who is witnessing the event. In a personally humiliating event, 
the audience is independent of the humiliated person, whereas in a vicariously humiliating 
event the audience and the person who feels humiliated on behalf of the humiliated person, 
are the same. Consequently, we hypothesised that individuals will attribute more importance 
to the situational determinant visual exposure when they experience personal humiliation 
than when they experience vicarious humiliation.  
To sum up, humiliating events are characterised by situational determinants of being 
attacked, or being reduced in size, being rejected or excluded, or being found or made 
deficient. These determinants evoke a discrepancy between how a person experiences to be 
viewed or treated by others and how she or he wants to be viewed or treated by others. 




this publicity of the humiliating event that is assumed to aggravate the experience of 
humiliation in personally humiliating events more so than in vicariously humiliating events.  
If an event is characterised by the above outlined situational determinants, the feeling 
of humiliation is likely to be elicited. Yet, according to the appraisal theories of emotions, it 
is not the event itself that leads to an internal feeling but rather how the event, and the 
associated situational determinants, are appraised or evaluated (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997). 
 
Appraisals of Humiliation  
When are situational determinants, such as being attacked, being reduced in size, 
being excluded and being made deficient, appraised as humiliating? According to appraisal 
theories of emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; 
Scherer, 1997), an emotion is elicited not just through the sensing of an environmental event 
but by the interpretation of the event. To put it differently, it is not the situational 
determinants of an event that directly elicit emotional responses but rather indirectly through 
the appraisal of the event (e.g., is this event desirable, who caused it, what power do I have 
over this event) (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Marsella & Gratch, 
2009; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997). 
How people interpret events are called appraisals and it is these appraisals of the 
event that determine emotional responses (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 
1991; Roseman, 1991). Although appraisal theorists tend to differ in which appraisals elicit 
which emotions, they agree that a person’s appraisal of an event, whether it is immediate, 
imagined or remembered, plays a vital role not only for the elicitation of emotions but also 




even when exposed to the very same, or a very similar event, people might respond with 
different emotions depending on how they appraise the event.  
When it comes to the elicitation of the feeling of humiliation, it is important to keep in 
mind that humiliation has been described as a self-conscious (or self-focused) emotion 
(Elison & Harter, 2007). Therefore, to experience humiliation, a person needs to reflect on 
her or his self-representations and to evaluate how the emotion-eliciting event is relevant to 
those representations of the self (Lewis, 2019). Although appraisal theories of emotions have 
proposed various appraisal patterns that allow for the differentiation among emotions, these 
theories do not provide a clear and consensual set of appraisals that elicit only self-conscious 
emotions (Tracy et al., 2007). Most of the appraisal theories include appraisals of whether the 
event is relevant and congruent with a person’s goals and needs, and whether these 
goals/needs are generally viewed as survival or reproduction goals/needs. As Tracy and 
Robins (2004, p. 109) argue, appraisal theories that include appraisals of self-relevance tend 
to combine them with appraisals of general goal relevance and therefore imply a very basic 
notion of the self (i.e., the ability to differentiate between self and other). General goal 
relevance is, however, not the same as self-awareness and self-representation that are 
necessary for the elicitation of self-conscious emotions. For self-conscious emotions to occur 
there must be ongoing self-evaluative processes within the individual, which include both a 
continuing sense of self-awareness (i.e., the I or We) and the ability for more complex self-
representations (i.e., the mental representations of one’s personal and/or social identity) 
(Tracy et al., 2007). 
To address self-awareness and self-representations in the formation of a set of 
appraisals that would elicit different self-conscious emotions, Tracy and Robins (2004, p. 
109) added an appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions to the appraisal theories of 




relevant for survival and reproduction, basic emotions, but not self-conscious emotions, are 
likely to be elicited, (2) for a self-conscious emotion to be elicited the event must be 
appraised as activating self-representations of the person, (3) when the attentional focus is on 
a person’s self-representations, events need to be appraised as relevant to the identity goals of 
the person, (4) when an event has been appraised for its relevance to identity goals, then the 
event needs to be appraised as congruent or incongruent with these identity goals, and (5) the 
elicitation of self-conscious emotions requires attributions to internal causes (i.e., the self) 
(Tracy & Robins, 2004, pp. 109-114).  
The predictions of the model by Tracy and Robins (2004), particularly the assumption 
that the elicitation of self-conscious emotions requires attributions to internal causes, might 
apply to self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt and embarrassment, but we would 
argue that blaming oneself for the event is not necessarily an appraisal associated with 
humiliation. This assumption is based on the observation that humiliated persons do not feel 
that they deserve this negative feeling (Fernández et al., 2015); or as Klein (1991, p. 117) 
noted, “people believe that they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their 
humiliation”. Therefore, we proposed that people who blame themselves as being responsible 
for the humiliating event (i.e., internal blame) might feel ashamed, embarrassed or guilty but 
not necessarily humiliated. Instead, a humiliated person might attribute the blame to the 
humiliator(s) (i.e., external blame) and/or appraise the devaluation of the self as unfair and 
unjust (i.e., injustice) (Fernández et al., 2015).  
Perceiving oneself powerless, and thus not in control of the situation, has been 
described as another appraisal in the elicitation of humiliation (Elshout et al., 2017; Hartling 
et al., 2013; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 2005; Lacey, 2011; Otten & Jonas, 2014; 
Torres & Bergner, 2010). According to the attribution-based theory of motivation, people 




control; see Weiner, 2010). For example, if a person fails at a task and attributes it internally 
to a lack of effort from her or his side, then the person perceives the event as controllable. 
But if the person attributes the event internally due to a lack of competence, then the person 
perceives the event as uncontrollable (Weiner, 2010).  
Another appraisal identified to elicit humiliation is internalising the devaluation that 
is imposed on the person (Fernández et al., 2015, 2018). Internalisation results in a loss in 
self-value and the lowering of a person’s self-esteem (Fernández et al., 2015, 2018). 
Fernández et al. (2018) found that contextual factors, such as the status and the hostility of 
the humiliator, played a role in whether a humiliated person internalises the devaluation 
imposed on her or him. More specifically, they showed that participants internalised the 
humiliating event significantly more when the humiliator was hostile and of higher status 
(Fernández et al., 2018). They attributed these findings to the perception that if the humiliated 
person evaluates the humiliator as having higher status, the humiliator is likely to have power 
or influence over the humiliated person’s self and consequently, a stronger ability to compel 
the humiliated person to internalise the devaluation (Fernández et al., 2018). 
According to the appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions (Tracy et al., 
2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004) and previous studies on humiliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; 
Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015; Hartling et al., 2013; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; 
Klein, 1991; Otten & Jonas, 2013; Silver et al., 1986; Torres & Bergner, 2010), we proposed 
that for the feeling of humiliation to be elicited, the appraising of a situational determinant 
has to activate a self-representation and should be relevant and incongruent with the identity 
goals of the humiliated person(s). More specifically, situational determinants need to be 
appraised as being the result of someone else’s actions (i.e., externally blamed), and/or 




appraised as something that lowers the self-esteem of the humiliated person (i.e., 
internalised); and/or appraised as something uncontrollable (i.e., powerlessness).  
As various emotions share the same appraisals, one appraisal can elicit different 
emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). For instance, blaming someone else for an unjust 
devaluation is not only likely to elicit humiliation but also anger, while internalising the 
devaluation elicits, besides humiliation, also shame and/or embarrassment (Fernández et al., 
2015). Therefore, appraising a humiliating event elicits emotional blends consisting of 
humiliation accompanied by different self-focused emotions such as shame and/or 
embarrassment, or other-focused emotions such as anger, depending on which appraisals are 
prompted (Elison & Harter, 2007; Jonas et al., 2014; Klein, 1991). 
 
Humiliation as a Blended Emotion 
According to appraisal theories of emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; 
Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), emotional blends result from the fact that different 
emotions share core appraisals. For example, humiliation might be blended with shame as 
they share the appraisal of internalisation (Fernández et al., 2015) and powerlessness (Elshout 
et al., 2017; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Tangney et al., 1996). Shame is also associated with 
internal attributions of blame in that people who experience shame usually appraise the 
situation as being their fault and that they brought about this negative feeling (Tracy et al., 
2007). A humiliated person, on the other hand, does not feel that she or he deserves this 
negative feeling (Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991) and is, therefore, less likely to 
internally blame her- or himself. Thus, when a situational determinant is internalised and the 
humiliated person perceives her- or himself powerless, humiliation and shame are likely to be 
elicited as an emotional blend, but if the situational determinant is appraised as internal 




Guilt has also been associated with humiliation (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Both of 
these emotions are elicited following a transgression. With guilt, the transgression is 
committed by the person, while with humiliation the humiliated person(s) perceive(s) 
themselves as having done nothing wrong (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Therefore, guilt is 
usually elicited after internally blaming an emotion-inducing event, while it is assumed that 
humiliation is not (Neumann, 2000). Yet, it is likely that humiliation will be accompanied by 
guilt when the humiliated person perceives her- or himself powerless because of her or his 
inability to protect her- or himself from the humiliating event (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). 
Therefore, when humiliated persons perceive that they are unable to protect themselves from 
the event (i.e., powerlessness), then guilt might probably be elicited as part of the emotional 
blend of humiliation. 
Another emotion associated with humiliation is embarrassment (Elison & Harter, 
2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015). As with humiliation and shame, 
embarrassment is associated with powerlessness and the internalisation of a devalued self 
(Fernández et al., 2015; Pulham, 2009). Different from shame but similar to humiliation, 
embarrassment is a public emotion in that being devalued in front of others is an appraisal 
that might elicit both humiliation and embarrassment (Fernández et al., 2015; Tangney et al., 
1996). Similar to shame and guilt, embarrassment is also associated with internal blaming 
and the experience of powerlessness (Lewis, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004) as it is often 
elicited after social blunders such as spilling or tripping where the individual might feel she 
or he has little control over (i.e., powerlessness) (Pulham, 2009). Therefore, when a 
situational determinant is internalised, as being public knowledge, and the humiliated person 
perceives her- or himself powerless and thus not in control, then embarrassment is likely to 




part of the blend, and instead, shame and guilt are likely to accompany the feeling of 
embarrassment. 
The emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment are also defined as self-focused 
moral emotions because they all involve ongoing assessments of moral worth and whether 
the personal self fits within a community (Rozin et al., 1999, p. 574). More specifically, the 
emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment signal that the individual does not only want to 
“fit in” by behaving appropriately but also that the individual does not want to harm anybody 
(not even the humiliator). Although these self-focused moral emotions can be distinguished 
from each other, they are interrelated (Rozin et al., 1999). Humiliation is, however, not only 
accompanied by self-focused moral emotions but also by other-focused moral emotions such 
as anger (Elison & Harter, 2007; Fernández et al., 2015; Leidner et al., 2012; Veldhuis et al., 
2014). Anger and humiliation differ from each other in that the former might be elicited as a 
result of a blocked goal, while the latter requires self-evaluative processes (Tracy et al., 
2007). Yet, other-focused anger and humiliation share the appraisals of injustice and 
externally blaming others for the event (Fernández et al., 2015).  
Other-focused anger is part of a cluster of distinguishable, yet strongly related 
emotional reactions to the moral violations of others, namely contempt and disgust (Rozin et 
al., 1999). Contempt and disgust, similar to anger and humiliation, are associated with 
external blaming an unfair act that was committed by another person (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). Anger, contempt and disgust are other-focused moral emotions, in that they are 
elicited following the violation of shared moral codes (Rozin et al., 1999; Russell et al., 
2013). More specifically, anger is elicited in reaction to a violation of autonomy where 
individuals feel that their rights or freedom have been violated by others (Russell et al., 
2013). Contempt, on the other hand, is elicited when the violation refers to moral codes that 




members of an outgroup, that is perceived as low-status in society, devalue members of one’s 
ingroup, that is perceived as having high-status, one might feel contempt towards members of 
the outgroup because they have violated moral codes related to the hierarchy (Rozin et al., 
1999). It is also suggested that contempt is related to appraisals of competence in that people 
might feel contempt for individuals who are perceived as being less competent and who are 
perceived as not being able to contribute meaningfully to a group (Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011).  
Disgust is assumed to be elicited following the violation of a purity sanction (i.e., 
regulation of bodily functions, such as eating, defecation, and hygiene that are integrated into 
the moral codes of cultures; see Rozin et al., 1999). Yet, disgust is also assumed to be elicited 
following situations where people violate the dignity of others through their behaviour (Haidt 
et al., 1994, 1997; Rozin et al., 2008; Steiger & Reyna, 2017). Rozin et al. (1999) define it as 
socio-moral disgust. It is most often triggered when people behave socially immoral and/or 
act against others by violating their human dignity, as it is the case with racism, child abuse, 
cruelty and rape (Rozin et al., 1999). In line with this, participants who recalled past 
experiences associated with disgust reported feelings of disgust for others whom they 
perceived as having “unacceptable” sexist or racist attitudes (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Consequently, we proposed that the emotional blend of humiliation and other-focused 
moral emotions is likely to be elicited when situational determinants are appraised as being 
the result of someone else’s actions and perceived as unfair or undeserved. The interplay 






Figure 1. Appraisals of humiliation and the associated emotional responses. 
 
Blended emotional responses to humiliating events do not only depend on the shared 
appraisals but also on the identity processes involved (i.e., personal or self-related; and social 
or other-related). According to the intergroup emotion theory, depending on whether an event 
is evaluated as affecting the individual personally or the ingroup determines the appraisals 
and thus, the emotional patterns (Smith et al., 2007). Consequently, we proposed that the 
same situational determinants would be differently appraised when a person is personally 
humiliated compared to being vicariously humiliated, which will result in different emotional 
patterns. Or to put it differently, under the condition that a humiliating event is evaluated as 
affecting the personal self, situational determinants are likely to be appraised from a self-
focused perspective (i.e., aiming at appropriate responses to restore self-worth and to remain 
a part of the community), which makes the appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness 
most likely, and consequently, the elicitation of the feeling of humiliation accompanied by 




humiliating event is evaluated as affecting the ingroup (i.e., social self), situational 
determinants are likely to be appraised from the other-focused perspective (i.e., aiming at 
appropriate responses to restore or maintain positive intergroup distinctiveness), which makes 
the appraisals of external blame and perceived injustice more likely, and consequently, the 
elicitation of the feeling of humiliation and other-focused emotions such as anger, contempt 
and disgust. The assumption that the two latter emotions are elicited, is supported by various 
studies showing that not only anger but also contempt and disgust, are emotions typically 
experienced when a salient social identity is threatened (Gordijn et al., 2006; Reicher et al., 
2016; Tagar et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; Taylor, 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). For 
instance, it was found that anger was more prevalent when participants were prompted to see 
themselves and the victims of unfair treatment as part of the same group, especially when 
they identified strongly with this group (Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Likewise, 
another study that analysed the written language used by perpetrators of hate crimes found 
that the emotion of disgust was most frequently used as a means of discriminating against the 
outgroup (Taylor, 2007). Reicher and colleagues (2016) also showed that behaviour 
associated with disgust (i.e., eagerness to wash hands) was significantly less if participants 
perceived touching an ingroup member’s belongings (i.e., a t-shirt) as compared to touching 
an outgroup member’s t-shirt.  
We, therefore, hypothesised that personally humiliating events (i.e., situational 
determinants) are likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as 
uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation 
blended with self-focused emotions (i.e., self-conscious emotions such as shame, 
embarrassment and guilt), whereas vicariously humiliating events are likely to be appraised 
as something unjust and/or something to be externally blamed, which in turn will elicit 




The present research further proposes that not only identity processes influence 
appraisals and consequent emotional patterns but also the presence of an audience (i.e., visual 
exposure). As outlined elsewhere, visual exposure is a situational determinant that aggravates 
the appraisals of the other situational determinants (i.e., attack, reduction in size, social 
exclusion and being made deficient) and therefore, increases the experience of humiliation 
(Mann et al., 2017; Otten et al., 2017). Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the 
aggravating influence of visual exposure is assumed to differ between personally and 
vicariously humiliating events because in the former visual exposure refers to the 
distinctiveness between the humiliated person and the audience, whereas in the latter it refers 
to the indistinctiveness between the (vicariously) humiliated person and the audience. 
Consequently, we assumed that visual exposure influences the intensity of appraisals and 
emotions, and that this effect will be stronger in personally humiliating events when 
compared to vicariously humiliating events. 
The appraisal theories of emotions argue that the emotions elicited as a result of 
appraisals regulate people’s responses to events (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; 
Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997). Therefore, emotions do not only correspond 
to a certain pattern of appraisals, but also to a pattern of behavioural tendencies (Roseman et 
al., 1994) that have different social functions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).  
 
Responses to Humiliating Events 
Responses to humiliation are associated with both avoidance and approach tendencies 
(Fernández et al., 2015; Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). These avoidance and 
approach tendencies correspond with the aversive and appetitive motivational systems, 
respectively, which represent the core elements in the organisation of human behaviour 




needs for protection and security, whereas the appetitive motivational system refers to 
people’s needs for distinctiveness by, for instance, achieving a more positive goal and 
seeking different (usually more positive) outcomes (i.e., approach; Elliot & Church, 1997). 
The reasons for these rather contradicting responses to a humiliating event are due to 
the appraisals that humiliation shares with other emotions and therefore, resulting in different 
emotional blends (e.g., Fernández et al., 2015; Goldman, 2008; Jonas et al., 2014). It is 
because of these different blends of emotions that humiliation can simultaneously lead to 
both avoidance tendencies typically associated with self-focused emotions, such as shame 
and embarrassment, and approach tendencies typically associated with other-focused 
emotions, such as anger (Fernández et al., 2015; Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). 
More specifically, humiliation blended with shame and embarrassment will likely result in 
avoidance tendencies such as aiming to get to a safe place, a desire to do nothing, escaping, 
and/or hiding and withdrawing from the situation (Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 
2007). On the other hand, when humiliation is blended with anger then approach tendencies, 
such as removing an obstacle, hurting or hitting someone, opposing or resisting, screaming, 
complaining about someone, or getting back at someone (Frijda, 1987; Roseman et al., 1994), 
are most likely.  
Both avoidance and approach tendencies do not only help to cope and deal with an 
event, but they also determine the future relationships by either increasing or decreasing the 
social and psychological distance between the self and the other, or between the ingroup and 
the outgroup (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). How emotions are expressed (i.e., behavioural 
tendencies) help people to form and maintain positive relationships with others, and/or they 
help people to preserve their self-esteem, identity or power over others (Fischer & Manstead, 
2008). Because humiliation is defined as an interaction-oriented emotion that is elicited 




audience (Coleman et al., 2007; Klein, 1991), the responses to humiliation always refers to 
the relationship between these role players. More specifically, avoidance-oriented tendencies, 
such as getting to a safe place (e.g., escaping) and/or withdrawing from the situation aim at 
temporarily escaping from the interaction with the humiliator. This means, although the 
humiliated person avoids any future contact with the humiliator, the relationship remains 
unchanged. On the other hand, normative approach tendencies, such as opposing the 
humiliator or complaining about the humiliator to a third party aim in most cases at 
correcting or changing the relationship with the humiliator and thus, maintaining a future 
(although different) relationship between the parties involved. Relationships might also be 
changed and thus maintained when people respond to humiliating events with non-normative 
tendencies that often violate laws and social norms. We would argue that normative as well 
as non-normative approach tendencies serve to maintain - although a changed - relationship 
between the humiliated person(s) and the humiliator(s) as the associated actions are directed 
at the humiliator(s) through which her or his, or their existence, is recognised. 
There might, however, be situations where the very existence of the other (i.e., 
humiliator) is contested. In this case, the humiliated person(s) are likely to engage in 
responses that signal the end of the relationship. For instance, the humiliated person(s) might 
opt to socially exclude the humiliator. Socially excluding and ostracising another person(s) or 
group is equivalent to “the silent treatment” by which either the mere existence of the other is 
denied or by which the worth of the other is contested (Fischer & Roseman, 2007, p. 104). 
Both social exclusion and ostracism can occur on different levels. For instance, a student 
from University A who humiliates a student from University B might be excluded from the 
social category of students or even excluded from the category of humans. The reasoning that 
social exclusion occurs on different levels is informed by self-categorisation theory, which 




1987). The most inclusive social category refers to the self as being human (i.e., the human 
identity), the intermediate level of inclusiveness refers to the self as a member of a social 
group in comparison to other groups (i.e., the social identity), whereas the least inclusive 
category refers to the self as a unique being (i.e., personal identity).  
Ignoring others and treating them with indifference is also central to dehumanisation, 
which refers to the denial of being part of the human community (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; 
Oliver, 2011). The exclusion from the human community legitimises the indifference to the 
suffering and unjust treatment of the excluded others (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). A subtler 
form of dehumanisation is infrahumanisation by which, for instance, moral emotions are less 
attributed to the other (Vaes et al., 2003), and therefore, the other is seen as less human. Both 
dehumanising the humiliator or seeing the humiliator as lacking human attributes (i.e., 
infrahumanising), and therefore, as lacking the capacity to evoke compassion (Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014), have the potential to change one humiliating relationship into another 
humiliating relationship. This shift has been coined as the cycle of humiliation, which refers 
to the changing roles of the humiliated person, and is portrayed as the underlying mechanism 
that describes the interplay between vicarious humiliation and intergroup conflict (Lindner, 
2016).  
In line with our reasoning, we would argue that the emotional blends of self-focused 
emotions and other-focused emotions regulate the responses to a humiliating event. More 
specifically, we proposed that when shame and embarrassment as self-focused emotions 
blend with humiliation, people will be motivated to withdraw from the humiliator(s). On the 
other hand, when anger as other-focused emotion is blended with humiliation, people will be 
motivated to engage in behavioural tendencies that are aimed at changing the behaviour of 
the humiliator(s), which should result in an improved relationship (i.e., normative or non-




contempt and disgust as other-focused emotions regulate the relationship between a 
humiliating event and social exclusion. This reasoning is informed by previous research that 
demonstrated the different effects of the other-focused emotions of anger, contempt and 
disgust (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al., 2011; Taylor, 2007). For instance, Tausch 
et al. (2011), who studied the interplay between moral emotions and collective action, 
showed that group-based anger results in normative (i.e., actions that conform to the norms of 
the wider social system) and non-violent non-normative responses, whereas group-based 
contempt is likely to result in violent non-normative responses. Likewise, Taylor (2007) 
showed in her analysis of anti-group texts that words related to disgust were more prevalent 
than words related to anger, which made her conclude that disgust is crucial in understanding 
discrimination and prejudice. Contempt, like disgust, differs also from anger according to 
Fischer and Roseman (2007), who showed that although anger and contempt can occur 
together, they result in different motivational tendencies. More specifically, they showed that 
anger provokes short-term attack responses towards others, whereas contempt provokes 
rejection and social exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Intergroup disgust has also been 
linked to dehumanisation and social exclusion (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006). For 
instance, Harris and Fiske (2006) provided evidence that outgroups perceived as low in 
competence and low in warmth are often dehumanised by ingroup members and that this 
process is associated with the feeling of disgust. Haslam (2006) also proposed that 
dehumanisation involving the denial of uniquely humanistic attributes in outgroups are 
associated with the emotions of contempt and disgust. Moreover, one could assume that 
dehumanising the humiliator provides legitimacy to exclude her or him from the most 
inclusive category. We, therefore, proposed that when humiliation is blended with the feeling 





To conclude, humiliation is associated with more than one behavioural response – 
either the humiliated person(s) are motivated to respond by avoiding or by approaching the 
humiliator(s) (Fernández et al., 2015; Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). These 
contradicting behavioural responses are the result of the emotional blends of humiliation (i.e., 
shame, embarrassment and anger) that are elicited following a humiliating event. Humiliation 
blended with shame and embarrassment is likely to be associated with avoidance (Roseman 
et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 2007), while humiliation blended with anger is associated with 
approach tendencies that either do or do not conform to social norms (Fernández et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the present research proposes that humiliation blended with contempt and/or 
disgust is likely to result in dehumanisation and the tendency to socially exclude.  
In the following section, we will provide an overview about the current research by 
presenting our main arguments as outlined in the literature review and derived hypotheses 





THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
The overall aim of the present research is to extend our understanding about the 
psychological processes of vicarious humiliation that either prevent or foster intergroup 
conflicts. More specifically, because our research was not only based on the premise that 
people can indeed feel humiliated on behalf of somebody they share a social identity with but 
also that the experience of vicarious humiliation is rather common, our first aim was to 
explore the commonness of the experience of vicarious humiliation relative to personal 
humiliation. Moreover, that people can feel humiliated requires that they first appraise an 
event as humiliating, which means that they recognise situational determinants of the event 
such as (1) being attacked, (2) being reduced in size, (3) being socially rejected or excluded, 
and (4) being found or made deficient. We argued elsewhere that these situational 
determinants characterise humiliating events irrespective of whether these events are 
experienced as personal or as vicarious humiliation. However, we also argued that the role of 
visual exposure as situational determinant differs between personally and vicariously 
humiliating events. In the former, the audience is independent from the humiliated person, 
whereas in the latter, the audience and the person who feels humiliated on behalf of the other, 
are often one and the same. Therefore, our second aim was to provide evidence that 
personally and vicariously humiliating events differ with regards to the situational 
determinant of visual exposure but not necessarily with regards to the situational 
determinants of (1) being attacked, (2) being reduced in size, (3) being socially rejected or 
excluded, or (4) being found or made deficient. Also, we argued that humiliation is a blended 
emotion as it shares core appraisals with other emotions such as shame, embarrassment, guilt, 
anger, contempt and/or disgust (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 
2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Veldhuis et al., 2014). Thus, our third aim was 




which were explorative in nature, were addressed in Study 1 (N = 1048) using a cross-
sectional survey design. 
The role of ingroup identification in experiencing vicarious humiliation was 
addressed in Study 2 (N = 175). More specifically, we argued that highly identified group 
members who experience vicarious humiliation experience a discrepancy between how they 
perceive others as seeing or treating members of their ingroup and how they view their 
ingroup (Miller, 1993), which affects the essence of their social identity. We, therefore, 
proposed a positive relationship between ingroup identification and vicarious humiliation, in 
that highly identified group members experience an intensified feeling of humiliation after 
witnessing an ingroup member being devalued by an outgroup. Consequently, Study 2 tested 
the hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 1. After witnessing an ingroup member being humiliated, highly 
identified ingroup members experience a stronger feeling of humiliation compared to 
low identified ingroup members.  
We further argued that the different identity processes involved in personal and 
vicarious humiliation determine the appraisal processes and thus the profile of emotions. 
Because situational determinants of a personally humiliating event are appraised with regard 
to the personal self, self-focused emotions are likely to dominate the emotional responses. On 
the other hand, because situational determinants of a vicariously humiliating event are 
appraised with regard to their relevance to the social self, other-focused emotions are likely to 
dominate the emotional responses. More specifically, we hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2a. Personally humiliating events (i.e., the situational determinants) 
are likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., 
internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by 




Hypothesis 2b. Vicariously humiliating events (i.e., the situational determinants) 
are likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will 
elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions such as anger, contempt and 
disgust.  
Moreover, we reasoned that there might be situations where humiliated people 
appraise a humiliating event as caused by themselves (i.e., internal blame). However, because 
the feeling of humiliation is considered as undeserved (Klein, 1991; Fernández et al., 2015), 
we hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3. If a humiliating event (i.e., situational determinants) is appraised 
as internal blame then the emotional responses of shame, embarrassment and/or guilt 
are likely to be elicited but not as blends of humiliation.   
We further argued that appraisals and emotional patterns are not only influenced by 
identity processes (i.e., whether it is a personally or a vicariously humiliating event) but also 
by the presence or absence of others witnessing the humiliation. As outlined elsewhere, the 
situational determinant visual exposure is an aggravator of the other situational determinants, 
and thus, is assumed to intensify the experience of humiliation, which was assumed to be 
stronger in personally humiliating events compared to vicariously humiliating events. 
Consequently, we hypothesised:  
Hypothesis 4. The aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in 
personally humiliating events when compared to vicariously humiliating events. 
Hypotheses 2a/b, 3 and 4 were tested in three experimental studies (Study 3, Study 4 
and Study 5) using different social contexts and different approaches to manipulate personal 
and vicarious humiliation. Study 3 (N = 74) used as manipulation strategy the personal recall 




vicarious humiliation by providing participants with a scenario, while controlling for the 
presence of an audience within the contexts of gender and university students, respectively.  
We also argued that emotions are not only related to a pattern of appraisals but also to 
a pattern of behavioural intentions (Roseman et al., 1994). In fact, emotions are regulators 
between emotion-eliciting events and the behaviours that people intend to engage in as a 
response to these events. With regard to humiliation, we argued that it is the emotions that 
accompany the feeling of humiliation (rather than humiliation on its own), that regulate 
which behavioural tendency the humiliated person(s) opt(s) for. When humiliated person(s) 
tend(s) to engage in avoidance, they are likely trying to escape from the relationship with the 
humiliator(s), while when they tend to approach the humiliator(s), they are likely trying to 
correct or change the relationship with the humiliator(s). On the other hand, the humiliated 
person(s) might also want to end the relationship with the humiliator(s) by socially excluding 
them. Socially excluding people is legitimised by the process of dehumanisation (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006) as it becomes easier to exclude people from one’s social network 
when they are seen as less human. We proposed that the processes of dehumanisation and/or 
social exclusion facilitate the conflict associated with intergroup humiliation. Consequently, 
we hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5a. Humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions, such as 
shame and embarrassment, will provoke avoidance tendencies. 
Hypothesis 5b. Humiliation accompanied by anger will provoke normative and 
non-normative approach tendencies. 
Hypothesis 5c. Humiliation accompanied by disgust will provoke indirectly social 
exclusion through dehumanisation.  
We tested these hypotheses within the intergroup contexts of gender with females as 




In our explorative and experimental studies, we used undergraduate university 
students registered with the University of South Africa as research participants. We invited 
for each study different students to participate in order to avoid multiple participation in the 
different studies. Data for all studies was collected through internet-based research designs, 
which were uploaded on the online platform, Qualtrics. Approval to conduct the studies and 
the use of Unisa students as research participants was granted by the Ethical Research 
Committee at the College of Human Sciences (REC-240816-052; 2018-CHS-004) and the 
Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee at the University of South 
Africa (2018_RPSC_007_RS), respectively. 
In all studies, participants received an email inviting them to participate in the study. 
In the email, and on the first page of the internet-based studies, participants were informed 
about the nature of the respective study. It was also stipulated that we were interested in the 
participants’ honest opinion and that there would be no right or wrong answers. It was 
furthermore stipulated that participation in the study was voluntary, that they could withdraw 
at any time without consequences, and that all answers are made anonymously. The 
participants were notified about the estimated duration of the respective study and they were 
requested to follow a link that would direct them to the study. Participants were further 
informed that they provide consent to participate in the study by selecting the I agree option 
which took them to the study.  
After participants completed (or withdraw from) each study, they were thanked for 
taking the time and effort to participate. In Studies 2 to 6, where we adopted experimental 
designs, participants were debriefed as to the real purpose of the respective study and they 
were provided with an explanation as to why the researchers were not able to be upfront 




were again assured. Furthermore, we assured the participants that the results would only be 






Overall, Study 1 focused on participants’ understandings about and experiences with 
humiliation. The study addressed various aims using an explorative approach (i.e., cross-
sectional survey design). Firstly, the study aimed at exploring the commonness of vicarious 
humiliation. The second aim was to explore the situational determinants of personal and 
vicarious humiliation with a particular focus on the role of visual exposure. Lastly, we aimed 
at exploring the emotional implications of humiliation. More specifically, we aimed at 




One thousand and forty-eight participants started the study. However, only half of the 
sample answered all questions (n = 758). Of those 465 participants indicated that they were 
female, 291 indicated that they were male and two selected ‘other’ as describing their gender. 
Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 66 years with a mean age of 29.57 (SD = 9.54). 
 
Procedure and Measurements 
Participants were informed in an email that the study aimed at understanding 
emotions that we experience in our daily lives. Participants were asked to complete several 
questions that were presented in the same order as described below. Firstly, participants were 
asked to define humiliation providing them with the following instruction: “In this part of our 
survey, we will ask you about your experience with the term humiliation. We all have 
experienced and felt it. If asked by somebody, how would you define humiliation?” 




Next, we asked participants to describe in detail a situation that made them feel 
humiliated. Because we aimed at exploring the commonness of vicarious humiliation, we did 
not specify the target of humiliating (e.g., personal or vicarious). Again, participants were 
provided with a box in which they could describe this situation (n = 819).  
After participants provided their narratives about situations that made them feel 
humiliated, they were provided with a list of emotions and asked whether they felt these 
emotions too in the situation that made them feel humiliated? The following emotions were 
listed: angry, outraged, annoyed, disgust, dislike, distaste, shame, small, ashamed, 
embarrassed, guilty, contempt, indifference and disregard. Participants answered on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). Angry, outraged and annoyed were combined 
into the anger measure ( = .77); disgust, dislike and distaste were combined into the disgust 
measure ( = .77); shame, small, ashamed were combined into the shame measure ( = .82) 
and contempt, indifference and disregard were combined into the contempt measure ( = 
.63). Embarrassment and guilt were treated as one-item measures.  
Next, we asked participants to describe a situation in the box provided, where they 
have experienced vicarious humiliation (n = 764) because they witnessed or heard about the 
humiliation of somebody with whom they have something in common (e.g., gender, age, 
nationality, etc.) (n = 764). This question was followed by asking participants how often they 
have been experiencing humiliation where they were personally targeted and how often they 
experienced humiliation because they witnessed the humiliation of someone with whom they 
have something in common (i.e., vicarious humiliation). These two items were answered on a 
scale ranging from 0 (never) to 100 (always). Lastly, participants were asked to indicate their 







The data retrieved from the open-end questions (i.e., the definition of humiliation, 
humiliating event, and vicariously humiliating events) were analysed using content analysis 
(by using Atlas.ti, 2019). A coding scheme for each open-ended question was developed by 
creating an initial list of coding categories (including definitions) deductively from previous 
research as outlined in the literature review. The respective coding schemes will be outlined 
in the following result section. 
 
Results 
Before we directly addressed our three aims of Study 1, we explored our participants’ 
understanding of humiliation. More specifically, we explored whether individuals tend to 
define humiliation as an event or as a feeling by assessing the narratives provided by 
participants when they were asked to define humiliation (n = 1048). Three primary categories 
were used: (1) event; (2) feeling and (3) event and feeling. Content was coded as an event 
when humiliation was defined in terms of its causes (e.g., “An event in which someone or a 
group of persons degrade one another in an inhumane manner”), whereas content was coded 
as a feeling when humiliation was defined in terms of its emotional implications (e.g., 
“Feeling embarrassed, or ashamed, or stupid, because of something that you have done”). 
Content was coded as event and feeling when humiliation was defined as being both an event 
and a feeling (e.g., “the worst possible feeling ever and it is degrading someone’s 
humanity”). Sixteen participants’ definitions were not coded with any of the three primary 
codes as none of the features of these codes were evident (e.g., “I would simply say Ubuntu a 
person is a person because of another person”).  
The frequencies of the primary codes, which are depicted in Table 1, suggest that the 




Table 1  
Frequencies of humiliation as event and feeling, Study 1. 
Primary Code Frequencies Cumulative 
percentage  
An event 708 68.60 
A feeling 249 24.13 
An event and a feeling 75 7.27 
 
Commonness of vicarious humiliation 
To explore the commonness of vicarious humiliation we used the narratives provided 
by our participants to our request to describe a situation that made them feel humiliated (n = 
819). As mentioned above, we intentionally did not specify the target of the humiliation. 
Thus, we first assessed the target of the humiliation in the descriptions, in other words, was 
the participant personally targeted or did she or he witness the humiliation of someone else 
(i.e., vicarious humiliation). We coded the target of humiliation as (1) personal humiliation 
and (2) vicarious humiliation. Content was coded as personal humiliation when the described 
situation referred to personal identity, i.e., a personal trait of the humiliated person is 
devalued by the event (e.g., “Often my mother would comment, in front of people, on the size 
of my nose”). On the other hand, content was coded as vicarious humiliation when the 
described situation portrayed the humiliation of another person(s) (e.g., “As a gay man I hear 
a lot of instances where gay men and women are made to feel less than human just because 
of who we love”). Forty-nine participants described an event where they were personally 
humiliated because of their group membership; in other words, the humiliated person’s social 
identity was targeted by the humiliating event (e.g., “A conversation with a male figure where 
he stated that he does not want to discuss rugby with a female”). As the participants were 




person, we decided to code these descriptions as personal humiliation. Furthermore, 37 
participants’ narratives were not included in the analysis as the target of the humiliation was 
not identifiable (e.g., “I’m quite headstrong so I’ll never allow individuals to toy around with 




Frequencies of personal versus vicarious humiliation, Study 1. 




Personal humiliation 771 98.59 
Vicarious humiliation 11 1.41 
 
Apparent from the results is that when participants were asked to think about and 
describe an event where they felt humiliated without prompting the target in the instruction, 
the vast majority referred to interpersonal humiliating events where their personal self was 
targeted. Interestingly, when participants were asked to compare the commonness of personal 
versus vicarious humiliation, they reported to experience vicarious humiliation significantly 
more often (M = 49.60, SE = 28.68) than personal humiliation (M = 40.85, SE = 28.95), 
t(760) = -8.05, p < .001, d = 0.28. This result implies that when participants were asked at 
which level they mostly experience humiliation, they reported vicarious humiliation more 
often than personal humiliation. 
Overall, our results so far imply firstly, that the majority of our participants 
conceptualised humiliation as an event rather than as a feeling; and secondly, that the 
majority of our participants described a humiliating situation as personal humiliation. Yet, 




humiliation, they reported to experience significantly more vicarious humiliation than 
personal humiliation. 
 
Situational determinants of humiliation 
To explore the situational determinants of personal and vicarious humiliation, two 
kinds of narratives were considered. Firstly, the descriptions of a humiliating situation 
whereby only the descriptions coded as personal humiliation were considered for further 
analysis (n = 771) (see Table 2). The second kind of narratives refer to the descriptions given 
by participants when they were asked to describe a vicariously humiliating event (n = 764). 
These two sources allowed us to compare the situational determinants used to describe 
personally and vicariously humiliating events, which we assumed would not differ, except for 
visual exposure. More specifically, we assumed that the presence of others will be more 
prevalent in personally humiliating events (i.e., more frequently mentioned) than in 
vicariously humiliating events as the audience and the person who feels humiliated on behalf 
of the other are the same person(s). 
Five sub-codes were distinguished for situational determinants which correspond to 
the conceptualisations of humiliating events (Klein, 1991; Lazare, 1987): (1) attack (e.g., 
ridicule, scorn, insult, bullying, reprimand, criticise, assault, being laughed at), (2) reduced in 
size (e.g., disrespect, lowered pride and self-esteem, lowered dignity and status, belittlement, 
dishonoured, made worthless or insignificant, stigmatisation, discredit, devalue, name 
calling), (3) social rejection and exclusion (e.g., ostracism, dehumanisation, discrimination, 
discounted, cheated on, betrayal), (4) being made or found deficient (e.g., failure, deficiency), 
and (5) visual exposure (e.g., in front of others, exposure, privacy or secrets are revealed). In 
the descriptions of personally humiliating events, the content of 24 participants was not 




personal to discuss”; “I don’t recall a time where I can honestly say I felt humiliated”), while 
in the descriptions of vicarious humiliation, the content of 104 participants was not coded as, 
once more, none of the features of the five determinants were mentioned (e.g., “I cannot 
recall an incident where I could relate to someone else being humiliated”). Twenty 
participants described a personally humiliating event, instead of a vicariously humiliating 
event and were therefore, not included in the analysis. As each description could be 
characterised by more than one of the situational determinants, the coding strategy allowed 
again that each separate description could be coded with more than one of the five codes.  
Content was coded as attack when an event (irrespective of whether it was a 
personally or a vicariously humiliating event) was described as a discrepancy between how 
the humiliated person is treated by another person and how she or he expects to be treated. 
This included any event of ridicule, scorn, being laughed at, insult, bullying, being 
reprimanded, criticism, harassment and assault such as rape (e.g., “when a person is making 
jokes about me or when a person criticise what I say and do”). Content was coded as reduced 
in size when the situational determinants of the event referred to any form of being lowered 
or downgraded (i.e., being reduced in size); in other words, there was a discrepancy in 
position (or status) that the person was placed in by the humiliator and the position that she or 
he perceived to hold. These included events where the humiliated person was disrespected, 
had her or his pride and self-esteem lowered, dignity was violated, dishonored, 
‘badmouthed’, discredited, devalued and/or derogatory names were used (e.g., “when my 
high school teacher called me stupid just because I was not good with mathematics”). 
Content was coded as social rejection and exclusion when the participant described an event 
where she or he was not included in a group or was rejected by another person. This included 
any situation of discrimination, being treated differently, not being considered, being 




lied to (e.g., “Rejection and a walk over like a door mat, being told I am not wanted”). 
Content was coded as being made or found deficient when the event described an inadequacy 
or a shortcoming of the humiliated person in a certain domain such as failing a test, losing a 
job, not being able to answer a question, failed bodily function (e.g., urinating on oneself) or 
falling down (e.g., “When I thought I knew the answer, but then completely gave the wrong 
answer”). Lastly, content was coded as visual exposure when others witnessed the 
humiliating event or had the potential of finding out about the humiliation. This included any 
situation described as happening in front of others, publicly, on social media, or situations 
where the person felt exposed as something was revealed about her or him that nobody 
should know about (e.g., “When in front of people someone singles you out and talks about 
your personal life”). Table 3 reports on the frequencies of the five situational determinants as 
described by the participants for personally and vicariously humiliating events. 
 
Table 3 
Frequencies of situational determinants of personal versus vicarious humiliation, Study 1. 
 Personal humiliation Vicarious humiliation 




Attack 277 24 253 32.44 
Reduced in size 115 9.97 208 26.67 
Social rejection and 
exclusion 
145 12.56 133  17.05 
Being found or made 
deficient 
267 23.14 58  7.44 
Visual exposure 350 30.33 128 16.41 
 
The frequencies imply that our participants’ descriptions of both personally and 




humiliation. However, some determinants played a more substantial role in personally 
humiliating events and others more in the vicariously humiliating events. As we assumed, 
personally humiliating events were more often characterised by the presence of an audience 
(i.e., visual exposure) than vicariously humiliating events. Being found or made deficient was 
more important in personally humiliating events, while being reduced in size was more 
important in vicariously humiliating events (see Table 3).  
 
Emotional blends of humiliation 
To explore whether participants experience humiliation as emotional blend, two kinds 
of data were analysed. The first kind of data refers to the definitions of humiliation that were 
coded as a feeling or as an event and feeling (n = 324) (see Table 1). The second kind refers 
to the measurements of emotions that were presented to participants (n = 813). 
We created sub-codes under the primary codes feeling and event and feeling to 
determine whether or not participants refer to other emotions (i.e., emotional blends) when 
they describe humiliation as a feeling. The following sub-codes were created: (1) a unique 
feeling if participants referred to humiliation as a distinctive feeling where no mention is 
made of any other emotion (e.g., “A state of feeling that attacks one’s character negatively”); 
and (2) as a blended emotion if participants referred to other emotions (e.g., “Strong feelings 
of embarrassment”). Further sub-codes were introduced under the category of blended 
emotions: (2.1) embarrassment, (2.2) shame, (2.3) guilt, (2.4) anger, (2.5) contempt, and (2.6) 










Unique feeling 79 24.38 
Blended feeling 245 75.62 
Sub-codes of blended feeling    
Embarrassment  187 66.55 
Shame  87 30.96 
Guilt 3 1.07 
Anger 4 1.42 
Contempt 0 0 
Disgust 0 0 
Note. Because participants named multiple blended emotions, the sum of the frequency of 
sub-codes for blended emotions differs from the frequency of blended emotions as reported 
in the upper part of the table. 
 
Considering the results depicted in Table 4, it is evident that the majority of 
participants, who described humiliation as a feeling, described it as a blended emotion. 
Furthermore, the majority of participants who defined humiliation as blended emotion 
referred to the feelings of embarrassment, followed by shame. Interestingly, the feelings of 
guilt and anger were rarely used, and the feelings of contempt and disgust were not used at all 
to describe humiliation as blended emotion. 
Figure 2 shows the means of the measure of emotions as reported by the participants 
(i.e., the list of emotions where participants indicated how likely they were to also feel any of 




pattern to the previous findings as embarrassment was the emotion that was most strongly felt 
by our participants as an accommodating emotion, followed by shame. Likewise, the 
emotions of guilt and contempt were reported as less relevant. Results of the repeated- 
measures ANOVA, F(3.60, 2925.07) = 301.78, p < .001, ƞp
2
= .27, and the Bonferroni post 
hoc test revealed significant differences between all emotions (ps < .001), except between the 
feelings of contempt and guilt (p = .32). These results imply that participants reported 
significantly stronger embarrassment (M = 4.10, SD = 1.07) as blended emotion followed by 
shame (M = 3.56, SD = 1.12), anger (M = 3.30, SD = 1.05), disgust (M = 3.10, SD = 1.07), 
contempt (M = 2.76, SD = 0.97) and guilt (M = 2.63, SD = 1.40). 
  
 
Figure 2. Means and error bars (95% confidence interval) of blended emotions, Study 1. 
 
Discussion  
Study 1 focused on people’s understandings of humiliation and their experiences with 
this emotion. More specifically, the study first aimed at exploring how often individuals 




experience it on a personal level (i.e., the commonness of humiliation). The second aim of 
Study 1 was to explore the situational determinants of humiliation and whether they differed 
in personally versus vicariously humiliating events. Lastly, the study aimed at exploring 
whether humiliation as a feeling is experienced as a blended emotion, as suggested by 
previous research (Elison & Harter, 2007; Jonas et al., 2014; Klein, 1991), or rather as an 
emotion on its own.  
Our results firstly imply that the majority of our participants conceptualised 
humiliation in terms of its causes (i.e., as an event) rather than its emotional implications (i.e., 
as feeling). Furthermore, the majority of our participants conceptualised humiliation as 
personal humiliation. Only when we asked whether they experience more often personal 
relative to vicarious humiliation, did participants report vicarious humiliation as a more 
common experience relative to personal humiliation. One reason for these seemingly 
contradicting results might be that participants tended to conceptualise humiliation by default 
as personal humiliation. They only differentiated between personal and vicarious humiliation, 
after they were prompted to do so.  
In line with our proposed assumption, participants’ descriptions of personally and 
vicariously humiliating events referred to the proposed situational determinants of being 
attacked, being reduced in size, social rejection and exclusion, being found or made deficient 
and visual exposure. Also, in line with our assumption, the presence of an audience (i.e., 
visual exposure) played a more substantial role in personally humiliating events compared to 
vicariously humiliating events. An interesting finding was that participants more frequently 
reported to be reduced in size when they were vicariously targeted, whereas being found or 
made deficient was more frequently reported as a situational determinant for personally 
humiliating events. However, the finding might not be surprising if we take the current 




status differences are discussed with regard to the persisting inequalities in household 
incomes, which are substantially lower for black South Africans relative to white South 
Africans (Maluleke, 2019), and the still unresolved educational inequality affects black South 
Africans and white South Africans differently (Roodt, 2018). Although both inequalities are 
caused by structural barriers, it seems that the associated beliefs about these inequalities 
differ in that status inequality (i.e., reduced in size) is perceived as an intergroup 
phenomenon, whereas educational inequality is perceived as an intra-individual phenomenon, 
that is from the perspective of the “ideology of merit” (Piff et al., 2018). The latter refers to 
the dominant belief that people can escape their low social-economic status through 
education, which is propagated as individual rather than collective mobility.  
Our assumption that humiliation is experienced as a blended emotion was supported 
by the results of Study 1. Participants reported in their narratives and in the measures of 
emotions to experience humiliation to be accompanied by the self-focused emotions of 
embarrassment and shame. Interestingly, other-focused emotions such as anger, contempt and 
disgust were less reported to blend with humiliation. The latter might be influenced by the 
fact that the majority of participants defined and conceptualised a humiliating event as 
personal humiliation. Therefore, the results of Study 1 provide first empirical evidence that 
personally humiliating events are more likely to provoke humiliation accompanied by self-
focused emotions as proposed in Hypothesis 2a. 
Although our results provide insights into people’s understanding of and experiences 
with humiliation, Study 1 had various limitations. Firstly, we did neither assess nor control 
for social identity. Therefore, Study 2 tested the effect of ingroup identification on the 
experience of vicarious humiliation by manipulating its salience. Furthermore, Study 1 did 
not assess blended emotions resulting from vicarious humiliation. Thus, to test our 




emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas vicariously humiliating events elicit humiliation 
accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b) requires a more controlled 
methodological design. We, therefore, conducted a range of experimental studies which 
systematically controlled the target of humiliation (personal versus an ingroup member) and 
tested its effects on appraisal processes and emotional responses within different social 
contexts (Studies 3 to 5). 
Although Study 1 provided first empirical evidence that the presence of an audience 
seems to be more important for personal humiliation compared to vicarious humiliation, its 
methodological design did not allow to explore whether the visual exposure of humiliating 
events aggravates the experience of humiliation more in a personally humiliating event than 
in a vicariously humiliating event. In order to overcome this limitation, we systematically 
controlled for visual exposure in personally and vicariously humiliating events and tested its 
effects on appraisals and emotional responses in two experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5). 
Overall, the results of our first study showed that vicarious humiliation is a 
phenomenon that is indeed regularly experienced by individuals, thereby validating the claim 
of the present research that vicarious humiliation is important to be studied. Moreover, the 
results confirm that personally and vicariously humiliating events are characterised by our 
proposed situational determinants and that the presence of others who witness the humiliation 
is more important when individuals are personally targeted. Lastly, our results show that as a 
feeling, humiliation is perceived and experienced to be blended with other emotions. 





We hypothesised that the intensity of the experience of vicarious humiliation depends 
on how much the person who observes another person being humiliated identifies with the 
shared social group. More precisely, we hypothesised that after witnessing an ingroup 
member being devalued by member(s) of an outgroup highly identified ingroup members will 
experience a stronger feeling of humiliation compared to low identified ingroup members 
(Hypothesis 1). We tested our hypothesis experimentally using a within-subjects factorial 
design by manipulating ingroup identification (i.e., high identification vs. low identification) 
and assessing its effect on appraisals and the feeling of humiliation. Every participant was 
exposed to both the high ingroup identification and the low ingroup identification conditions. 
The order of the experimental conditions was counterbalanced.  
 
Sample 
One hundred and seventy-five participants completed Study 2. The age of participants 
ranged from 19 to 75 years (Mage = 31.65, SD = 9.45, missing: 6). Seventy-one participants 
indicated that they are male, and 104 participants indicated that they are female. One hundred 
and sixty-one participants indicated being South African, while 14 participants indicated 
belonging to other nationalities.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that we live in a society where sharing our stories and 
experiences have become easier than ever with technologies such as social media, and that 
some stories and experiences are more important to us than others. They were further 
informed that the study is interested in understanding how we perceive and experience these 




Firstly, participants were asked to complete demographic questions related to their 
gender, age and nationality. Participants were then randomly allocated to either the high 
ingroup identification condition followed by the low ingroup identification condition, or to 
the low ingroup identification condition followed by the high ingroup identification 
condition. 
Participants were provided with a list of five social groups (South Africans, gender, 
University of South Africa students, their neighbourhood, taxpayers). In the high ingroup 
identification condition participants had to select the social group with whom they strongly 
identify, and in the low ingroup identification condition they selected the group with whom 
they least identify. More specifically, in the high ingroup identification condition, 
participants were informed that we belong to different social categories (e.g., nationality, 
university etc.) and that some of these social categories give us meaning, provoke positive 
emotions and they give us a sense of belonging, while others do not. Participants were told 
that they will be provided with a list of such social categories and that they had to select one 
of these categories that gives them a sense of belonging, that represents an essential part of 
them and with which they associate positive emotions such as being proud. In the low 
ingroup identification condition, participants were presented with similar information except 
that they were reminded that some social categories do not really give us meaning, they do 
not provoke positive emotions, and they do not give us a sense of belonging. Participants 
were asked to select a social category that is not important or significant to them.  
In both conditions, participants were then asked how much they identify with the 
group that they selected. Following this, participants were informed that we are also 
interested in finding out how much more [less] they identify with the selected social category 





In order to further strengthen [weaken] ingroup identification, participants were 
reminded that being South African/female/male/a Unisa student/a resident from my 
neighbourhood/a taxpayer is [not] an important part of how they see themselves. After this 
reminder, they were asked to take a minute and name three reasons why their selected social 
category makes them feel good [does not make them feel good]. 
After participants completed the above-mentioned questions, they were provided with 
a bogus Facebook post exposing them to a vicariously humiliating event. Irrespective of 
whether participants were in the low or the high ingroup identification condition, but 
depending on which social category they selected, they were asked to read the Facebook post 
outlining an interaction between an ingroup member and outgroup members. It is important 
to note, that if participants selected gender as social category they do [not] identify with, they 
were allocated to the gender group that they indicated to belong to when we assessed the 
demographic information.  
Each Facebook post referred to an ingroup member sharing a post commenting on an 
issue related to the selected category. For instance, the South African ingroup member shared 
a post related to the possible downgrading of South Africa to Junk Status; the female ingroup 
member, as well as the male ingroup member, posted posts commenting on possible 
strategies to stop gender-based violence; the Unisa student shared a post commenting on 
possible ideas on how to improve the study conditions of students; the resident from the 
neighbourhood shared a post related to possible ideas on improving the safety in the 
neighbourhood; and the taxpayer shared a post on possible ideas on how to improve the 
transparency of the national tax office (see Annexure 1). 
Each Facebook post included negative comments made by outgroup members (see 
Annexure 1). In this way our participants witnessed the humiliation of an ingroup member by 




characterised by the situational determinants of humiliation (i.e., being attacked, being 
reduced in size, social rejection and exclusion, being made or found deficient). After the 
manipulations, participants were asked to complete the outcome measurements (i.e., 
appraisals of humiliation and humiliation).  
 
Measurements 
The measures were presented in the order as outlined below. All items of the 
respective measures were randomly presented to the participants. If not differently stated, the 
measures were assessed using an answering format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
 
Appraisals of humiliation 
The first measure presented after each manipulation was appraisals of humiliation. 
The instruction and the two items for the appraisal of internalisation (adapted from Fernández 
et al., 2018) were as follows: Now you will be presented with a range of statements that 
address the interaction on Facebook. Think about the post again, the comments made by the 
others and the thoughts and feelings you had while reading these comments. Please indicate 
how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: “The idea I have of myself is 
negatively affected” and “My self-esteem is reduced” (r low ingroup identification = .79, p < .001; r 
high ingroup identification = .70, p < .001). The following instruction was provided for the appraisal 
of injustice (adapted from Fernández et al., 2018). The comments made by the others were: 
“unjust”, “unethical”, “unfair”, and “biased” (αlow ingroup identification = .92; αhigh ingroup identification = 
.89). For the appraisal of powerlessness (adapted from Ellsworth & Smith, 1988), the 
participants were instructed as follows: The comments made by the others made me feel: “out 




The appraisal of external and internal blame was measured by the following instruction and 
items: The comments made by the others made me blame, “myself” and “someone else” 
(adapted from Ellsworth & Smith, 1988).  
 
Humiliation 
Humiliation was measured by the following instruction and items: To what extent do 
you feel each of the following: “insulted”, “demeaned”, “humiliated”, “belittled” and 
“degraded” (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). The answering format ranged from 1 (not at all) to 
5 (a great deal). These five items formed reliable scales for participants in the low and the 
high ingroup identification conditions (αlow ingroup identification = .95; αhigh ingroup identification = .95). 
 
Manipulation check measures 
For the first manipulation check measure participants had to indicate how much they 
identify with their selected category using the one-item approach (Postmes et al., 2013): “I 
identify with South Africans/females/males/Unisa students/residents from my 
neighbourhood/tax-payers”. 
How much more [less] participants identified with their selected group relative to the 
not selected categories, were used as a second manipulation check measure. Instructions for 
this measure were: Please select the most appropriate answer ranging from 1 (about the 
same) to 5 (very much more [less]) indicating how much more [less] you identify with your 
selected social category in comparison to each of the other four social categories. The 
answers were combined for the high ingroup identification condition (i.e., positive 









To check whether the ingroup identification manipulation was successful, scores on 
the first manipulation check item (“I identify with [selected category]”; Postmes et al., 2013) 
were compared for the two identification conditions. The result of the paired samples t-test 
showed that being in the high ingroup identification condition (M = 4.29, SD = 0.90) elicited 
significantly stronger ingroup identification with the selected group than being in the low 
ingroup identification condition (M = 3.01, SD = 1.31; t(171) = 11.46, p < .001, d = .87). 
We further assessed the combined answers to the question “how much more [less] 
they identified with their selected group compared to the other four categories”, for each 
identification condition. First, a one sample t-test was conducted to determine if participants 
in the high ingroup identification condition identified stronger with their selected group 
relative to other non-selected groups by comparing the mean scores with the reference score 
(1) that indicated no identification difference (i.e., about the same). Results show that the 
mean score (M = 2.73; SD = 1.13) differed significantly from the reference score (1), t(174) = 
20.21, p < .001, indicating that overall our participants identified significantly more with their 
selected group compared to the other categories they did not select. The result of the one 
sample t-test determining whether participants in the low ingroup identification condition 
identified less with the selected group relative to the other (non-selective groups) revealed a 
significant difference between the mean score (M = 2.76; SD = 1.22) and the reference score 
(1), t(174) = 19.18, p < .001, implying that our participants identified significantly less with 
their selected group compared to the other categories that they did not select.  
Overall, the results of our two manipulation checks imply that the manipulation of 




stronger with the selected group in the high ingroup identification condition than with the 
selected group in the low ingroup identification condition. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 reports the means, standard deviations and the inter-correlations of the 
principal variables for the high ingroup identification and the low ingroup identification 
conditions, separately. Results of the inter-correlations indicate that the feeling of humiliation 
correlated moderately and strongly with the appraisals of internalisation, injustice and 
powerlessness, respectively, when participants completed these measures in the high ingroup 
identification condition. Although humiliation correlated strongly with internalisation and 
powerlessness when participants completed these measures in the low ingroup identification 
condition, the appraisal of injustice did not correlate statistically significantly with 
humiliation. Blaming oneself (i.e., internal blame) for the humiliating event also moderately 
correlated with humiliation in the low ingroup identification condition, while internal blame 
correlated weakly with humiliation in the high ingroup identification condition. Interestingly, 
blaming others for the humiliating event correlated weakly, although significantly, with 





Means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the principal variables for high ingroup 
identification and low ingroup identification conditions, Study 2 (N = 175).  
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Low ingroup 
identification 
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4 External blame .12 -.10 .27
***
 --- .14 .22
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Note. ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients for high ingroup 
identification condition are reported in the upper right part of the table and for low ingroup 
identification condition in the lower left part of the table. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
To test Hypothesis 1 that after witnessing an ingroup member being devalued by 
member(s) of an outgroup highly identified ingroup members experience a stronger feeling of 
humiliation when compared to low identified ingroup members, we conducted firstly, a 
paired samples t-test to compare the mean scores of humiliation when participants were in the 




condition. The results showed that although the mean scores on humiliation pointed to the 
expected direction, the difference between high ingroup identification condition (M = 2.29, 
SD = 1.34) and low ingroup identification condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.30; t(174) = -1.50, p = 
.14, d = .11, did not reach statistical significance. 
As the manipulation of high ingroup identification and low ingroup identification 
were counterbalanced, a mixed between-within subject analysis of variance was conducted to 
compare humiliation depending on ingroup identification and the order of conditions. The 
order of conditions was entered as a dummy variable (receiving the low ingroup 
identification manipulation first was coded as 0 and receiving the high ingroup identification 
manipulation first was coded as 1). The results showed neither a significant main effect of 
ingroup identification conditions, F(1, 173) = 1.35, p = .25, ƞp
2
= .01, nor of the order of 
conditions, F(1, 173) = 0.15, p = .70, ƞp
2
= .00, on humiliation. However, the two-way 
interaction between ingroup identification conditions and the order of conditions was 
statistically significant, F(1, 173) = 9.15, p < .01, ƞp
2
= .05. This interaction effect indicates 
that the effect of ingroup identification on the feelings of humiliation depended on whether 
participants received the low or the high ingroup identification manipulation first. The 
interaction graph in Figure 3 suggests that participants felt more humiliated in the high 
ingroup identification condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.28) than in the low ingroup identification 
condition (M = 2.10, SD = 1.41) when they received the high ingroup identification 
manipulation first. When they received the low ingroup identification manipulation first, they 
felt slightly more humiliated in the low ingroup identification condition (M = 2.27, SD = 
1.27) than in the high ingroup identification condition (M = 2.07, SD = 1.32). 
Overall, our results suggest that high identifiers felt more humiliated than low 




that this relationship was only valid if participants received the high ingroup identification 
manipulation first.   
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction graph between the feelings of humiliation in the experimental 
conditions (low vs. high ingroup identification) and the order in which the manipulations 
were presented, Study 2. 
 
We further conducted paired-samples t-tests comparing the appraisals of humiliation 
(i.e., internalisation, injustice, powerlessness, external and internal blame) for the high 
ingroup identification and the low ingroup identification conditions. The results showed that 
participants appraised the event as significantly more unjust (M = 3.90, SD = 1.12) in the 
high ingroup identification condition than in the low ingroup identification condition, (M = 
3.47, SD = 1.22; t(174) = -3.88, p < .001, d = -0.29). There were, however, no significant 
differences between any of the other appraisals, t(174)internalisation = 1.60, pinternalisation = .11, 
dinternalisation = 0.12; t(174)powerlessness = -0.27, ppowerlessness = .79, dpowerlessness = -0.02; t(174)external 
= 0.84, pexternal = .40, dexternal = 0.06; t(174)internal = 1.75, pinternal = .08, dinternal = 0.13. To check 













Low ingroup identification humiliation




within subject analysis of variance to compare scores on each appraisal at low ingroup 
identification and high ingroup identification, entering the order of conditions as a between-
subjects factor. Results showed that there were no significant effects of the interaction 
between the ingroup identification conditions and the order of the conditions on any of the 
appraisals, Finternalisation(1, 173) = 1.71, pinternalisation = .19, ƞp
2
 internalisation= .01; Finjustice(1, 173) = 
1.80, pinjustice = .18, ƞp
2
 injustice= .01; Fpowerlessness(1, 173) = 0.18, ppowerlessness = .67, ƞp
2
 
powerlessness= .00; Fexternal(1, 173) = 0.85, pexternal = .36, ƞp
2
 external = .01; Finternal (1, 173) = 0.30, 
pinternal = .59, ƞp
2
 internal = .00. 
Overall, our results indicate that perceiving the vicariously humiliating event as unjust 
is influenced by the degree to which participants identify with the group they share with the 
target of the humiliation. How much participants internalised the event, how powerless they 
perceived themselves and whether they blamed others or themselves for the event, did not 
differ depending on participants’ degree of identification with the shared group. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of Study 2 was to test whether individuals who highly identify with the 
ingroup would feel more humiliated when they witness (or read about) the humiliation of an 
ingroup member compared to individuals who do not highly identify with the ingroup. 
According to the appraisal theories of emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; 
Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1997), how we appraise the event influences the 
emotional responses. Therefore, we did not only test participants’ level of humiliation, but 
also the levels of appraisals. We used a within-subjects design where we manipulated 
participants’ level of ingroup identification (low versus high ingroup identification). As we 
assumed that the participants’ responses might be affected by the order in which they 




Results supported our Hypothesis 1 that high identifiers feel more humiliated than 
low identifiers when witnessing (or reading about) the humiliation of an ingroup member. 
However, this effect reached only statistical significance when the order in which the 
manipulations were presented was controlled for. We speculate that the reason for the order 
effect might be that having as reference an ingroup that is highly significant for oneself 
relative to an ingroup that is less significant for oneself creates more psychological distance 
between these two groups than having as reference an ingroup that is less significant for 
oneself relative to an ingroup that is highly significant for oneself.  
We were also interested in whether participants appraised the humiliating event 
differently depending on whether they identified strongly or weakly with the social group that 
she or he shared with the humiliated person. Results showed that participants perceived the 
humiliating event as significantly more unjust when they highly identified with the ingroup. 
How much they internalised, how powerless they perceived themselves and whether they 
blamed the humiliating event internally or externally, was not conditional on the degree of 
ingroup identification.  
The result that the appraisal of injustice is stronger when an ingroup is more 
significant to the vicariously humiliated person indicates that perceiving the devaluation of an 
ingroup member as unjust is an appraisal that plays an important role in intergroup situations. 
As mentioned elsewhere, the appraisal of injustice is associated with the other-focused 
emotions of anger, contempt and disgust, which are emotions that are regularly experienced 
in intergroup situations (Gordijn et al., 2006; Reicher et al., 2016; Tagar et al., 2011; Tausch 
et al., 2011; Taylor, 2007; Veldhuis et al., 2014; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Therefore, the 
importance of the appraisal of injustice in intergroup devaluing events might explain why 
these other-focused emotions are often associated with intergroup events. To assess whether 




where a person highly identifies with a social group and where she or he is vicariously 
humiliated, we conducted follow-up studies (Studies 3 to 5) where we experimentally 
manipulated personal and vicarious humiliation and assessed its effects on the consequent 
appraisals and emotions. More specifically, following the intergroup emotion theory (Smith 
et al., 2007), we argued that whether a person is personally humiliated or vicariously 
humiliated, will lead to different appraisals of humiliation and consequently to different 




The overall aim of Study 3 was to test the hypotheses that a personally humiliating 
event is likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., 
internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-
focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas a humiliating event where the social self is 
targeted (i.e., vicarious humiliation) is likely to be appraised as injustice and externally 
blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions 
(Hypothesis 2b). Moreover, we tested Hypothesis 3 stating that if a situational determinant is 
appraised as internal blame then the emotional responses of shame, embarrasment and/or 
guilt will be elicited but not as blends of humiliation. 
Study 3 applied a between-subjects design with one factor (target of humiliation) 
manipulated on two levels (personal vs. vicarious humiliation). Target of humiliation was 
manipulated using the personal recall approach. Participants were randomly allocated to 
either the condition where they were asked to recall and describe situations where they were 




situations where they witnessed the humiliation of someone else with whom they shared a 
group membership. The outcome variables were appraisals and emotional responses.  
 
Sample 
Seventy-four participants completed all measurements. The age of participants ranged 
from 18 to 49 years (Mage = 30.43, SD = 6.69, missing: 6). Forty-eight participants indicated 
that they are male, and 26 participants indicated that they are female. None of the participants 
identified the true aim of the study and were therefore all included in the data analyses.  
 
Procedure 
In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that our emotions, 
thoughts and behaviours are often influenced by our perceptions, beliefs, memories and 
interactions with others, and that the study is interested in how interactions with others 
influence our emotions. To manipulate the target of humiliation, we asked participants to 
recall either a personally humiliating event or a vicariously humiliating event. This 
manipulation is based on the established Relived-Emotion Task, which has been found to 
manipulate emotional experiences and elicit emotion-typical subjective feelings successfully 
(Ekman et al., 1983). 
After participants were randomly allocated to one of the two target of humiliation 
conditions, we aimed to increase the salience of either their personal identity or social 
identity. In the personal humiliation condition the instruction was as follows: As we are part 
of various social groups that are related to our gender, age, race, occupations, political 
orientation, party affiliations, university etc; we are mostly unique human beings with 




– so are you. We would like to ask you to take a minute and recall an incident where you 
were personally insulted by somebody else. Could you briefly describe the insult?  
The instruction in the vicarious humiliation condition was: We are all part of various 
social groups that are related to our gender, age, race, occupations, political orientation, 
party affiliations, university. etc. These social groups are sometimes more or less important 
to us and so are the people who are also part of these social groups. In some situations, we 
feel for somebody, not because we know the person very well, but because we share 
something with the person – for instance attending the same university or sharing the same 
gender. We would like to ask you to take a minute and recall an incident you heard about or 
witnessed where a person you did not personally know but with whom you have something in 
common (e.g., gender, university etc.) was insulted by someone else. Could you please 
describe the insult? 
After participants recalled a personally or vicariously humiliating event, they were 
asked to complete the measurements, followed by a suspicion check (i.e., where they were 
asked to recall the aim of this study as it was described in the introduction) and demographic 
questions (i.e., gender and age). 
 
Measurements  
The following measurements were presented to participants in the same order as 
outlined below. All items of the respective measures were randomly presented to the 
participants. If not differently stated, participants were requested to indicate their agreement 







Appraisals of humiliation 
The appraisals of humiliation were assessed as in Study 2: appraisal of internalisation 
(r = .75, p < .001), appraisal of injustice (α = .87) and appraisal of powerlessness (α = .92). 
The appraisals of external and internal blame were measured by the same single items as in 
Study 2. However, the instructions for the appraisal measures differed as they referred to the 
self-reported humiliating incidents.  
 
Emotions 
Emotions were measured by asking participants to what extent they feel each of the 
following emotions right now on an answer format ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great 
deal): humiliation, shame, embarrassment, guilt, anger, contempt and disgust. Shame, 
embarrassment and guilt were combined into the self-focused emotions measure (α = .87), 
and anger, contempt and disgust were combined into other-focused emotions measure (α = 
.79).  
 
Manipulation check measures 
Two items served as manipulation check measures: “I was personally insulted” and “I 





Participants in the personal humiliation condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.35) scored 
statistically significantly higher on the personal humiliation manipulation check (“I was 




2.84, SD = 1.71), t(72) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.88. Although the means of the vicarious 
humiliation manipulation check item (“I witnessed the insult”) pointed to the expected 
direction, the difference between vicarious humiliation (M = 3.88, SD = 1.56) and personal 
humiliation conditions (M = 3.38, SD = 1.51) did not reach statistical significance, t(72) = -
1.37, p = .17. d = 0.33). As intended, participants in the personal humiliation condition 
experienced their recalled personal humiliation as personally insulting; whereas participants 
who recalled a vicariously humiliating event did not experience the event as a personal insult. 
However, participants in the personal humiliation condition seemed to be less able to 
differentiate between being the target of humiliation from being the witness of humiliation 
compared to participants in the vicarious humiliation condition.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations are reported 
in Table 6 for each condition, separately. Overall, results of the inter-correlations of the 
principal variables imply that the feeling of humiliation correlated moderately and strongly 
with self-focused and other-focused emotions which was expected as these emotions are 
considered as emotional blends. Moreover, the appraisals of internalisation, powerlessness 
and injustice correlated strongly and moderately with humiliation, respectively, independent 
from the experimental conditions. However, the appraisal injustice correlated only with 
other-focused emotions but not with self-focused emotions, whereas internalisation and 
powerlessness correlated with both self-focused and other-focused emotions independent 
from the experimental conditions. Interestingly, no correlations were found for external 
blame and any emotions. However, as expected, internal blame correlated strongly with self-




Table 6  
The means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the principal 
variables for personal and vicarious humiliation conditions, Study 3. 
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Note. ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients for personal 
humiliation condition are reported in the upper right part of the table and for vicarious 







Hypotheses testing  
To test our hypotheses, that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as 
internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), 
which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a); 
whereas a vicariously humiliating event is likely to be appraised as unjust and externally 
blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions 
(Hypothesis 2b), and that a humiliating event appraised as internal blame results in emotional 
responses of shame, embarrasment and/or guilt that are not blended with the feeling of 
humiliation (Hypothesis 3), we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation 
(personal humiliation coded as 0 and vicarious humiliation coded as 1) on self-focused 
emotions and other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation in two separate 
analyses using SPSS PROCESS Macro (#Model 80, Hayes, 2018) (see Figure 4). In both 





Figure 4. Conceptual diagram of the model testing for the indirect effects of target of 
humiliation on the emotions through appraisals and through humiliation, Study 3. 
 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions 
Firstly, we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused 
emotions through appraisals and through humiliation (see Figure 4), while including other-
focused emotions as a covariate. The overall model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .6750, F 
(8, 65) = 16.88, p < .001. Table 7 reports the direct and indirect effects of target of 
humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and self-focused emotions. The analyses of the direct 
effects revealed that target of humiliation only affected marginally external and internal 
blame as appraisals but neither injustice and powerlessness as appraisals, nor humiliation and 
self-focused emotions. Self-focused emotions were only directly affected by humiliation and 




The analyses of the indirect effects revealed only one significant negative indirect 
effect, namely from target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame
1
. 
More specifically, the result implies that participants in the personal humiliation condition 
were more likely to appraise the event as one’s own fault (i.e., internal blame) which in turn 
elicited self-focused emotions without the feeling of humiliation (Hypothesis 3). All other 
indirect effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table 7). Thus, our results did not 
support our hypothesis that a personally humiliating event is likely to be appraised as 
something to be internalised and uncontrollable (i.e., internalisation and powerlessness), 
which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a). 
However, they support our Hypothesis 3 that a humiliating event appraised as one’s own fault 
(i.e., internal blame) elicits self-focused emotions without being accompanied by the feeling 




Direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through 
appraisals and humiliation, Study 3. 
Effects on appraisals  
Internalisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.400 0.420 3.337 < .01 0.700 2.100 
Target of humiliation 
-0.206 0.305 -0.675 .50 -0.715 0.303 
Other-focused emotions 
0.553 0.121 4.571 < .001 0.351 0.754 
                                                 
1
 The negative indirect effect results from how we coded the target of humiliation conditions: personal 





 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.479 0.260 9.524 < .001 2.046 2.913 
Target of humiliation 
-0.121 0.190 -0.641 .52 -0.437 0.195 
Other-focused emotions 
0.548 0.075 7.29 < .001 0.423 0.673 
Powerlessness 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.473 0.425 3.470 < .01 0.766 2.181 
Target of humiliation 
-0.036 0.309 -0.115 .909 -0.551 0.480 
Other-focused emotions 
0.506 0.123 4.131 < .01 0.302 0.711 
External blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.691 0.450 3.755 < .01 0.941 2.442 
Target of humiliation 
0.575 0.328 1.753 .08 0.028 1.122 
Other-focused emotions 
0.265 0.1300 2.041 .05 0.050 0.482 
Internal blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.121 0.504 4.206 < .001 1.281 2.961 
Target of humiliation 
-0.707 0.367 -1.926 .06 -1.320 -0.095 
Other-focused emotions 
0.250 0.146 1.713 .09 0.007 0.492 
Effects on humiliation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.430 0.640 -0.670 .51 -1.500 0.639 
Target of humiliation 





0.322 0.112 2.872 < .01 1.135 0.510 
Injustice 
0.128 0.172 0.746 .46 -0.158 0.414 
Powerlessness 
0.074 0.123 0.603 .55 -0.131 0.279 
External blame 
0.029 0.094 0.309 .76 -0.129 0.186 
Internal blame 
0.188 0.107 1.755 .08 0.009 0.367 
Other-focused emotions 
0.413 0.157 2.636 .01 0.152 0.674 
Effects on self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.182 0.453 0.402 .69 -0.574 0.939 
Target of humiliation 
-0.190 0.198 -0.958 .34 -0.520 0.141 
Internalisation 
0.071 0.084 0.845 .40 -0.069 0.211 
Injustice 
-0.045 0.123 0.373 .71 -0.249 0.158 
Powerlessness 
0.132 0.087 1.521 .13 -0.013 0.277 
External blame 
-0.047 0.067 -0.709 .48 -0.158 0.064 
Internal blame 
0.273 0.077 3.533 < .01 0.144 0.403 
Humiliation 
0.281 0.087 3.226 < .01 0.135 0.426 
Other-focused emotions 
0.145 0.116 1.250 .22 -0.049 0.339 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Target*Internalisation -0.015 0.039 -0.086 0.037 
Target*Injustice 0.006 0.027 -0.032 0.053 
Target*Powerlessness -0.005 0.048 -0.083 0.073 
Target*External blame -0.027 0.063 -0.147 0.058 
Target*Internal blame -0.193 0.133 -0.448 -0.016 
Target*Humiliation -0.123 0.089 -0.276 0.006 
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation -0.019 0.033 -0.078 0.024 




Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation -0.001 0.016 -0.026 0.024 
Target*External 
blame*Humiliation 
0.005 0.020 -0.030 0.034 
Target*Internal 
blame*Humiliation 
-0.037 0.036 -0.108 0.003 
 
 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions 
In the second model, we assessed the indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-
focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation, while controlling for self-
focused emotions. Similar to the previous analysis, the model was statistically significant, R
2
 
= .6403, F (8. 65) = 14.47, p < .001. The direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on 
appraisals, humiliation and other-focused emotions are reported in Table 8. The analyses of 
the direct effects revealed that target of humiliation only affected significantly the appraisal 
of external blame but neither humiliation nor other-focused emotions. Other-focused 
emotions were affected significantly by the appraisal of injustice and marginally by 
humiliation (see Table 8). 
Our analysis revealed no significant indirect effects of target of humiliation neither on 
humiliation through appraisals nor on other-focused emotions through appraisals and/or 
humiliation (see Table 8). Thus, we were not able to provide any empirical evidence 
supporting our hypothesis that vicariously humiliating events are likely to be appraised as 
something unjust and/or externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied 





Direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through 
appraisals and humiliation, Study 3. 
Effects on appraisals 
Effects on internalisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.303 0.350 3.729 < .01 0.721 1.886 
Target of humiliation 
0.271 0.285 0.949 .35 -0.205 0.747 
Self-focused emotions 
0.680 0.113 6.000 < .001 0.491 0.869 
Effects on injustice 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
3.765 0.305 12.338 < .001 3.256 4.273 
Target of humiliation 
0.113 0.249 0.453 .65 -0.302 0.528 
Self-focused emotions 
0.147 0.100 1.482 .14 -0.018 0.312 
Effects on powerlessness 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.103 0.331 3.331 < .01 0.551 1.654 
Target of humiliation 
0.450 0.270 1.665 .10 -0.000 0.900 
Self-focused emotions 
0.731 0.107 6.807 < .001 0.552 0.909 
Effects on external blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.112 0.414 5.108 < .001 1.423 2.802 
Target of humiliation 
0.723 0.338 2.142 .04 0.161 1.286 
Self-focused emotions 




Effects on internal blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.756 0.355 2.128 .04 0.164 1.348 
Target of humiliation 
-0.264 0.290 -0.910 .37 -0.748 0.220 
Self-focused emotions 
0.811 0.115 7.042 < .001 0.619 1.003 
Effects on humiliation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.773 0.586 -1.320 .19 -1.750 0.204 
Target of humiliation 
-0.198 0.263 -0.754 .45 -0.636 0.240 
Internalisation 
0.268 0.109 2.458 .02 0.086 0.449 
Injustice 
0.316 0.130 2.427 .02 0.099 0.532 
Powerlessness 
0.040 0.117 0.338 .74 -0.156 0.235 
External blame 
0.070 0.089 0.791 .43 -0.078 0.219 
Internal blame 
0.017 0.114 0.149 .88 -0.173 0.207 
Self-focused emotions 
0.567 0.150 3.781 .01 0.317 0.817 
Effects on other-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.964 0.463 -2.080 .04 -1.737 -0.191 
Target of humiliation 
0.343 0.206 1.665 .10 -0.001 0.687 
Internalisation 
0.040 0.089 0.450 .65 -0.108 0.188 
Injustice 
0.586 0.106 5.529 < .001 0.409 0.763 
Powerlessness 
0.137 0.092 1.490 .14 -0.016 0.290 
External blame 
0.066 0.070 0.940 .35 -0.051 0.182 
Internal blame 





0.180 0.096 1.873 .06 0.020 0.341 
Self-focused emotions 
0.162 0.129 1.250 .22 -0.054 0.377 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Target*Internalisation 0.011 0.036 -0.037 0.077 
Target*Injustice 0.066 0.151 -0.165 0.332 
Target*Powerlessness 0.062 0.072 -0.015 0.206 
Target*External blame 0.047 0.060 -0.024 0.162 
Target*Internal blame 0.011 0.040 -0.033 0.091 
Target*Humiliation -0.036 0.059 -0.145 0.041 
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation 0.013 0.019 -0.011 0.047 
Target*Injustice*Humiliation 0.006 0.018 -0.016 0.042 
Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation 0.003 0.016 -0.015 0.032 
Target*External 
blame*Humiliation 
0.009 0.018 -0.012 0.042 
Target*Internal 
blame*Humiliation 




Overall, our results of Study 3 did not support Hypotheses 2a and 2b as there was no 
empirical evidence that personal and vicarious humiliation influenced differently the 
emotional patterns (self-focused versus other-focused emotions) through appraisal processes 
and the feeling of humiliation. Results did, however, support Hypothesis 3 as participants 
who appraised a humiliating event as their fault (i.e., internal blame) experienced self-
focused emotions without necessarily feeling humiliated. More specifically, we found this 
effect for personally humiliating events. 
Apart from the fact that Hypotheses 2a and 2b could not be supported, another 




The possible reasons for the ambiguous results might be that participants in the personal 
humiliation condition experienced difficulties to differentiate between being personally 
humiliated and witnessing a humiliating event. This might be caused by the fact that recalling 
a past event does not only activate memories about the concrete event but also memories on 
how the participants might have dealt with the event. The latter might have increased the 
psychological distance to the event which in turn made the boundaries between being the 
target and being a witness of humiliation less distinct. Another limitation of Study 3 refers to 
the approach we used to increase the salience of either personal or social identity. We aimed 
in our instruction for participants in the personal humiliation condition to increase the 
awareness about their personal identity by contrasting personal with social identity. However, 
we did not control whether they actually thought about themselves as unique persons. Lastly, 
the rather small sample size of Study 3 represents another limitation, which might have 
influenced the statistical analyses as small sample sizes reduce the likelihood to detect 
statistically significant effects (Erdfelder et al., 1996; Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). 
To overcome these limitations, we conducted two follow-up studies (Studies 4 and 5) 
where we re-tested Hypotheses 2a and 2b, and Hypothesis 3 by exposing participants directly 
to different humiliating events (i.e., target of humiliation) by applying a different approach to 
increase the salience of either personal or social identities, by using distinct and different 
intergroup contexts to manipulate vicarious humiliation (Study 4: gender; Study 5: university 
students) and by increasing the sample sizes.  
In the following two studies, we furthermore controlled for the presence of an 
audience by manipulating the visual exposure of personal and vicarious humiliating events 
and assessed its influence on appraisals and emotional patterns. More specifically, we tested 
the hypothesis that the aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in personally 





The aim of Study 4 was to re-test the hypotheses that a personally humiliating event is 
likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and/or as uncontrollable (i.e., 
internalisation and powerlessness), which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by self-
focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas a vicariously humiliating event is likely to be 
appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation 
accompanied by other-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2b). We further tested Hypothesis 3 that 
appraising a humiliating event as internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being 
accompanied by humiliation. Additionally, we assessed the role of visual exposure by testing 
the hypothesis that the aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in personally 
humiliating events compared to vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4).  
Different to Study 3, we used a more direct approach to increase the salience of either 
personal or social identity and participants had to read a bogus Facebook post as a means of 
manipulating humiliation rather than recall their own experiences. A 2 (target of the 
humiliating: personal vs. vicarious) x 3 (visual exposure: laughing vs. silent vs. no audience) 
between-subjects factorial design was adopted. The intergroup context was gender with 
females as the ingroup.  
It was assumed that exposing participants to a scenario where they had to imagine that 
the incident is happening to them personally (i.e., personal humiliation conditions) will be 
experienced as personal humiliation, whereas it was assumed that exposing participants to a 
scenario where they are witness to the humiliation of a fellow ingroup member will be 
experienced as vicarious humiliation (i.e., vicarious humiliation conditions). Furthermore, it 
was assumed that making participants aware of the presence of an audience, whether this 
audience is laughing (or silent instead), or whether no audience is present, will influence 





A total of 359 female participants completed Study 4. The age of participants ranged 
from 19 to 63 years (Mage = 31.00, SD = 9.20, missing: 98). None of the participants 
identified the true aim of the study and were therefore all included in the data analyses.  
 
Procedure 
In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that we live in a 
society where sharing our stories and experiences have become easier than ever with 
technology such as social media. They were furthermore informed that the present study aims 
at understanding how we perceive and experience these stories. After providing consent to 
participate in the study, participants were randomly allocated to one of six experimental 
conditions: (1) personal humiliation and laughing audience, (2) vicarious humiliation and 
laughing audience, (3) personal humiliation and silent audience, (4) vicarious humiliation and 
silent audience, (5) personal humiliation and no salient audience, and (6) vicarious 
humiliation and no salient audience. 
If allocated to the personal humiliation conditions, the participant was first asked to 
think about herself as a unique person and to think what she can do better than others, and 
what makes her different from most of her friends and family. She was furthermore asked to 
name three characteristics that distinguish her from others that are important to her. If 
allocated to the vicarious humiliation conditions, the participant was first asked to think of 
herself as a woman. She was further asked to think about what women can do better than 
men, and what makes women different from men. She was furthermore asked to name three 
characteristics that distinguish women from men. 
Afterwards, participants were asked to read a bogus Facebook post about an incident 




situational determinants of being attacked and being made or found deficient as means of 
devaluating the humiliated person.  
Depending on the experimental conditions, participants were asked to imagine that 
the incident has actually happened to her and that she is the author of the post (personal 
humiliation conditions), or participants were asked to imagine that this happened to another 
woman and that this woman is the author of the post (vicarious humiliation conditions). In all 
six experimental conditions the first part of the Facebook post consisted of the text as 
depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Facebook post used as manipulation in experimental conditions, Study 4. 
 
In the vicarious humiliation conditions, the intergroup context was made salient by 
specifying that “the man (instead of the person) next to me said in a mocking tone”. 
Subsequently, in the laughing audience conditions the following sentence was added at the 
end of the post: “The others started to laugh and nodded their heads in agreement”, while in 




anything and just kept quiet”. In the no audience conditions, no reference was made to others 
that were present at the event.  
 
Measurements 
After exposure to the different experimental conditions, the participants were asked to 
complete the same measurements as in Study 3 using the same answer format: appraisal of 
internalisation (r = .68, p < .01), appraisal of injustice (α  = .84), appraisal of powerlessness 
(α  = .83), self-focused emotions (α = .80) and other-focused emotions (α = .73). Internal and 
external blame were assessed using the same single items as in Study 3. Again, all items of 
the respective measures were randomly presented to the participants. The measures were 
followed by a suspicion check (i.e., they asked to recall the aim of this study as it was 
described in the introduction) and demographic questions (i.e., gender and age). 
 
Manipulation check measures 
The following manipulation check items measured target of humiliation: “You were 
degraded personally in the event” and “Women were degraded in the event”, and visual 
exposure: “The others who witnessed the event, were laughing” and “The others who 





In a first step, we assessed the manipulations of the target of humiliation on the 
manipulation check items “You were degraded personally in the event”; and “Women were 




target of humiliation as dummy variable (personal humiliation conditions were coded as 0 
and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1). Additionally, we controlled for 
possible effects of visual exposure by entering visual exposure conditions as a second 
independent variable (laughing audience coded as 1, silent audience as 2, and no audience as 
3). 
The Pillai’s trace estimate showed a significant main effect of target of humiliation on 
the manipulation check items, V = 0.20, F(2, 308) = 38.92, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = 0.20; but no main 
effect of visual exposure, V = 0.02, F(4, 618) = 1.14, p = .34, ƞp
2
 = 0.01; and no significant 
effect of the two-way interaction between target of humiliation and visual exposure, V= 0.02, 
F(4, 618) = 1.43, p = .22, ƞp
2
 = 0.01. 
Results of the separate univariate analyses of target of humiliation on the items “You 
were degraded personally in the event” and “Women were degraded in the event” revealed a 
non-significant main effect on the former item (Mpersonal  =  3.39, SDpersonal = 1.48; Mvicarious = 
3.47, SDvicarious = 1.53), F(1, 313) = 0.186. p = .67, ƞp
2
 = 0.00, but a significant effect on the 
latter (Mpersonal = 2.65, SDpersonal = 1.32; Mvicarious = 3.88, SDvicarious = 1.29, F(1, 313) = 69.935, 
p < .000, ƞp
2
 = 0.18. The means indicated that participants in the vicarious humiliation 
conditions felt similarly personally devalued as participants in personal humiliation 
conditions. However, as expected only participants in the vicarious humiliation conditions 
perceived women devalued.  
In a second step, we assessed the manipulations of visual exposure on the 
manipulation check items “The others who witnessed the event, were laughing” and “The 
others who witnessed the event, were quiet” using again a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA). The visual exposure conditions were entered as first independent variable 
(laughing audience coded as 1, silent audience as 2, and no audience as 3) and target of 




were coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1). The Pillai’s trace 
estimate showed a significant main effect of visual exposure on the manipulation check 
items, V = 0.33, F(4, 618) = 30.69, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = 0.17; but no main effect of target of 
humiliation, V = 0.01, F(2, 308) = 1.79, p = .17, ƞp
2
 = 0.01; and no significant effect, V= 0.01, 
F(4, 618) = 0.95, p = .43, ƞp
2
 = 0.01. 
The results of the separate univariate analyses on the two visual exposure 
manipulation check items “The other who witnessed the event, were laughing” and “The 
other who witnessed the event were quiet” revealed for the former (Mlaughing  =  4.20, 
SDlaughing = 1.13; Msilent = 2.45, SDsilent = 1.32, Mno audience = 3.30, SDno auiience = 1.30),  F(2, 
312) = 59.70, p = < .001, ƞp
2
 = 0.25, and for the latter (Mlaughing  =  2.55, SDlaughing = 1.40; 
Msilent = 4.06, SDsilent = 1.29, Mno audience = 3.32, SDno audience = 1.31),  F(2, 312) = 32.72, p = < 
.001, ƞp
2
 = 0.17, significant effects. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that participants in the 
laughing audience conditions scored significantly higher on the item “The other who 
witnessed the event, were laughing” than participants in the other two conditions (ps < .001), 
whereas participants in the silent audience conditions scored significantly higher on the item 
“The other who witnessed the event were quiet” than participants in the laughing audience 
and no audience conditions (ps < .001). These results imply that participants in the laughing 
audience conditions indeed perceived the audience in the Facebook post as laughing, while 
participants in the silent audience conditions perceived indeed the audience as being quiet.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 9 reports the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-
correlations of our principal variables for the six experimental conditions, separately. As 
found in Study 3, humiliation correlated moderately with self-focused emotions in the 




emotions in the other conditions. Similar to Study 3, the correlations between the appraisals 
of internalisation and powerlessness, and humiliation ranged from moderate to strong in all 
experimental conditions. Different to Study 3, the appraisal of injustice correlated strongly 
with humiliation in the personal humiliation conditions irrespective of audience, whereas its 
association with humiliation was only moderately significant in the vicarious humiliation and 
laughing audience condition. Also different to Study 3, the appraisals of internalisation, 
powerlessness and injustice correlated significantly with both self-focused and other-focused 
emotions in the personal humiliation conditions irrespective of audience, whereas only the 
appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness – although rather moderately – correlated with 
self-focused emotions and other-focused emotions in the vicarious humiliation conditions 
irrespective of audience. The appraisal injustice correlated only significantly with self-
focused emotions and other-focused emotions in the condition vicarious humiliation and 
laughing audience. Similar to Study 3, internal blame correlated strongest with self-focused 
emotions irrespective of the experimental conditions. Also similar to the previous study, 
external blame did not correlate with humiliation except for the condition personal 
humiliation and silent audience. Different to the previous study, correlations between external 
blame and other-focused emotions were found in both personal and vicarious humiliation 
conditions and between external blame and self-focused emotions in the personal humiliation 
condition.  
 86 
Table 9  
Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the principal variables in the six experimental conditions, Study 4. 
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Note. ***p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05 (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients of the personal humiliation conditions are reported in the upper 
right part of the table where the first coefficient refers to the laughing audience, the second coefficient to the silent audience and the third 
coefficient to the no audience condition. Correlation coefficients of the vicarious humiliation conditions are reported in the lower left part of the 




In a first step, we again tested our hypothesis that a personally humiliating event is 
likely to be appraised as internalising the devaluation and powerlessness, which in turn will 
elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas a 
vicariously humiliating event is likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally 
blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions 
(Hypothesis 2b). We further tested Hypothesis 3 that appraising a humiliating event as 
internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being accompanied by humiliation. The 
same models (see Figure 4) were tested using the same analysis procedures as in Study 3. 
 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions 
Firstly, we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused 
emotions through appraisals and through humiliation (see Figure 4), while controlling for 
other-focused emotions. The overall model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .6874, F (8, 314) 
= 86.29, p < .001. Table 10 reports the direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on 
the appraisals, humiliation and self-focused emotions. The analyses of the direct effects 
revealed that target of humiliation affected the appraisals of injustice, powerlessness, internal 
blame and self-focused emotions but not the feeling of humiliation. Self-focused emotions 
were directly affected by target of humiliation, the appraisals of injustice, powerlessness and 
internal blame, humiliation and other-focused emotions (see Table 10). 
In line with our Hypothesis 2a, we found a negative indirect effect
2
 between target of 
humiliation on self-focused emotions through powerlessness and humiliation (see Table 10). 
However, we also found a negative indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused 
emotions through internal blame and humiliation. More specifically, the former implies that 
                                                 
2
 The negative indirect effect results from how we coded the target of humiliation conditions: personal 




participants in the personal humiliation conditions were more likely to appraise the event as 
something they cannot control which made them feel humiliated accompanied by self-
focused emotions, while the latter indirect effect implies that participants in the personal 
humiliation conditions were more likely to blame themselves for the event which in turn 
elicited humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions. Moreover, the indirect effects 
indicating that participants in the personal humiliation condition responded with self-focused 
emotions because they appraised the event as being out of their control or as being their own 
fault without feeling humiliated were significant too (see Table 10).  
The contrast analyses of the statistically significant indirect effects revealed firstly, 
that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through 
powerlessness and humiliation (effect = -0.030) was not significantly different from the 
indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through powerlessness 
without being mediated through humiliation (effect = -0.042), effectcontrast = -0.012, 
bootSEcontrast = .019, CIcontrast[-0.044, 0.016]. Secondly, the indirect effect of target of 
humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame (without feeling humiliated) 
(effect = -0.050) was however, significantly stronger than the indirect effect of target of 
humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal blame and humiliation (effect = -
0.015), effectcontrast = -0.035, bootSEcontrast = .022, CIcontrast[-0.80, -0.005]. 
Supporting Hypothesis 2a, our findings showed that personal humiliation indirectly 
effected self-focused emotions through the appraisal of powerlessness and through the feeling 
of humiliation. However, not in line with our Hypothesis 3 was the finding that personally 
humiliated participants who internally blame the event responded with self-focused emotions 
that were blended with the feeling of humiliation. However, our results also implied that 




emotions without feeling humiliated. This indirect effect was significantly stronger than the 
indirect effect through both internal blame and humiliation. 
 
Table 10  
Direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through 
appraisals and humiliation, Study 4. 
Effects on appraisals  
Internalisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.628 0.206 7.911 < .001 1.288 1.970 
Target of humiliation 
-0.196 0.156 -1.258 .21 -0.453 0.061 
Other-focused emotions 
0.463 0.070 6.578 < .001 0.347 0.579 
Injustice 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.783 0.155 17.992 < .001 2.527 3.038 
Target of humiliation 
0.271 0.117 2.310 .02 0.077 0.464 
Other-focused emotions 
0.329 0.053 6.206 < .001 0.241 0.416 
Powerlessness 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.393 0.179 7.798 < .001 1.099 1.688 
Target of humiliation 
-0.316 0.135 -2.337 .02 -0.540 -0.093 
Other-focused emotions 









 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.285 0.209 6.150 < .001 0.941 1.630 
Target of humiliation 
-0.062 0.158 -0.393 .69 -0.324 0.199 
Other-focused emotions 
0.525 0.072 7.340 < .001 0.407 0.643 
Internal blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.507 0.210 7.163 < .001 1.160 1.854 
Target of humiliation 
-0.374 0.159 -2.347 .02 -0.637 -0.111 
Other-focused emotions 
0.347 0.072 4.826 < .001 0.229 0.466 
Effects on humiliation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.201 0.250 -0.803 .42 -0.613 0.212 
Target of humiliation 
0.090 0.128 0.702 .48 -0.121 0.301 
Internalisation 
0.188 0.051 3.717 < .01 0.105 0.272 
Injustice 
0.070 0.062 1.134 .25 -0.032 0.172 
Powerlessness 
0.223 0.058 3.829 < .01 0.127 0.318 
External blame 
-0.012 0.045 -0.276 .78 -0086 0.061 
Internal blame 
0092 0.047 1.957 .05 0.014 0.169 
Other-focused emotions 
0525 .067 7.670 < .001 0412 0.638 
Effects on self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.316  0.142 2.237 .03 0.083 0.550 
Target of humiliation 





0.042 0.029 1.424 .15 -0.007 0.090 
Injustice 
-0.068 0.035 -1.931 .05 -0.125 -0.010 
Powerlessness 
0.134 0.034 3.973 < .01 0.078 0.189 
External blame 
0.004 0.025 0.161 .87 -0.038 0.046 
Internal blame 
0.132 0.027 4.936 < .001 0.088 0.176 
Humiliation 
0.425 0.032 13.350 < .001 0.373 0.478 
Other-focused emotions 
0.114 0.042 2.700 < .01 0.044 0.183 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Target*Internalisation -0.008 0.011 -0.028 0.004 
Target*Injustice -0.018 0.014 -0.044 0.001 
Target*Powerlessness -0.042 0.023 -0.083 -0.010 
Target*External blame -0.000 0.004 -0.007 0.006 
Target*Internal blame -0.049 0.025 -0.093 -0.013 
Target*Humiliation 0.038 0.052 -0.047 0.125 
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation -0.016 0.014 -0.040 0.005 
Target*Injustice*Humiliation 0.008 0.008 -0.003 0.024 
Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation -0.030 0.016 -0.060 -0.007 
Target*External blame*Humiliation 0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.007 




Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions 
In the second model, we assessed the indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-
focused emotions through appraisals and through humiliation, while controlling for self-
focused emotions. The model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .4649, F (8, 304) = 34.10, p < 
.001. The direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and 
other-focused emotions are reported in Table 11. The analyses of the direct effects revealed 




other-focused emotions. Other-focused emotions were affected by target of humiliation, the 
appraisals of injustice and external blame, humiliation and self-focused emotions. 
The analyses of the indirect effects revealed a significant indirect effect of target of 
humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice and humiliation (see Table 11). We 
also found indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused moral emotions through 
injustice only and through humiliation only. Interestingly, the contrast analyses revealed 
firstly, that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions only through 
injustice (effect = 0.060) was statistically stronger than the indirect effect through both 
injustice and humiliation (effect = 0.013), effectcontrast = 0.042, bootSEcontrast = .025, 
CIcontrast[0.009, 0.090]. A similar result was found for the indirect effect of target of 
humiliation on other-focused emotions through humiliation only (effect = 0.058) which was 
significantly stronger than the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused 
emotions through both injustice and humiliation (effect = 0.013), effectcontrast = 0.046, 
bootSEcontrast = .028, CIcontrast[0.006, 0.095]. 
Although our results support Hypothesis 2b that participants who were vicariously 
humiliated were more likely to appraise the humiliating event as unjust which resulted in 
feelings of humiliation and other-focused emotions, they also imply that vicariously 
humiliating events resulted in other-focused emotions because they were appraised as unjust 





Direct and indirect effects on other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, 
Study 4. 
Effects on appraisals 
Effects on internalisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.329 0.181 7.357 < .001 1.031 1.627 
Target of humiliation 
0.037 0.143 0.257 .80 -0.200 0.272 
Self-focused emotions 
0.633 0.065 9.710 < .001 0.526 0.741 
Effects on injustice 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
3.080 0.150 20.606 < .001 2.834 3.327 
Target of humiliation 
0.428 0.118 3.622 < .01 0.233 0.623 
Self-focused emotions 
0.226 0.054 4.181 < .001 0137 0.315 
Effects on powerlessness 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.149 0.154 7.480 < .001 0.900 1.403 
Target of humiliation 
-0.056 0.122 -0.459 .65 -0.256 0.145 
Self-focused emotions 
0.672 0.055 12.124 < .001 0.581 0.764 
Effects on external blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.885 0.207 9.127 < .001 1.544 2.225 
Target of humiliation 
0.188 0.163 1.150 .25 -0.082 0.457 
Self-focused emotions 




Effects on internal blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.981 0.181 5.407 < .001 0.681 1.280 
Target of humiliation 
-0.195 0.143 -1.358 .17 -0.431 0.042 
Self-focused emotions 
0.607 0.065 9.284 < .001 0.500 0.715 
Effects on humiliation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.333 0.205 -1.625 .11 -0.670 0.005 
Target of humiliation 
0.281 0.103 2.731 < .01 0.111 0.450 
Internalisation 
0.088 0.042 2.087 .04 0.019 0.158 
Injustice 
0.143 0.050 2.871 < .01 0.061 0.224 
Powerlessness 
0.043 0.050 0.858 .39 -0.039 0.125 
External blame 
0.030 0.035 0.863 .39 -0.028 0.088 
Internal blame 
-0.050 0.040 -1.249 .21 -0.116 0.016 
Self-focused emotions 
0.945 0.061 15.554 < .001 0.845 1.046 
Effects on other-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.341 0.188 1.821 .07 0.032 0.651 
Target of humiliation 
0.317 0.095 3.339 < .01 0.160 0.474 
Internalisation 
-0.003 0.039 -0.089 .92 -0.068 0.060 
Injustice 
0.139 0.046 3.037 < .01 0.064 0.215 
Powerlessness 
0.052 0.045 1.137 .26 -0.023 0.127 
External blame 
0.168 0.032 5.250 < .001 0.115 0.221 
Internal blame 





0.208 0.051 4.049 < .01 0.123 0.293 
Self-focused emotions 
0.199 0.074 2.695 < .01 0.077 0.320 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Target*Internalisation -0.000 0.006 -0.008 0.011 
Target*Injustice 0.060 0.029 0.019 0.115 
Target*Powerlessness -0.003 0.009 -0.018 0.010 
Target*External blame 0.032 0.029 -0.015 0.081 
Target*Internal blame -0.005 0.009 -0.022 0.007 
Target*Humiliation 0.058 0.027 0.019 0.107 
Target*Internalisation* 
Humiliation 
0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.006 
Target*Injustice*Humiliation 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.026 
Target*Powerlessness* 
Humiliation 
-0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
Target*External blame* 
Humiliation 
0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.005 
Target*Internal blame* 
Humiliation 
0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.008 
 
 
The role of visual exposure 
The assumption that the aggravating effect visual exposure will be stronger in 
personally humiliating events than in vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4) was 
tested using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). We included the appraisals (i.e., 
internalisation, injustice, powerlessness, external and internal blame) and the emotions (i.e., 
humiliation, self-focused and other-focused emotions) as dependent variables and the 




analysis) as independent variables. To support our hypothesis, we would have expected a 
significant interaction effect between visual exposure and target of humiliation. 
The Pillai’s trace estimate revealed neither a significant main effect of visual 
exposure, V = 0.05, F(16, 622) = 1.05, p = .41, ƞp
2
= .03, nor a significant two-way interaction 
effect between target of humiliation and visual exposure, V = 0.05, F(16, 622) = 0.92, p = 
.55, ƞp
2
= .02, on the appraisals and emotions. The main effect of target of humiliation, V = 
0.11, F(8, 310) = 4.71, p < .001, ƞp
2
= .11; was significant as expected by the results of our 
previous analysis.  
In sum, we were neither able to show that the presence of an audience (whether this 
audience is laughing or silent) elicit stronger appraisals and emotional responses as the main 
effect of visual exposure was not significant; nor that effects would be stronger when 
participants were personally humiliated relative to being vicariously humiliated as the 




The results of Study 4 provide first empirical evidence, that depending on whether a 
person is personally or vicariously humiliated, different emotional patterns through different 
patterns of appraisals are indeed elicited. Firstly, we found that participants appraised a 
personally humiliating event as something they do not have power over (i.e., powerlessness), 
which elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions, and 
secondly, that participants appraised a vicariously humiliating event as unjust, which elicited 
the feeling of humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions. As we found these 




intergroup context for vicarious humiliation in Study 5 to increase the internal validity of our 
results.  
We also found that participants appraised a personally humiliating event by blaming 
themselves, which did not only elicit self-focused emotions but also the feeling of 
humiliation. Yet, personally humiliated participants felt also self-focused emotions through 
the appraisal of internal blame without feeling humiliated, and this indirect effect was 
significantly stronger than the indirect effect on self-focused emotions through both internal 
blame and humiliation. Nevertheless, the former finding was not in line with our Hypothesis 
3 that internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without being blended with humiliation, 
which was based on the prepositions of Fernández et al. (2015) and Klein (1991) who stated 
that humiliation is considered as undeserved. However, before dismissing our reasoning it is 
necessary to replicate these findings. Therefore, we re-assessed the role of the appraisal of 
internal blame in the interplay between personally humiliating events, humiliation and self-
focused emotions (Hypothesis 3) in the following Study 5.  
Moreover, our results concerning the visual exposure of events did not support our 
assumption that the presence of an audience leads to stronger appraisals and emotions when a 
person is personally humiliated (Hypothesis 4). To exclude possible methodological effects, 
we differently manipulate visual exposure in Study 5, which aimed at re-testing the effect of 
this independent variable. Another limitation of Study 4 was that the results of the personal 
humiliation manipulation check did not show a significant difference between the personal 
and the vicarious humiliation conditions. It might be that it was difficult for participants to 
imagine themselves having posted the story on Facebook. Therefore, in the follow-up study, 
we adjusted the instruction of the personal humiliation manipulation by asking participants to 
vividly imagine that the story described in the post really happened to them and to imagine 





The aim of Study 5 was to replicate the results found in the previous study relating to 
the interplay between personally and vicariously humiliating events, appraisals of humiliation 
and the associated emotional patterns (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) using a different intergroup 
context. Moreover, we re-tested our hypothesis that appraising a humiliating event as internal 
blame evokes self-focused emotions without being blended with the feeling of humiliation 
(Hypothesis 3). Finally, Study 5 aimed at re-testing the effect of audience on the intensity of 
appraisals and emotions, which were assumed be stronger for participants who are personally 
humiliated compared to participants who are vicariously humiliated (Hypothesis 4). 
In the present study, we again used a bogus Facebook post as a means of 
manipulating humiliation. Different to Study 4, Study 5 used a 2 (target of humiliation: 
personal vs. vicarious humiliation) x 2 (visual exposure: laughing audience vs. no audience) 
between-subject factorial design. Also different to Study 4, the manipulation of audience 
applied a different approach. While in Study 4, the presence of audience was indicated as part 
of the message posted on Facebook, in Study 5, the presence of audience was indicated 
through comments made by other Facebook users about the respective message posted on 
Facebook. The intergroup context referred to Unisa students relative to students from other 
South African universities.  
Similar to the previous two studies, the outcome variables were appraisals of 
humiliation and emotional responses. Demographic information related to age and gender 
were again assessed at the end of the study, as well as a suspicion check (i.e., whether 








Three hundred and seventy-six participants completed Study 5. The age of the 
participants ranged from 19 to 65 years (M = 32.33, SD = 9.71, missing: 94). Of the 312 
participants who indicated their gender, 67 were males and 244 were females. Again, none of 




In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were given the same information 
as in Study 4. After providing consent to participate in the study, participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the four experimental conditions: (1) personal humiliation and laughing 
audience, (2) vicarious humiliation and laughing audience, (3) personal humiliation and no 
salient audience, and (4) vicarious humiliation and no salient audience. 
Similar to Study 4, participants were asked to name three characteristics that 
distinguish her or him from others that are important to her or him if they were allocated to 
the personal humiliation conditions, or they were asked to name three characteristics that 
distinguish Unisa students from students from other universities if they were in the vicarious 
humiliation conditions. Afterwards, participants were asked to read a bogus Facebook post 
about an incident that happened during a discussion (see Figures 6 and 7). The situational 
determinants of being attacked, being made or found deficient, and social exclusion were 
used as means of devaluating the humiliated person.  
Participants in the personal humiliation [and in the vicarious humiliation] conditions 
were asked to imagine that they themselves [another Unisa student] posted the following 
story on Facebook. They were asked to furthermore imagine that the incident described really 




They were asked to imagine the thoughts that they would have and the emotions they would 
feel and to imagine the state of mind in which they would be if this happened to them [if this 
happened to another Unisa student]. 
Participants in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition were 
provided with the Facebook post depicted in Figure 6. Comments made by other Facebook 






Figure 6. Facebook post used as manipulation for personal humiliation with a laughing 
audience condition, Study 5. 
 
In the personal humiliation and no audience condition, participants were provided 
with the same Facebook post as in Figure 6 except that no comments by others were shown. 
In the vicarious humiliation conditions participants were provided with the Facebook 




were used in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition, were added at the 
bottom; while these comments were omitted in the condition of no audience present. 
 
 




After reading the Facebook post, participants received the same instruction as in 
Study 4 and were asked to complete the same measures as in Studies 3 and 4: appraisal of 
internalisation (r  = .71, p < .001), appraisal of injustice (α  = .83), appraisal of powerlessness 
(α  = .84), self-focused emotions (α = .81), and other-focused emotions (α = .73). Again, 
external and internal blame were measured using the same single items used as in the 
previous two studies. Like in the previous two studies, all items of the respective scales were 






Manipulation check measures 
The following items were used for as manipulation checks for target of humiliation: “I 
feel personally degraded by the incident described in the Facebook post I was asked to 
imagine having posted myself” and “I feel degraded on behalf of the Unisa student who 
experienced the incident as described in the Facebook post”, and for visual exposure: “Others 





We first assessed the manipulation of the target of humiliation on the manipulation 
check items: “I feel personally degraded by the incident described in the Facebook post I was 
asked to imagine having posted myself” and “I feel degraded on behalf of the Unisa student 
who experienced the incident as described in the Facebook post”, using a multivariate and 
univariate analyses of variance, respectively. We entered target of humiliation as dummy 
variable (personal humiliation conditions coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions 
were coded as 1), and we controlled for visual exposure by entering it as a second dummy 
variable (no audience conditions coded as 0 and laughing audience conditions coded as 1). 
The Pillai’s trace estimate showed no significant main effect of target of humiliation 
on the manipulation check items, V = 0.00, F(2, 327) = 0.51, p = .60, ƞp
2
 = 0.00; no main 
effect of visual exposure, V = 0.00, F(2, 327) = 0.60, p = .55, ƞp
2
 = 0.00; and no significant 
effect of the two-way interaction between target of humiliation and visual exposure, V= 0.00, 
F(2, 327) = 0.91, p = .41, ƞp
2
 = 0.01. No further separate univariate analyses were performed 
due to the non-significant main effect of target of humiliation. It seems that irrespective of 




humiliation manipulation check = 1.44 ; Mvicarious humiliation manipulation check = 3.04, SDvicarious humiliation 
manipulation check = 1.56) or in the vicarious humiliation conditions (Mpersonal humiliation manipulation check 
= 3.21, SDpersonal humiliation manipulation check = 1.49 ; Mvicarious humiliation manipulation check = 3.35, 
SDvicarious humiliation manipulation check = 1.55), they perceived themselves relatively equally 
personally and vicariously humiliated.  
Next, we assessed the manipulation of visual exposure on the manipulation check 
item “Others were laughing about the incident as described in the Facebook post”, using a 
univariate analysis of variance. Visual exposure was entered as first independent variable (no 
audience conditions coded as 0 and laughing audience conditions coded as) and target of 
humiliation was entered as second independent variable (personal humiliation conditions 
were coded as 0 and the vicarious humiliation conditions were coded as 1). Results showed 
that visual exposure had a significant main effect on the manipulation check item (Mlaughing  =  
3.84, SDlaughing = 1.31; Mno audience = 3.36, SDno auiience = 1.24), F(1, 328) = 11.78, p = .01, ƞp
2
 = 
0.04. These results imply that participants in the laughing audience conditions indeed 
perceived the audience in the Facebook post as laughing compared to the participants in the 
no audience conditions. This effect was not conditional on target of humiliation as there was 
no significant two-way interaction, F(1, 328) = 0.01, p = .92, ƞp
2
 = 0.00. There was also no 
significant main effect of target of humiliation on the visual exposure manipulation check 
item, F(1, 328) = 0.07, p = .79, ƞp
2
 = 0.00. 
Overall, these results supported our certainty that the manipulation of visual exposure 
was successful in Study 5. However, we could not be completely certain with regards to the 








Table 12 reports the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-
correlations of the principal variables as measured in the four experimental conditions. 
Similar to Studies 3 and 4, humiliation correlated strongly with both self-focused and other-
focused emotions, irrespective of the experimental conditions. Similar to Study 4, the 
appraisals of internalisation and powerlessness correlated moderately and strongly with 
humiliation, self-focused and other-focused emotions in all four conditions. The appraisal of 
injustice correlated weakly with humiliation in the personal humiliation and laughing 
audience condition; and in the vicarious humiliation and no audience condition. As expected, 
the appraisal of injustice only correlated strongly with the other-focused emotions (although 
only in the personal humiliation and laughing audience condition; and the vicarious 
humiliation and no audience condition) but did not correlate with self-focused emotions 
regardless of the experimental group. As expected, external blame correlated significantly, 
although weakly, with the other-focused emotions in the personal humiliation conditions 
(irrespective of audience) and in the vicarious humiliation and no audience condition. 
External blame was also weakly correlated with the self-focused emotions in this latter 
condition. The appraisal of internal blame correlated moderately to strongly with humiliation 
and expectedly with self-focused emotions in all four experimental conditions; and only 
correlated weakly with the other-focused emotions in the personal humiliation conditions. 
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Table 12  
Means, standard deviations. number of participants and inter-correlations of principal variables in the four experimental conditions, Study 5  




2.62/2.84 3.61/3.68 2.32/2.47 2.09/2.54 2.51/2.33 2.67/2.73 2.34/2.29 2.32/2.40 
Vicarious 
humiliation 




1.30/1.49 1.20/1.08 1.20/1.29 1.34/1.49 1.57/1.57 1.36/1.47 1.00/1.13 1.00/1.00 
Vicarious 
humiliation 




97/95 93/91 91/88 89/87 89/87 87/85 87/85 87/85 
Vicarious 
humiliation 
85/99 81/98 80/98 79/98 79/98 79/97 79/97 79/97 





























































































































































Note. ***p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05 (two-tailed). Correlation coefficients of the personal humiliation conditions are reported in the upper 
right part of the table where the first coefficient refers to the laughing audience and the second coefficient to the no audience condition. 
Correlation coefficients of the vicarious humiliation conditions are reported in the lower left part of the table where the first coefficient refers to 




To test our hypotheses that personally humiliating events are likely to be appraised as 
internalising the devaluation and/or and powerlessness, which in turn will elicit humiliation 
accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas vicariously humiliating 
events are likely to be appraised as something unjust and externally blamed, which in turn 
will elicit humiliation accompanied by other-focused moral emotions (Hypothesis 2b), and 
that appraising a humiliating event as internal blame elicits self-focused emotions without 
being accompanied by humiliation (Hypothesis 3), we tested the same models using the 
analysis procedure as in Studies 3 and 4. 
 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions 
Firstly, we estimated the indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused 
emotions through appraisals and through humiliation (see Figure 4), while controlling for 
other-related emotions. The overall model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .6724, F (8, 339) 
= 86.29, p < .001. Table 13 reports the direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on 
the appraisals, humiliation and self-focused emotions. The analyses of the direct effects 
revealed that target of humiliation affected only the appraisal of internal blame and self-
focused emotions but not humiliation. Self-focused emotions were directly affected by target 
of humiliation, the appraisals of powerlessness and internal blame, humiliation and other-
focused emotions (see Table 13). 
Similar to Study 4, we found a negative indirect effect
3
 of target of humiliation on 
self-focused emotions through internal blame and humiliation (see Table 13). Also, we found 
a negative indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through internal 
blame but not through humiliation. The former indirect effect implies that participants in the 
                                                 
3
 The negative indirect effect results from how we coded the target of humiliation conditions: personal 




personal humiliation conditions appraised the event by blaming themselves which in turn 
made them feel humiliated accompanied by self-focused emotions. Yet, the latter indirect 
effect also implies that some participants also blamed themselves and felt self-focused 
emotions without feeling humiliated. Different to the previous study, the contrast analyses of 
indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused 
emotions through internal blame and humiliation (effect = -0.021) was not significantly 
different from the indirect effect of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions through 
internal blame without being mediated through humiliation (effect = -0.035), effectcontrast = -
0.013, bootSEcontrast = 0.015, CIcontrast[-0.041, 0.007]. However, different to Study 4 no other 
indirect effects reached statistical significance. 
 
Table 13 
Direct and indirect effects on self-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, 
Study 5. 
Effects on appraisals  
Internalisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.534 0.195 7.882 < .001 1.213 1.860 
Target of humiliation 
-0.013 0.147 -0.091 .93 -0.256 0.230 
Other-focused emotions 
0.490 0.070 7.002 < .001 0.375 0.605 
Injustice 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.948 0.149 19.850 < .001 2.703 3.192 
Target of humiliation 
0.176 0.112 1.568 .12 -0.009 0.361 
Other-focused emotions 





 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.348 0.173 7.798 < .001 1.063 1.634 
Target of humiliation 
0.088 0.131 0.674 .50 -0128 0.304 
Other-focused emotions 
0.420 0.062 6.760 < .001 0.318 0.523 
External blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.563 0.204 7.671 < .001 1.227 1.900 
Target of humiliation 
0.090 0.154 0.581 .56 -0.164 0.343 
Other-focused emotions 
0.321 0.073 4.377 < .001 0.200 0.441 
Internal blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.737 0.214 8.120 < .001 1.385 2.090 
Target of humiliation 
-0.320 0.1617 -1.976 .05 -0.586 -0.053 
Other-focused emotions 
0.286 0.077 3.718 < .01 0.159 0.413 
Effects on humiliation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.365 0.242 -1.508 .13 -0.765 0.034 
Target of humiliation 
0.001 0.113 0.012 .99 -0.186 0.188 
Internalisation 
0.240 0.046 5.239 < .001 0.165 0.316 
Injustice 
0.058 0.055 1.056 .29 -0.033 0.149 
Powerlessness 
0.185 0.051 3.636 < .01 0.101 0.269 
External blame 
-0.028 0.040 0.683 .50 -0.039 0.094 
Internal blame 





0.565 .061 9.235 < .001 0.464 0.666 
Effects on self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.242  0.155 1.557 .12 -0.014 0.498 
Target of humiliation 
-0.170 0.072 -2.350 .02 -0.290 -0.051 
Internalisation 
0.073 0.031 2.390 .10 0.023 0.123 
Injustice 
-0.028 0.035 -0.797 .43 -0.087 0.030 
Powerlessness 
0.088 0.033 2.653 < .01 0.033 0.143 
External blame 
-0.012 0.026 -0.462 .64 -0.055 0.031 
Internal blame 
0.108 0.027 3.972 < .01 0.063 0.153 
Humiliation 
0.439 0.035 12.676 < .001 0.382 0.500 
Other-focused emotions 
0.151 0.044 3.458 < .01 0.079 0.223 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on self-focused emotions 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Target*Internalisation -0.001 0.012 -0.020 0.018 
Target*Injustice -0.005 0.009 -0.021 0.006 
Target*Powerlessness 0.008 0.013 -0.011 0.031 
Target*External blame -0.001 0.005 -0.009 0.006 
Target*Internal blame -0.035 0.020 -0.071 -0.005 
Target*Humiliation 0.001 0.051 -0.082 0.085 
Target*Internalisation*Humiliation -0.001 0.016 -0.028 0.025 
Target*Injustice*Humiliation 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.015 
Target*Powerlessness*Humiliation 0.007 0.011 -0.010 0.025 
Target*External blame* 
Humiliation 
0.011 0.004 -0.004 0.008 
Target*Internal blame* 
Humiliation 






Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions 
The model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .4332, F (8, 339) = 32.39, p < .001. The 
direct and indirect effects of target of humiliation on appraisals, humiliation and other-
focused emotions are reported in Table 14. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that 
target of humiliation affected significantly the appraisal of injustice, powerlessness, 
humiliation and other-focused emotions. Other-focused emotions were affected by target of 
humiliation, the appraisals of injustice and external blame, humiliation and self-focused 
emotions (see Table 14). 
In line with our Hypothesis 2b, and replicating the findings of Study 4, the analyses of 
the indirect effects revealed a significant indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-
focused emotions through injustice and humiliation (see Table 14). We also found the 
indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice only and 
through humiliation only. Again, the contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the 
indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions only through injustice 
(effect = 0.045) was significantly stronger than the indirect effect through injustice and 
humiliation (effect = 0.008), effectcontrast = 0.038, bootSEcontrast = 0.019, CIcontrast[0.010, 
0.072]. A similar result was found for the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-
focused emotions through humiliation only (effect = 0.050) which was significantly stronger 
than the indirect effect of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions through injustice 






Direct and indirect effects on other-focused emotions through appraisals and humiliation, 
Study 5. 
Effects on appraisals 
Effects on internalisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.169 0.164 7.109 < .001 0.898 1.440 
Target of humiliation 
0.162 0.132 1.229 .22 -0.056 0.380 
Self-focused emotions 
0.658 0.058 11.287 < .001 0.562 0.754 
Effects on injustice 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
3.327 0.142 23.421 < .001 3.093 3.561 
Target of humiliation 
0.295 0.114 2.582  .01 0.107 0.483 
Self-focused emotions 
0.156 0.050 3.104 < .01 0.073 0.239 
Effects on powerlessness 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.065 0.148 7.188 < .001 0.821 1.309 
Target of humiliation 
0.239 0.119 2.008 .05 0.043 0.435 
Self-focused emotions 
0.551 0.053 10.494 < .001 0.464 0.638 
Effects on external blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.910 0.192 9.970 < .001 1.594 2.226 
Target of humiliation 
0.210 0.154 1.366 .17 -0.044 0.464 
Self-focused emotions 




Effects on internal blame 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.025 0.180 5.694 < .001 0.728 1.322 
Target of humiliation 
-0.222 0.145 -1.535 .13 -0.461 0.017 
Self-focused emotions 
0.599 0.064 9.387 < .001 0.494 0.704 
Effects on humiliation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.322 0.205 -1.570 .12 -0.661 0.016 
Target of humiliation 
0.204 0.096 2.136 .03 0.047 0.362 
Internalisation 
0.117 0.041 2.884 < .01 0.050 0.184 
Injustice 
0.110 0.046 2.383 .02 0.034 0.185 
Powerlessness 
0.075 0.045 1.628 .10 -0.001 0.146 
External blame 
0.050 0.034 1.473 .14 -0.006 0.107 
Internal blame 
0.020 0.037 0.530 .60 -0.042 0.081 
Self-focused emotions 
0.850 0.054 15.658 < .001 0.760 0.939 
Effects on other-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.454 0.189 2.407 .02 0.143 0.765 
Target of humiliation 
0.239 0.088 2.716 < .01 0.094 0.385 
Internalisation 
-0.003 0.038 -0.071 .94 -0.065 0.059 
Injustice 
0.154 0.042 3.634 < .01 0.084 0.224 
Powerlessness 
0.024 0.041 0.574 .57 -0.044 0.091 
External blame 
0.071 0.031 2.276 .02 0.020 0.123 
Internal blame 





0.244 0.050 4.913 < .001 0.162 0.326 
Self-focused emotions 
0.225 0.065 3.458 < .01 0.118 0.333 
Indirect effects of target of humiliation on other-focused emotions 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Target*Internalisation -0.000 0.008 -0.013 0.013 
Target*Injustice 0.045 0.021 0.014 0.083 
Target*Powerlessness 0.006 0.013 -0.011 0.029 
Target*External blame 0.015 0.014 -0.003 0.040 
Target*Internal blame 0.005 0.009 -0.008 0.021 
Target*Humiliation 0.050 0.026 0.010 0.095 
Target*Internalisation* 
Humiliation 
0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.013 
Target*Injustice* 
Humiliation 
0.008 0.006 0.001 0.018 
Target*Powerlessness* 
Humiliation 
0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.013 
Target*External blame* 
Humiliation 
0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.007 
Target*Internal blame* 
Humiliation 
-0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.003 
 
The role of visual exposure 
The hypothesis that the aggravating effect of visual exposure will be stronger in 
personally humiliating events than vicariously humiliating events (Hypothesis 4) was tested 
using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Like in Study 4, we included the 
appraisal variables (i.e., internalisation, injustice, powerlessness, external and internal blame) 
and the emotions (i.e., humiliation, self-focused and other-focused emotions) as dependent 
variables and the conditions of visual exposure and target of humiliation (coding as in the 




Replicating the findings of Study 4, the Pillai’s trace estimate revealed neither a 
significant main effect of visual exposure, V = 0.04, F(8,337) = 1.58, p = .13, ƞp
2
= .04, nor a 
significant two-way interaction effect between visual exposure and target of humiliation, V = 
0.02, F(16, 622) = 0.90, p = .52, ƞp
2
= .02, on the appraisals and emotions. The main effect of 
target of humiliation, V = 0.07, F(8, 310) = 3.00, p < .01, ƞp
2
= .07, was significant as 
expected by the results of the previous analysis. In sum, we were again unable to show that 
the presence of an audience (whether this audience is laughing or absent) elicit stronger 
appraisals or emotional responses in participants who were personally humiliated compared 
to those who were vicariously humiliated. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 5 supported our Hypothesis 2b that a vicariously humiliating 
event is likely to be appraised as unjust, which in turn elicited humiliation accompanied by 
other-focused emotions. Our results, however, did not replicate the results of Study 4 and 
thus, did not support our assumption that a personally humiliating event was likely to be 
appraised as internalisation and/or powerlessness, which in turn would elicit humiliation 
accompanied by self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 2a). Instead, results showed that the 
personally humiliating event was appraised as internal blame which elicited humiliation 
accompanied by self-focused emotions. This finding contradicted Hypothesis 3. Moreover, 
similar to Study 4, the results of Study 5 did not provide any evidence for the aggravating 
effects of visual exposure on the appraisals or emotions in personally humiliating events. 
Although not consistently, the results of Studies 3 to 5 implied that identity processes 
(i.e., personal or the social identity) determine the different appraisals, by which the same 
situational determinants are assessed, which leads to different emotional patterns as predicted 




events resulted in humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions through the appraisal of 
powerlessness (Study 4), secondly, that the appraisal of injustice and the feeling of 
humiliation regulated the relationship between vicarious humiliation and other-focused 
emotions (Studies 4 and 5), and finally, although not in line with our prediction (Hypothesis 
3), and only found for personal humiliation, that the appraisal of internal blame (Studies 3, 4 
and 5) elicited self-focused emotions blended with the feeling of humiliation (Studies 4 and 
5). Some of the identity effects on the appraisal and emotional patterns are seemingly context 
invariant as we found them in different studies, which did not only vary concerning the 
approaches to manipulate the independent variable target of humiliation but also with regard 
to the intergroup contexts. For instance, Study 3 applied the personal recall approach as a 
means of manipulating the target of humiliation, whereas Studies 4 and 5 used the scenario-
based approach (Facebook) and distinct intergroup contexts for vicarious humiliation (Study 
4: gender, Study 5: university students). However, it is important to note that irrespective of 
whether indirect effects were statistically significant, the target of humiliation, the appraisals 
and the feeling of humiliation explained a similar amount of variance of self-focused and 
other-focused emotions when participants recalled incidents (explained variance was 68% for 
self-focused emotions and 64% for other-focused emotions in Study 3), but not when they 
were exposed to the scenario-based (Facebook) approach (Study 4 and Study 5). More 
specifically, the target of humiliation, appraisals and the feeling of humiliation explained 
more variance of self-focused emotions (Study 4: 68.7% explained variance and Study 5: 
67% explained variance) than of other-focused emotions (Study 4: 46% explained variance 
and Study 5: 43% explained variance). We would speculate that the differences in the 
explained variances of self-focused and other-focused emotions in Studies 4 and 5 result from 




by the results of the manipulation checks of Study 4 implying that participants construed the 
humiliating event as personal humiliation irrespective of the experimental conditions. 
It is important to stress that the effect of personal humiliation on self-focused 
emotions through the appraisals of powerlessness and through humiliation was only found in 
one of three studies (Study 4). Although Study 4 and Study 5 used the same scenario-based 
approach (i.e., Facebook posts) to manipulate the target of humiliation, which differed from 
Study 3, both the social context and the situational determinants of the humiliating event 
varied. Study 4 used females and the situational determinants characterising the humiliating 
event were limited to being reduced in size and being made deficient, as compared to Study 
5, which used university students and additionally included the situational determinant of 
social exclusion. These differences in the two studies and the inconsistent findings 
concerning the effects of personal humiliating events suggest that not only do identity 
processes influence how the event is appraised and consequently which emotions are felt but 
that the social context in which the personally humiliating event occurs, also plays an 
influential role. One could speculate that being treated as small and incompetent (in the 
personal humiliation conditions) might confirm the powerless position in which many 
individual South African women find themselves (Study 4), a reference which will be less 
applicable to any university student at a South African university since the advent of the 
“Fees/Rhodes Must Fall” movements (Study 5).  
As mentioned above, we found that participants in the personal humiliation conditions 
appraised the event as being their fault (i.e., internal blame), which made them feel ashamed, 
embarrassed and guilty (i.e., self-focused moral emotions) whether they felt humiliated 
(Studies 4 and 5) or not (Study 3). Although we did not rule out the possibility that people 
might blame themselves when they are attacked, reduced in size, socially excluded and/or 




self-focused emotions are not blended with the feeling of humiliation (Hypothesis 3). Yet, 
our results suggest that there are instances, particularly when one is personally targeted, that 
lead to both the feeling of humiliation and self-focused emotions because the event is 
appraised as being one’s fault. These consistent findings related to the appraisal of internal 
blame question the previous observations that humiliation is appraised as undeserved 
(Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991). 
Moreover, the present research assumed that not only identity processes but also the 
presence of an audience influence the appraisals and emotional patterns (and more so when 
an individual is personally humiliated). Although the analysis of participants’ narratives in 
Study 1 indicated that the presence of others was more important for individuals who were 
personally humiliated compared to being vicariously humiliated, we were unable in Studies 4 
and 5 to empirically support our Hypothesis 4 that the presence of an audience aggravates 
appraisals and emotions, and more so depending on whether they were personally or 
vicariously humiliated. These results were rather unexpected because the role of the audience 
for the experience of humiliation has been shown in previous studies (Fernández et al., 2015; 
Mann et al., 2017). However, different to these studies, which also used scenario-based 
manipulations, our scenarios were embedded in and presented as a social media exchange 
(Facebook), which was selected as means of creating a more authentic context for our 
participants. Moreover, because our manipulation checks for visual exposure focused on the 
actions of the audience rather than whether an audience was experienced as present or not 
present, we can only speculate that our manipulation of visual exposure might have been 
confounded by the fact that any actions on social media are by definition visually exposed. 
Or to put it differently, our attempt to manipulate the non-existence of an audience in both 
Study 4 and Study 5 might have been confounded by our participants’ beliefs about social 




audience, which has been shown to aggravate humiliation (Mann et al., 2017), might have 
also been confounded by participants’ experiences with their “friends” on Facebook, which is 
more intimidating as compared to how “friends” engage in the “real-world” (Lapidot-Lefler 
& Barak, 2012). 
Relevant for the overall aim to extend our understanding of vicarious humiliation for 
intergroup relations was the consistent findings related to the appraisal of injustice. More 
specifically, we found that participants tended to appraise vicariously humiliating events as 
unjust, which elicited the feeling of humiliation (Study 2, Study 4 and Study 5) accompanied 
by other-focused emotions (Study 4 and Study 5). It is these other-focused emotions that are 
assumed to play a role in the escalation of intergroup conflicts. As other-focused emotions 
consist of anger, contempt and disgust, and because each of these emotions is assumed to be 
related to different behavioural tendencies, we aimed in Study 6 to manipulate these emotions 
separately to assess the associated behavioural tendencies of avoidance, normative and non-
normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion. As similar behavioural intentions 
are expected in response to contempt and disgust, we focused only on disgust (besides anger) 
as blended emotion of humiliation. Specifically, we tested in Study 6 the hypotheses that 
humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions (i.e., shame and embarrassment) will 
provoke avoidance tendencies (i.e., escaping from the relationship with the humiliator(s); 
Hypothesis 5a), that humiliation accompanied by anger will provoke normative and non-
normative approach tendencies (i.e., aiming at changing the relationship with the 
humiliator(s); Hypothesis 5b), whereas humiliation accompanied by disgust will provoke 







The aim of Study 6 was to test the hypotheses that humiliation accompanied by self-
focused emotions, such as shame and embarrassment, will provoke avoidance tendencies 
(Hypothesis 5a); whereas humiliation accompanied by anger will provoke normative and 
non-normative approach tendencies (Hypothesis 5b); and that humiliation accompanied by 
disgust will provoke social exclusion through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c). We tested our 
hypotheses experimentally by manipulating the blended emotions of humiliation (i.e., anger 
and disgust). Participants were exposed to a vicariously humiliating event where they were 
prompted to feel anger, or disgust as blended emotions (i.e., humiliation and anger condition; 
humiliation and disgust condition), or they were not prompted into feeling any specific 
emotion (i.e., control condition). We tested our hypotheses using the intergroup context of 
gender (i.e., females relative to violent males).  
In all conditions, participants were asked to read a bogus Facebook post that was 
supposedly posted by an ingroup member (i.e., another female). Again, we assumed that 
exposing participants to a Facebook post where an ingroup member describes being 
humiliated by outgroup members, would elicit feelings of vicarious humiliation in our 
participants. Additionally, participants in the humiliation and anger condition and in the 
humiliation and disgust condition were exposed to comments made by other ingroup 
members about the post that expressed either their anger or their disgust. In line with the 
intergroup emotion theory, which states that group-based emotions are socially shared as 
group members tend to feel the same way that they perceive other ingroup members to feel 
(Smith & Mackie, 2015; Turner et al., 1987), we expected that the shared emotional 







Nine hundred and ninety-eight female students participated in Study 6. Only black 
students were invited to participate in Study 6 as we wanted to avoid that the gender context 
is confounded by possible ethnicity effects. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 60 
years (M = 29.68, SD = 7.00, missing: 0). None of the participants identified the true aim of 
the study and were therefore all included in the following analyses.  
 
Procedure 
In the opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that we live in a 
society where sharing our stories and experiences have become easier than ever with 
technologies such as social media. They were furthermore informed that these stories shared 
on social media can elicit strong feelings as they are either very positive and uplifting or very 
negative and upsetting, but that (un)fortunately they are still part of our daily lives as we read 
or hear about such stories in news reports. Participants were told that the present study aims 
at understanding how we perceive and experience these stories when we share or read about 
them on social media. After providing consent to participate in the study, participants were 
asked to answer demographic questions (i.e., age and gender).  
Irrespective to what condition participants were allocated, they were first asked to 
think about themselves as women and to think about what women can do better than men and 
what makes women different from men. Participants were provided with a space where they 
had to name three characteristics that distinguish women from men. Similar to the previous 
four studies, this question aided in making the ingroup salient. Afterwards, participants were 
asked to complete the ingroup identification measure. 
Next, participants were allocated to one of three experimental conditions: (1) 




condition. All participants were asked to read an incident that was posted on Facebook by 
another woman (see Figures 8 and 9). The incidents used as humiliating event referred to the 
main discourse related to gender violence within the South African public since the country 
was declared a “State of Disaster” in March 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The 
situational determinant of being attacked was used as means of devaluating the humiliated 
person. The comments made by fellow ingroup members (i.e., other females) contained 
labels and characteristics associated with anger (e.g., fury and violation of autonomy; see 
Figure 8); or with disgust (e.g., revolt and violation of dignity; see Figure 9). The Facebook 
post used in the control condition did not include any comments and the last sentence of the 













Figure 9. Facebook post used as manipulation in the humiliation and disgust condition, Study 
6. 
 
After being exposed to the manipulation, participants were asked to complete the 
measures of emotions (i.e., humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust) followed 
by the measures of behavioural intentions (i.e., avoidance, normative and non-normative 
approach and social exclusion). Lastly, participants were asked to complete the measure of 





The four measures of emotion and the four behavioural intentions measures were 
randomly presented to participants. The items within each measure were also randomised. If 
not differently stated, participants were requested to indicate their agreement on an answer 
format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Ingroup identification was measured by the following five items (selected from Leach 
et al., 2008): “I feel strong bonds with women”, “I feel committed to women”, “I am glad to 
be a woman”, “I think that women have a lot to be proud of” and “Being a woman is an 
important part of how I see myself” (α  = .87).  
The emotions of humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust were measured 
by asking participants to what extent they feel each of the following emotions right now on 
an answer format ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (A great deal): “demeaned”, “humiliated”, 
“belittled”, “degraded” and “insulted” (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) combined into the 
humiliation measure (α  = .94); “ashamed”, “embarrassed”, “small”, “shy” and “discomfort” 
were the items combined as self-focused emotions measure (α  = .87); “angry”, “furious”, 
“annoyed”, “enraged” and “irritated” (adapted from Tausch et al., 2011) were used as anger 
measure (α  = .93); and lastly, “disgusted”, “revolted”, “sickened”, “repulsed” and “stomach-
turning” (adapted from Skarlicki et al., 2013) were combined as disgust measure (α  = .92). 
These emotion measures served as manipulation check measures where it was expected that 
participants in the humiliation and anger condition would score higher on the anger measure 
compared to the other two conditions, that participants in the humiliation and disgust 
condition would score higher on the disgust measure compared to the other two conditions, 
and that in the control condition the participants’ scores on the emotions would vary freely. 
Behavioural intentions were measured by first asking participants to think about the 




unlikely) to 5 (Extremely likely) to what extent they are motivated to engage in the following 
actions right now. Avoidance was measured using five items (adapted from Roseman et al., 
1994; Tangney et al., 2007): “Hiding from violent men”, “Escaping from violent men”, 
“Avoiding violent men”, Turning away from violent men” and “Running away from violent 
men” (α  = .88). Normative and non-normative approach as behavioural intentions were 
assessed by five items, respectively, and were adapted from the research of Tausch et al. 
(2011). For normative approach the items were: “Setting up a petition against violent men”, 
“Participating in a protest against male violence”, “Distributing flyers against violent men”, 
“Filing a complaint against violent men” and “Participating in a public discussion about male 
violence” (α = .89). For non-normative approach the items were: “Disturb events that are 
male dominated (e.g., soccer matches)”, “Interrupting male dominated board meetings”, 
“Participating in flash mobs to interrupt public life”, “Blocking males from malls” and 
“Blocking streets to protest” (α = .88). Items to assess social exclusion (adapted from (Ferris 
et al., 2008; Roseman et al., 1994) were: “Removing violent men from the country”, 
“Ignoring violent men/the police”, “Shaming violent men”, “Preventing violent men”, and 
“Excluding violent men from the community” (α = .76).  
The five items used as the measure of dehumanisation were adapted from Bastian and 
Haslam (2010): “Violent men are mechanical and cold, like robots”, “Violent men are 
objects, not humans”, “Violent men are not able to feel human emotions, like shame and 
guilt”, “Violent men are superficial” and “Violent men have warmth and depth” (reversed). 
As the reversed item did not correlate well with the other four items (Corrected Item Total 
Correlation = -.15), we omitted it. The four remaining items, however, formed a reliable scale 





Preliminary analyses  
Manipulation checks 
A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted entering the experimental 
conditions as independent variable and the emotions of humiliation, self-focused emotions, 
anger and disgust, as dependent variables. The Pillai’s trace estimate showed no significant 
main effects of the experimental conditions on the emotions, V = 0.02, F (8, 1080) = 1.27, p = 
.25, ƞp
2
 = 0.01. Consequently, no further univariate analyses were performed. It seems that 
irrespective of whether participants were in the humiliation and anger or humiliation and 
disgust or in the control condition, they perceived themselves equally humiliated, ashamed, 
angered and disgusted. Moreover, on face-value it seemed that participants felt all emotions 
rather strongly as all means were above the scale center (see Table 15). One sample t-tests 
were conducted to determine if participants felt each emotion significantly stronger compared 
to the scale centre (3). Results showed that the mean scores of each of the four measured 
emotions (see Table 15) differed significantly from the reference score (3), thumiliation(731) = 
23.70, phumiliation < .001; tself-focused emotions (563) = 2.96, pself-focused emotions < .01; tanger(746) = 
30.07, panger < .001; tdisgust(745) = 18.66, phumiliation < .001. These results confirm that although 
participants did not distinguish between the intensity that they felt each emotion, they 
nonetheless felt each emotion strongly. 
Overall, the results of the manipulation check indicate that there were no increases of 
the expected feelings in the participants in the different experimental conditions. We 
therefore concluded that our strategy to manipulate these emotions was not successful. Given 
that our manipulations were not successful, we could not test for causal effects. We, 
therefore, opted to treat the measures of emotions and behavioural intentions as correlative 




emotions and behavioural tendencies. More specifically, we assumed that the feeling of 
humiliation will explain variances in the different behavioural tendencies through self-
focused emotions, anger and disgust, respectively. Consequently, we hypothesised that 
humiliation is indirectly related to avoidance through self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 5a), 
that humiliation is indirectly related to normative and non-normative approach through anger 
(Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through disgust 
and through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c). 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 15 reports the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-
correlations of the principal variables. The feeling of humiliation correlated significantly with 
the behavioural intentions of avoidance, normative and non-normative approach and social 
exclusion. Self-focused emotions and anger correlated significantly with all the behavioural 
intentions, while disgust was only significantly related to normative and non-normative 
approach and social exclusion. The four measured emotions correlated significantly and 
strongly with each other. The behavioural intentions correlated significantly, but relatively 




Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of principal variables, Study 6.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean 4.32 3.90 3.14 4.02 3.72 4.13 4.37 2.76 3.66 3.72 
SD 0.81 1.03 1.16 0.92 1.06 1.05 0.90 1.22 1.02 1.06 





































































































         --- 
Note. ***p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05 (two-tailed)
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Hypotheses testing 
To test Hypotheses 5a and 5b which stated that humiliation is indirectly related with 
avoidance through self-focused emotions; and that humiliation is indirectly related to 
normative and non-normative behaviour through anger, we estimated the indirect effects of 
humiliation on behavioural intentions through the emotional blends of self-focused emotions, 
anger and disgust for each behavioural intention separately using SPSS PROCESS Macro 
(#Model 4,. Hayes, 2018) (see Figure 10). In order to test Hypothesis 5c, which stated that 
the feeling of humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through the feelings of 
disgust and through dehumanisation, we estimated the indirect effects of humiliation on the 
behavioural intention to socially exclude through self-focused emotions, anger and disgust, 
and dehumanisation which were entered as serial using SPSS PROCESS Macro (#Model 80, 




Figure 10. Conceptual diagram of the model testing for the indirect effects of humiliation on 







Figure 11. Conceptual diagram of the model testing for the indirect effects of humiliation on 
the behavioural intentions through emotional blends and through dehumanisation, Study 6. 
 
Indirect effects of humiliation on avoidance 
First, we estimated the indirect effects of humiliation on avoidance through self-
focused emotions, anger and disgust (see Figure 10), while normative approach, non-
normative approach, dehumanisation and social exclusion were entered as covariates for 
effects on the dependent variable. The overall model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .1541, 
F (8, 455) = 10.36, p < .001. The analyses of the direct effects revealed that humiliation was 
significantly related with self-focused emotions, anger and disgust but not avoidance (see 
Table 16).  
The analyses of the indirect effects supported Hypothesis 5a as results revealed a 
significant indirect effect from humiliation on avoidance through self-focused emotions. 
More specifically, the result implied that participants who felt humiliated accompanied by 




tendency to avoid the outgroup. All other indirect effects did not reach statistical significance 
(see Table 16). The contrast analyses of indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of 
humiliation on avoidance through self-focused emotions (effect = 0.070) was significantly 
stronger than the non-significant indirect effect through disgust (effect = -0.052), effectcontrast 
= 0.122, bootSEcontrast = 0.058, CIcontrast[0.015, 0.243], but it was not significantly stronger 
that the non-significant indirect effect through anger (effect = 0.029), effectcontrast = 0.042, 
bootSEcontrast = 0.061, CIcontrast[-0.079, 0.159].  
 
Table 16  
Direct and indirect effects of humiliation on the tendency to avoid through the emotional 
blends, Study 6. 
Effects on emotional blends  
Self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.791 0.195 4.056 < .01 0.408 1.175 
Humiliation 
0.598 0.047 12.657 < .001 0.505 0.694 
Anger 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.831 0.123 14.867 < .001 1.589 2.073 
Humiliation 
0.577 0.030 19.358 < .001 0.519 0.636 
Disgust 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.157 0.154 7.515 < .001 0.854 1.459 
Humiliation 




Effects on avoidance 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.179 0.338 6.438 < .001 1.514 2.845 
Humiliation 
-0.025 0.068 -0.370 .71 -0.160 0.109 
Self-focused emotions 
0.118 0.048 2.436 .02 0.023 0.212 
Anger 
0.049 0.087 0.571 .57 -0.121 0.219 
Disgust 
-0.076 0.070 -1.100 .27 -0.213 0.060 
Normative approach 
0.045 0.062 0.736 .46 -0.076 0.166 
Non-normative approach 
0.007 0.042 0.162 .87 -0.076 0.090 
Dehumanisation 
0.027 0.048 0.548 .58 -0.068 0.121 
Social exclusion 
0.369 0.053 6.904 < .001 0.264 0.474 
Indirect effects of humiliation on avoidance 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Feeling*Self-focused emotions 0.070 0.030 0.014 0.133 
Feeling*Anger 0.029 0.052 -0.071 0.135 




 Indirect effects of humiliation on normative approach 
The overall model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .1734, F (8, 455) = 11.930, p < 
.001. The analyses of the indirect effects revealed no significant indirect effects (see Table 
17). We were, therefore, unable to support Hypothesis 5b as none of the emotional blends 
regulated the relationship between the feeling of humiliation and normative approach
4
. 
                                                 
4
 When the other behavioural intentions were not controlled for, results showed a significant indirect effect of the 
humiliation on normative approach through anger, effect = 0.095, bootSE = 0.044, bootCI [0.027, 0.170]. The contrast 
analysis of indirect effects showed that this indirect effect was significantly stronger than the non-significant indirect effect 
through self-focused emotions (effect = 0.003), effectcontrast = 0.093, bootSEcontrast = 0.048, CIcontrast[-0.174, -0.016], but not 
significantly stronger than the non-significant effect through disgust, (effect = 0.051), effectcontrast = 0.044, bootSEcontrast = 






Direct and indirect effects of humiliation on the tendency to normatively approach through 
the emotional blends, Study 6. 
Effects on emotional blends  
Self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.791 0.195 4.056 < .01 0.408 1.175 
Humiliation 
0.598 0.047 12.657 < .001 0.505 0.694 
Anger 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.831 0.123 14.867 < .001 1.589 2.073 
Humiliation 
0.577 0.030 19.358 < .001 0.519 0.636 
Disgust 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.157 0.154 7.515 < .001 0.854 1.459 
Humiliation 
0.677 0.037 18.180 < .001 0.604 0.750 
Effects on normative approach 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
2.562 0.241 10.649 < .001 2.089 3.035 
Humiliation 
0.006 0.052 0.111 .91 -0.096 0.108 
Self-focused emotions 
-0.033 0.037 -0.893 .37 -0.106 0.040 
Anger 
0.140 0.066 2.133 .03 0.011 0.268 
Disgust 
0.058 0.053 1.095 .27 -0.046 0.162 
Avoidance 





0.074 0.032 2.309 .02 0.011 0.137 
Dehumanisation 
-0.010 0.037 -0.280 .78 -0.083 0.062 
Social exclusion 
0.236 0.041 5.723 < .001 0.155 0.317 
Indirect effects of humiliation on normative approach 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Feeling*Self-focused emotions -0.020 0.023 -0.063 0.025 
Feeling*Anger 0.081 0.045 -0.007 0.171 
Feeling*Disgust 0.039 0.045 -0.049 0.128 
 
 
Indirect effects humiliation on non-normative approach 
The model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .1778, F (8, 455) = 12.30, p < .001. The 
results revealed a significant indirect effect of humiliation on non-normative approach 
through self-focused emotions (see Table 18). This result did not support Hypothesis 5b as 
we hypothesised that anger would regulate the relationship between humiliation and non-
normative approach, but not self-focused emotions. The significant indirect effect implies 
that participants who felt humiliation accompanied by the feelings of shame and 
embarrassment (i.e., self-focused emotions) reported a stronger tendency to approach the 
outgroup with behaviour that violates laws or social norms (i.e., non-normative approach). 
All other indirect effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table 18). The contrast 
analyses of indirect effects revealed that the indirect effect of humiliation on non-normative 
approach through self-focused emotions (effect = 0.120) was significantly stronger than the 
non-significant indirect effect through anger (effect = -0.035), effectcontrast = 0.155, 
bootSEcontrast = 0.072, CIcontrast[0.012, 0.290], but not significantly stronger than the non-
significant indirect effect through disgust (effect = 0.049), effectcontrast = 0.071, bootSEcontrast = 






Direct and indirect effects humiliation on the tendency to approach non-normatively through 
the emotional blends, Study 6. 
Effects on emotional blends  
Self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.791 0.195 4.056 < .01 0.408 1.175 
Humiliation 
0.598 0.047 12.657 < .001 0.505 0.694 
Anger 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.831 0.123 14.867 < .001 1.589 2.073 
Humiliation 
0.577 0.030 19.358 < .001 0.519 0.636 
Disgust 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.157 0.154 7.515 < .001 0.854 1.459 
Humiliation 
0.677 0.037 18.180 < .001 0.604 0.750 
Effects on non-normative approach 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
-0.027 0.393 -0.070 .95 -0.800 0.744 
Humiliation 
-0.050 0.076 -0.758 .51 -0.199 0.100 
Self-focused emotions 
0.201 0.053 3.780 < .01 0.096 0.305 
Anger 
-0.061 0.096 -0.630 .53 -0.249 0.128 
Disgust 
0.072 0.077 0.939 .35 -0.079 0.224 
Avoidance 





0.157 0.068 2.309 .02 0.023 0.291 
Dehumanisation 
0.224 0.053 4.259 < .001 0.121 0.327 
Social exclusion 
0.198 0.062 3.209 < .01 0.077 0.319 
Indirect effects of humiliation on non-normative approach 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Feeling*Self-focused emotions 0.120 0.032 0.059 0.184 
Feeling*Anger -0.035 0.062 -0.151 0.091 
Feeling*Disgust 0.049 0.062 -0.064 0.180 
 
 
Indirect effects of humiliation on social exclusion 
The indirect effects of humiliation on social exclusion through disgust and through 
dehumanisation (see Figure 11) was tested, while controlling for the other emotions and the 
other behavioural tendencies. The overall model was statistically significant, R
2
 = .2984, F (8, 
455) = 24.185, p < .001. The analyses of the direct effects indicated that humiliation did not 
have a significant direct effect on dehumanisation nor on social exclusion, but that the 
relationship between humiliation and social exclusion was indirectly influenced through self-
focused emotions and dehumanisation (see Table 19). This result did not support Hypothesis 
5c as it was assumed that humiliation would be accompanied by disgust which would be 
related to a stronger tendency to dehumanise and exclude the humiliator(s). Instead, the 
results revealed that it was self-focused emotions that indirectly influenced the relationship 
between humiliation, dehumanisation and social exclusion. The contrast analyses of indirect 
effects revealed that the significant indirect effect of humiliation on social exclusion through 
self-focused emotions and dehumanisation (effect = 0.026) was significantly stronger than the 
non-significant indirect effect through only the self-focused emotions (effect = -0.029), 
effectcontrast = -0.055, bootSEcontrast = 0.027, CIcontrast[-0.109, -0.002], and the non-significant 




bootSEcontrast = 0.020, CIcontrast[-0.091, -0.015], and the non-significant indirect effect through 
disgust and dehumanisation (effect = -0.001), effectcontrast = 0.026, bootSEcontrast = 0.015, 
CIcontrast[0.002, 0.058]. The significant indirect effect of humiliation on social exclusion 
through self-focused emotions and dehumanisation was not significantly different from the 
non-significant indirect effect through anger (effect = 0.019) only, effectcontrast = -0.007, 
bootSEcontrast = 0.049, CIcontrast[-0.101, 0.093] or the non-significant indirect effect through 




Direct and indirect effects of humiliation on the tendency to socially exclude through the 
emotional blends and through dehumanisation, Study 6. 
Effects on emotional blends and dehumanisation 
Self-focused emotions 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.791 0.195 4.056 < .01 0.408 1.175 
Humiliation 
0.598 0.047 12.657 < .001 0.505 0.694 
Anger 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
1.831 0.123 14.867 < .001 1.589 2.073 
Humiliation 
0.577 0.030 19.358 < .001 0.519 0.636 
Disgust 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 





0.677 0.037 18.180 < .001 0.604 0.750 
Dehumanisation 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
3.284 0.241 13.623 < .001 2.810 3.757 
Feeling of humiliation 
-0.118 0.070 -1.683 .09 -0.257 0.020 
Self-focused emotions 
0.222 0.048 4.630 < .001 0.128 0.317 
Anger 
0.030 0.090 0.340 .73 -0.144 0.205 
Disgust 
0.006 0.072 -0.080 .94 -0.147 0.135 
Effects on social exclusion 
 Beta SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 
0.346 0.295 1.175 .25 -0.233 0.926 
Humiliation 
0.039 0.057 0.684 .49 -0.073 0.151 
Self-focused emotions 
0.048 0.041 -1.196 .23 -0.128 0.031 
Anger 
0.032 0.072 0.448 .65 -0.110 0.174 
Disgust 
0.031 0.058 0.530 .60 -0.083 0.145 
Dehumanisation 
0.193 0.039 4.907 < .001 0.116 0.270 
Avoidance 
0.257 0.037 6.904 < .001 0.184 0.330 
Normative approach 
0.285 0.050 5.723 < .001 0.187 0.382 
Non-normative approach 
0.112 0.035 3.209 < .01 0.043 0.180 
Indirect effects of humiliation on social exclusion 
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI Boot ULCI 
Humiliation*Self-focused emotions -0.029 0.025 -0.078 0.021 
Humiliation*Anger 0.019 0.048 -0.071 0.117 
Humiliation*Disgust 0.021 0.042 -0.063 0.106 
Humiliation*Dehumanisation -0.023 0.015 -0.053 0.003 





Humiliation*Anger*Dehumanisation 0.003 0.011 -0.018 0.024 




The initial aim of Study 6 was to test the causal relationships between the elicited 
emotional blends resulting from a vicariously humiliating event and the consequent 
behavioural tendencies of humiliation, which we assumed would vary between avoiding the 
humiliator(s), approaching the humiliator(s) or excluding the humiliator(s). We aimed at 
testing our hypotheses by manipulating humiliation together with anger, and humiliation 
together with disgust. Yet, the results of the manipulation checks showed that although our 
manipulations indeed provoked the feelings of humiliation, shame, embarrassment, anger and 
disgust (i.e., as means were significantly different from the scale center for all measured 
emotions), participants, however, felt equally humiliated, ashamed, angered and disgusted, 
regardless to which experimental condition they were exposed to. We speculate that the event 
that was used in the Facebook post (i.e., gender-based violence) was a situation that our 
female participants appraised in a manner that evoked all four of the measured emotions 
equally. As we did not control for the appraisals in Study 6, we were unable to comprehend 
how participants appraised the humiliating event used as manipulation and thus why they felt 
equally humiliated, ashamed, angry and disgusted.  
As our participants did not discriminate between humiliation and anger, and 
humiliation and disgust as a result of the experimental manipulation they were exposed to, we 
were unable to test for causal effects between humiliating events, emotional blends and 
behavioural tendencies. Consequently, we decided to use the measurements of emotions and 




relatedness between the measured feeling of humiliation, the measured self- and other- 
focused emotions and the measured behavioural intentions. The reformulated hypotheses 
stated that humiliation is indirectly related to avoidance through self-focused emotions 
(Hypothesis 5a), that humiliation is indirectly related to normative and non-normative 
behaviour through anger (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation is indirectly related to social 
exclusion through disgust and through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c). 
Results related to the relationship between humiliation and the avoidance tendency 
supported Hypothesis 5a as we found a significant indirect effect of humiliation on avoidance 
through self-focused emotions. As predicted, participants who felt humiliated accompanied 
by feelings of shame and embarrassment had a stronger tendency to avoid the humiliator 
outgroup. Our results did not support Hypothesis 5b, though. We could not find any empirical 
evidence that the relationship between the feeling of humiliation and normative or non-
normative approach was indirectly influenced by anger. Instead, we found a non-predicted 
indirect effect of humiliation on non-normative approach through self-focused emotions. 
Therefore, our female participants did not intend to approach the humiliator group 
normatively, but rather non-normatively through feelings of shame and embarrassment. 
We furthermore could not find evidence in support of Hypothesis 5c as disgust did 
not regulate the relationship between humiliation and social exclusion through 
dehumanisation. Again, it was the feelings of shame and embarrassment (i.e., self-focused 
emotions) through which humiliation indirectly influenced dehumanisation and social 
exclusion. This non-predicted significant indirect effect was significantly stronger than the 
predicted, yet non-significant indirect effect of humiliation on social exclusion through 
disgust and through dehumanisation. 
The three significant indirect effects found in Study 6 imply that some female 




for the tendency to engage in behaviour that violates social norms and the law (i.e., non-
normative approach), and some female participants opted for the tendency to end the 
relationship with the humiliator(s) (i.e., social exclusion) through dehumanising them - but all 
did it through self-focused emotions. Although the last two indirect effects were unexpected, 
our results nevertheless suggest that feeling humiliated is related to different behavioural 
tendencies through emotional blends, albeit not the emotional blends expected. The findings, 
that self-focused emotions did not only play a regulatory role in the relationship between 
humiliation and avoidance but also in the relationships between humiliation and non-
normative approach and social exclusion, suggest that when vicarious humiliation is 
accompanied by a certain emotion it does not necessarily mean that a specific behavioural 
tendency is by default associated with this emotional blend. But instead, other factors, such as 
the intergroup context and social norms attached to this context, might be at play in 
determining which behavioural tendency is deemed appropriate by the ingroup when 





The overall aim of the present research was to extend our understanding of the 
psychological processes involved in the experience of vicarious humiliation. More 
specifically, we aimed at exploring people’s experience of vicarious relative to personal 
humiliation (Studies 1, 3, 4 and 5), the role of ingroup identification (Study 2), the interplay 
between the appraisal processes of personally and vicariously humiliating events and 
humiliation as a blended emotion (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5), and the behaviours that people 
intend to engage in as a result of vicarious humiliation (Study 6).  
We focused firstly on people’s understanding of humiliation and their experiences 
with this emotion by exploring how often individuals experience humiliation on behalf of 
ingroup members compared to how often they experience this emotion on a personal level 
(i.e., the commonness of vicarious humiliation), the different situational determinants that are 
recognised by people in vicariously and personally humiliating events (and whether these are 
variant or invariant across these two contexts), and whether the feeling of humiliation is 
conceptualised as a blended emotion (Elison & Harter, 2007; Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández 
et al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; Veldhuis et al., 2014), or rather as a 
unique emotion (Study 1).  
Secondly, we systematically tested the hypotheses that individuals who strongly 
identify with their ingroup experience a stronger feeling of humiliation after witnessing an 
ingroup being humiliated than compared to low identifiers (Hypothesis 1, Study 2), that 
personally humiliating events (or rather the situational determinants that characterise the 
events) are likely to be appraised as something that lowers the individual’s self-esteem (i.e., 
internalisation) and is perceived as uncontrollable (i.e., powerlessness), which in turn will 
elicit humiliation accompanied by self-focused emotions such as shame, embarrassment and 




be appraised as unjust and externally blamed, which in turn will elicit humiliation 
accompanied by other-focused emotions such as anger, disgust and contempt (Hypothesis 2b, 
Studies 3, 4 and 5), that a situational determinant appraised as internal blame will result in 
self-focused emotions (i.e., shame, embarrassment and guilt), but that the feeling of 
humiliation will not be part of this blend (Hypothesis 3, Studies 3, 4 and 5), that visual 
exposure as a situational determinant of humiliation mainly aggravates the appraisals and the 
elicited emotional blends in personally humiliating events (Hypothesis 4, Studies 4 and 5), 
that humiliation accompanied by shame and embarrassment, provokes avoidance tendencies 
(Hypothesis 5b), whereas humiliation accompanied by anger provokes normative and non-
normative approach tendencies (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation accompanied by disgust 
provokes social exclusion through the tendency to dehumanise the humiliator outgroup 
(Hypothesis 5c, Study 6). 
Overall, our results revealed that participants construed humiliation in their memories 
mainly as personally humiliating events than as vicariously humiliating events, although they 
reported experiencing more often vicarious humiliation than personal humiliation when asked 
more directly (Study 1). The latter result confirmed our assumption that experiencing 
humiliation vicariously is indeed regularly experienced by people. The former is an 
interesting finding because it suggests that participants tend to construe a humiliating event 
by default as personal and that only by directly asking them to distinguish between personal 
and vicarious humiliation, do they distinguish between these two contexts. Results of the 
manipulation checks in Studies 3 and 4 further added evidence to this observation. In Study 
3, the participants allocated to the personal humiliation condition experienced difficulties in 
differentiating between being personally humiliated and witnessing a humiliating event, 
while results of the manipulation check in Study 4 showed that participants allocated to the 




who were personally humiliated. It might be that people construe a vicariously humiliating 
event on a more abstract level as the psychological distance is larger, which might in turn 
make the humiliation more personal (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Correspondingly, it might be 
that as the feeling of humiliation is experienced on a personal level, participants experienced 
difficulties distinguishing between the appraising of a personal event from the appraising of a 
vicarious event.  
Our results related to the situational determinants of humiliating events (i.e., being 
attacked, being socially excluded, being reduced in size, being found or made deficient and 
visual exposure) showed that participants used the proposed situational determinants when 
they described personally and vicariously humiliating events. Also, in line with our reasoning 
is the finding that visual exposure as situational determinant was more important in 
personally compared to vicariously humiliating events when participants were asked to 
remember humiliating events (Study 1). This finding could, however, not be replicated in the 
experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5) when participants were exposed to humiliating events 
as we were not able to provide empirical evidence that the presence of an audience 
aggravated the appraisals and consequent emotional responses to humiliating events, and 
more so in personally humiliating events. One could argue that we were unable to replicate 
the findings of the explorative study (Study 1) in the experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5) 
because of our methodological approach to use social media (i.e., Facebook) as a context to 
manipulate visual exposure. Although the manipulation checks for visual exposure were 
successful, our manipulation check items did not focus on whether an audience was present 
or not, but only on the actions of the audience (i.e., whether the audience was laughing or 
not). It might be that the use of Facebook was confounded by the fact that activities on social 
media are by default public and therefore, we actually did not manipulate the ‘non-existence’ 




Furthermore, our results related to the emotional blends of humiliation supported our 
reasoning that humiliation is indeed experienced as a blended emotion. We found that when 
participants defined humiliation as a feeling, they mostly described it as a blended emotion as 
compared to a unique feeling (Study 1). Moreover, our findings indicated that participants did 
not only mostly refer to the feelings of embarrassment, followed by shame, when describing 
the feeling of humiliation, but that they also felt these emotions significantly stronger 
compared to the other emotions (i.e., guilt, anger, disgust and contempt) when they were 
asked to indicate which emotions they felt as a result of humiliation. In line with this, the 
feeling of anger was rarely used when humiliation was described by our participants in terms 
of its emotional implications, and disgust and contempt were not mentioned at all. The latter 
finding might be because most of our participants defined and conceptualised a humiliating 
event as personal, and, in line with our assumption, being personally humiliated is more 
likely to result in the self-focused emotions such as shame and embarrassment. This 
assumption was supported by the experimental studies as results showed that being 
personally humiliated led to humiliation accompanied by the self-focused emotions (Studies 
3 to 5). As hypothesised, the appraisal of powerlessness played a regulatory role in this 
relationship (Study 4). An unexpected finding was, however, that personal humiliation led to 
feelings of humiliation and the self-focused emotions through the appraisal of internal blame 
(Studies 4 and 5). Although we would assume that participants would feel ashamed and/or 
embarrassed when they blamed themselves for the humiliating event (as was found in Study 
3), we did not assume that the feeling of humiliation would be part of this emotional blend 
(as it was found in Studies 4 and 5). Our findings suggest that, although previous studies 
suggest that people perceive humiliating events as undeserved (Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 
1991), there are actually situations, particularly when one is personally humiliated, where 




recall approach was used, Studies 4 and 5 exposed participants to a humiliating event where 
they had to imagine that they themselves posted the story on Facebook. The use of the latter 
approach in manipulating personal humiliation might have influenced our participants into 
perceiving the event as more deserved (i.e., blame oneself) and as humiliating because they 
were made to believe that they actually shared it with the public.  
Our results further supported our assumption that vicariously humiliating events result 
in a different pattern of emotions (i.e., humiliation and the other-focused emotions of anger, 
contempt and disgust). More specifically, results showed that participants tended to appraise 
vicariously humiliating events as unjust (and more so when they highly identified with the 
ingroup, Study 2), which elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by other-focused 
emotions (Study 4 and Study 5). Results further supported our Hypothesis 1 that high 
identifiers experience a stronger feeling of humiliation as compared to low identifiers as we 
found that high identifiers not only perceived the vicariously humiliating event as more 
unjust but that they also reported significantly stronger feelings of humiliation as compared to 
low identifiers (Study 2). However, this effect only reached statistical significance when the 
order in which the manipulations were presented was controlled for, in that only the high 
identifiers who received the high ingroup identification manipulation first felt more 
humiliated on behalf of the devalued ingroup member. Despite the order effect of our 
manipulations, the significant effect found supports the assumption made by the intergroup 
emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) that individuals’ level of identification with the ingroup 
plays an important role in the elicitation of group-based emotions.  
Results related to the behavioural intentions of vicarious humiliation (Study 6) were 
rather ambiguous. We exposed our participants to a vicariously humiliating event and 
prompted them into feeling either anger or disgust as blended emotion, respectively, or they 




checks showed, these manipulations were not successful as participants reported to feel all 
emotions equally (i.e., humiliation, self-focused emotions, anger and disgust). We decided, 
therefore, to treat our measurements of emotions and behavioural intentions as correlative 
data and instead tested for interrelatedness. The reformulated hypotheses stated that 
humiliation indirectly relates to avoidance through the self-focused emotions (Hypothesis 
5a), that humiliation indirectly relates to normative and non-normative approach through 
anger (Hypothesis 5b), and that humiliation is indirectly related to social exclusion through 
disgust and through dehumanisation (Hypothesis 5c). Our results supported Hypothesis 5a as 
we found a significant indirect effect of humiliation on avoidance through the self-focused 
emotions, thereby confirming that participants who felt humiliated, ashamed and embarrassed 
had a stronger intention to avoid the humiliator outgroup. Results pertaining to Hypotheses 
5b and 5c were, however, unexpected. Firstly, we were unable to find any evidence for the 
indirect relationship between humiliation and normative or non-normative behaviour through 
anger. We found a non-predicted effect, though, in that humiliation was indirectly related to 
non-normative approach through self-focused emotions. Therefore, some participants who 
felt humiliated accompanied by the self-focused emotions had a stronger tendency to 
approach the humiliator outgroup with behaviour that violates social norms or even break the 
law (i.e., non-normative approach). Secondly, our results showed that the indirect 
relationship between humiliation, dehumanisation and social exclusion was not influenced by 
disgust as hypothesised. Again, it was the self-focused emotions that regulated this 
relationship. To put it differently, our findings indicated that some of our participants who 
felt humiliated, ashamed and embarrassed had a stronger tendency to dehumanise the 
humiliator outgroup and intended to end the relationship by socially excluding them. We 
speculate that the regulatory role that the self-focused emotions played between humiliation 




feelings of shame and embarrassment are not exclusively linked to avoidance, as suggested 
by previous research (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008), but that other factors might 
influence the relationship between emotions and the behaviours that people opt for. As we 
only measured the emotions and the behavioural intentions in Study 6, we can only assume 
that other factors such as appraisals, social norms and the context also influenced the 
behavioural intentions deemed appropriate by our female participants in the context of 
gender-based violence. 
The findings of our six studies make several contributions to existing research. 
Firstly, our findings contribute to the research on vicarious emotions. Our results support the 
assumption that shared social identity is necessary for a person to experience an emotion 
vicariously, as suggested by Lickel et al. (2005). As mentioned elsewhere, research on 
vicarious emotions has mainly focused on the emotions of empathy and sympathy (Miller et 
al., 1996), guilt (Lickel et al., 2005), shame (Welten et al., 2012) and anger (Yzerbyt et al., 
2003), but not on vicarious humiliation (with the exception of Veldhuis et al., 2014). The 
present research, therefore, contributes to the scarce literature on vicarious humiliation and 
showed, in line with the research by Veldhuis et al. (2014), that feeling humiliated on behalf 
of an ingroup member (i.e., vicarious humiliation) is indeed possible. However, our findings 
make several additions to the findings of Veldhuis et al. (2014) as our research showed that 
being humiliated on behalf of a humiliated ingroup member is a phenomenon that is actually 
commonly experienced by people (Study 1), and thereby, confirming that vicarious 
humiliation is important to be studied.  
Secondly, our research contributes to the conceptualisation of humiliation by showing 
that people define humiliation as both an event and as a feeling (Study 1), and thus showing 
that humiliation should also be studied in terms of its causes and not only in terms of its 




2017; Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Fernández et al., 2015, 2018; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; 
Klein, 1991; Mann et al., 2017; McCarley, 2009; Negrao et al., 2005; Silver et al., 1986; 
Thomaes et al., 2011; Torres & Bergner, 2012). More specifically, the present research 
provides novel insights into the research on humiliation as an event as we studied the 
situational determinants that characterise humiliating events. For instance, our results imply 
that both personally or vicariously humiliating events are not only characterised by social 
exclusion, as shown in the studies of Veldhuis et al., (2014), but that they are also 
characterised by a range of situational determinants as proposed by Klein, 1991 (i.e., being 
attacked, being lowered in size, being socially excluded and/or being made or found 
deficient; Studies 1 to 6). Moreover, we showed that the importance of some situational 
determinants was invariant, and the importance of others was variant in personally and 
vicariously humiliating events (Study 1). For example, visual exposure, as well as being 
found or made deficient, are situational determinants that were deemed to be more important 
in personally humiliating events, while being reduced in size was seemingly considered to be 
more important in vicariously humiliating events. On the other hand, it seems that being 
ostracised, dehumanised, discriminated against, cheated on and/or betrayed by others (i.e., 
social exclusion) and being ridiculed, insulted, bullied, reprimanded, criticised and or 
assaulted (i.e., being attacked) played an equally important role as situational determinants in 
both personally and vicariously humiliating events. We would, however, argue that whether 
particular situational determinants are deemed to be more relevant in particular humiliating 
events, is less determined by the target of humiliation but rather by the dominating social 
discourses and related beliefs people share in certain social contexts. Future research should, 
therefore, clarify whether the importance of situational determinants depends on the target of 
the humiliating event (i.e., personal versus intergroup) or on the social context (e.g., social 




A third contribution of the present research related to the experience of vicarious 
humiliation, and different to the studies by Veldhuis et al. (2014), is that we showed that it is 
not only a shared social identity but also the significance of the social identity (Study 2). 
Moreover, the positive relationship found between ingroup identification and humiliation 
contributes to the literature on the role of ingroup identification in the elicitation of negative 
group-based emotions. Research on group-based guilt found a negative relationship between 
ingroup identification and the elicitation of group-based guilt (Doosje et al., 2006; Maitner et 
al., 2006) and speculated that this negative relationship was as a result of identity 
management strategies (Doosje et al., 1998). Yet different to guilt, humiliated people 
externally blame the event which, we speculate, might render identity management strategies 
unnecessary when people do not feel that they have done anything to cause this negative 
feeling. 
Fourthly, findings of the present studies (Study 1 and Studies 3 to 6) also contribute to 
the research on humiliation as blended emotion and confirm that humiliation is indeed 
experienced as a blended emotion as suggested by Jonas et al. (2014) and Negrao et al. 
(2005). Different to the findings of Veldhuis et al. (2014), where it was found that 
humiliation blended with anger and powerlessness, humiliation in our studies not only 
blended with the self-focused emotions of shame, embarrassment and guilt but also with the 
other-focused emotions of anger, disgust and contempt (Studies 3 to 6). The findings related 
to the other-focused emotions is a pioneering contribution to the understanding of humiliation 
as previous research mainly studied humiliation associated with shame (Hartling & Luchetta, 
1999; Klein, 1991), embarrassment (Elison & Harter, 2007), guilt (Hartling & Luchetta, 





Fifthly, our results contribute to the knowledge on appraisals of humiliation as we 
showed that the various emotional blends are elicited not directly as a result of the 
humiliating events, but rather indirectly through how these events are appraised - from being 
perceived as uncontrollable, on the one hand (i.e., powerlessness) to being perceived as 
unjust (i.e., injustice), on the other. As proposed by the appraisal theories of emotions (Frijda 
et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), the very same event 
can be differently evaluated by people and therefore, leading to different emotional patterns. 
Our results contribute to the understanding of why people would appraise the same 
humiliating event differently as we showed that, in line with the intergroup emotion theory 
(Smith et al., 2007), these different appraisal patterns are due to identity processes. More 
specifically, our results showed that humiliating events where a person is personally 
humiliated are likely to be appraised in terms of its relevance to the personal self, whereas a 
humiliating event targeting an ingroup member (i.e., vicariously humiliating event) are likely 
to be appraised in terms of its relevance to the social self (Studies 4 and 5). Linked to the 
contributions made to the knowledge on the appraisals of humiliation, is that we found that it 
is not always the case that people externally blame an event when they feel humiliated 
(Fernández et al., 2015; Klein, 1991), but that they might also perceive certain humiliating 
events as deserved and consequently blame themselves, especially when they are personally 
humiliated.  
Lastly, a contribution made by the present research relates to the behavioural 
intentions of vicarious humiliation. Different from previous studies on vicarious humiliation 
(Veldhuis et al., 2014), our results showed that people who were vicariously humiliated 
intended to respond with contradicting behaviours. For instance, our participants intended to 
avoid, and they intended to approach the humiliator(s). This result replicated previous 




avoidance and approach (Fernández et al., 2015). However, different from previous research 
on humiliation, our results found that participants who were vicariously humiliated also 
intended to socially exclude the humiliator outgroup through dehumanising them. This is an 
important result as it offers an empirical explanation to the proposed cycle of humiliation 
(Lindner, 2002), in that humiliated individuals might humiliate others in return by 
dehumanising and socially excluding them. We furthermore contributed to the knowledge on 
behavioural intentions of vicarious humiliation by showing that it is the emotions that 
accompany humiliation (i.e., emotional blends) that regulate the relationship between feeling 
humiliated on behalf of an ingroup member and having intentions to avoid, or to approach, 
and/or to socially exclude the humiliator(s). Showing that the humiliation of one ingroup 
member can elicit humiliation in other ingroup members (especially the high identifiers) and 
that consequently, vicarious humiliation can result in tendencies to avoid, to approach non-
normatively, to dehumanise and to socially exclude, are important for understanding why 
humiliation does not always lead to intergroup conflicts. This is because these behavioural 
intentions found to be associated with vicarious humiliation have the potential to both repair 
and harm intergroup relations and therefore, facilitate both the restoration of intergroup 
harmony and the onset of intergroup conflicts. 
Our research has also various implications for our current understanding of 
(vicarious) humiliation and future research. One implication of the present research is that 
although previous literature on humiliation has suggested that humiliation is part of our daily 
lives (Elison & Harter, 2007), our results indicated that humiliation might actually be more 
part of our daily lives than we would wish for. It seems that we are constantly exposed to the 
humiliation of others through reading or watching the news, through reading posts on social 
media or through watching reality shows where the “contestants” in these shows are regularly 




aware that when she or he demeans somebody in front of others, that she or he is actually 
vicariously humiliating every person that identifies with the humiliated person, and as our 
results indicated, vicariously humiliated people tend to respond in ways that might have 
damaging consequences for the social relations. In line with this, the manipulation of the 
degree of humiliation in our participants through the use of social media posts in Studies 2 to 
6 (i.e., Facebook) showed that people do not only need to witness and be present at the 
humiliating event, as was shown in the studies by Veldhuis et al. (2014) but that reading 
about it on a social media platform is sufficient to elicit feelings of humiliation on behalf of 
others. These findings imply that the psychological distance to humiliation (i.e., reading 
about it) does not lessen the experience of humiliation. 
Further, our results that participants conceptualised humiliation mostly in terms of its 
causes as compared to its emotional implications, and that when humiliation was 
conceptualised as a feeling it was defined as a blended emotion (e.g., as a feeling of 
embarrassment or shame), raises the fundamental question whether humiliation is an emotion 
or an event that elicits other emotional blends? For instance, Negrao et al. (2005) argued that 
humiliation is, in fact, a ‘hybrid emotion’ that consists of a mixture of self-focused (e.g., 
shame) and other-focused emotions (e.g., anger) (see also Coleman et al., 2007), which 
actually suggests the latter. However, future research is necessary to provide appropriate 
answers to this question. 
Another implication of our research is that the interplay between emotions and 
behavioural intentions is not as straightforward as assumed. For instance, in Study 6 (females 
as target group), the self-focused emotions of shame and embarrassment were not only 
positively related to avoidance but also to non-normative approach, dehumanisation and 
social exclusion. As we assume different emotions are elicited because they share the same 




The question is what determines whether humiliation accompanied by, for instance, self-
focused emotions results in avoidance, normative or non-normative approach or social 
exclusion? We would argue that social group and social context-specific factors play a role. 
For instance, the perceived ingroup efficacy and/or the status relationship between the 
humiliated ingroup and the humiliator outgroup might influence that the same emotional 
blends result in different behavioural intentions. For instance, Tausch et al. (2011) suggest 
that groups with a perceived low group efficacy are more likely to respond with aggression as 
they have nothing to lose. If this is the case, then our female participants in Study 6 might 
have perceived themselves as having less efficacy in relation to the humiliator outgroup of 
males, and therefore, responded with non-normative approach (despite their feelings of 
shame and embarrassment). It might, however, also be the case that our female participants 
felt actually ashamed by the gender-based violence as depicted in the Facebook story, which 
elicited the feeling of humiliation accompanied by other-focused emotions. Future research 
should, therefore, not only identify and control for contextual factors when studying the 
interplay between emotions and behavioural intentions in response to vicarious humiliation, 
but also the possibility of dual emotional processes. 
Finally, an implication worth mentioning relates to our findings of the role of the 
audience in personally and vicariously humiliating events. More specifically, our findings 
suggest that studying the role of the audience in vicarious humiliation requires that both the 
differences between and the similarities of the audience and the vicariously humiliated person 
are theoretically clarified. For instance, it might be that when the audience is defined as 
belonging to the group of the humiliator(s) (i.e., outgroup), and not as belonging to the group 
of the humiliated person (i.e., ingroup), visual exposure will indeed aggravate the feeling of 
humiliation, as was suggested by the present research. Future research should therefore be 




Related to this is the methodological implication of using a social media context (e.g., 
Facebook posts) when studying the effect of an audience. More specifically, we need to ask 
the question of whether this research context is actually appropriate when studying audience 
effects? As mentioned before, information posted on social media is seemingly by default 
public, thereby, making the manipulation of ‘an absent’ audience less likely. However, the 
social media context might raise a different question about the role of the audience as 
aggravating factor of humiliation, namely, when the personally or vicariously humiliated 
person does not have any control about the scope of the audience (because others can share or 
re-tweet a post) or does not even know who the audience is. Thus, one could argue that a 
limitation of the present research was to use Facebook posts in most of our experimental 
studies as a means of manipulating the presence of an audience as part of the humiliating 
events.  
Apart from this limitation, the present studies have several other limitations that we 
will outline in the following and that need to be overcome in future research. Firstly, although 
we used content analysis in Study 1, we did not make use of independent raters to code the 
qualitative data due to a lack of resources available. Therefore, we were not able to estimate 
the inter-reliability, which would have increased the trustworthiness of our results. Secondly, 
there were important variables that were not measured in our studies. For example, in Study 
1, we did not assess the participants’ feelings after they were required to describe a 
vicariously humiliating event, and in Study 6, we did not measure the participants’ appraisals 
of the vicariously humiliating event, which, therefore, limited our understanding of why all 
measured emotions were equally felt. Moreover, we did not control for participants’ moods 
and feelings prior to the manipulations, which can be assumed to influence the appraisal 
processes (Siemer, 2001). Lastly, we did not control for participants’ susceptibility to feelings 




third limitation refers to the manipulation checks in Studies 3 to 5, where we were unable to 
find a significant difference between the personal and vicarious humiliation conditions on the 
vicarious (Studies 3 and 5) and on the personal humiliation manipulation check measures 
(Studies 4 and 5). Although we used different methods to manipulate personal and vicarious 
humiliation (i.e., personal-recall approach in Study 3; scenario-based approach in Studies 4 
and 5), the results of the manipulation checks implied that participants in the personal 
humiliation conditions (Studies 3 and 5) were less able to differentiate between a personally 
and vicariously humiliating event, while participants in the vicariously humiliating conditions 
felt equally personally humiliated compared to the participants in the personally humiliating 
conditions (Studies 4 and 5). Future research should test for the success of the manipulation 
between personal and vicarious humiliation by making use of manipulation check items that 
enable participants to clearly distinguish between being personally targeted and being witness 
to someone else’s humiliation. 
A fourth limitation of the present research is that we applied a measurement of 
mediation design (Pirlott & McKinnon, 2016) in Studies 2 to 5, which does not account for 
the causal chain between the humiliating event, the appraisals of humiliation, the feeling of 
humiliation and the emotional blends (as we did not experimentally manipulate the appraisals 
of humiliation). To overcome this limitation, future research should therefore opt for a 
manipulation of mediation design (Pirlott & McKinnon, 2016). In line with this, the fifth 
limitation of our research is that we were unable to successfully manipulate the emotional 
blends of humiliation (i.e., anger and disgust; Study 6) and therefore, we were unable to test 
the assumed causal relationships between emotions and behavioural intentions. Future 
research should address this limitation by adopting a methodological approach where for 
instance, the situational determinants of anger (i.e., violation of autonomy) and disgust (i.e., 




participants’ physiological parameters (e.g., anger as increased adrenaline and cortisone) or 
facial expressions (e.g., disgust) are provided. 
Another limitation is that we used self-reported behavioural intentions that are of 
course only an approximation of participants’ true intentions and consequent behaviour. A 
limitation also worth mentioning refers to the use of only one intergroup context in Study 6, 
which left us unable to establish whether our results are variant or invariant across different 
contexts. Future research should, therefore, use more than one intergroup context when 
addressing the relationships between vicarious humiliation and behavioural intentions so that 
group differences can be identified. The last limitation of our research is that we used 
convenience sampling in all our studies. Although the use of Unisa students accelerated us in 
reaching our sample sizes in a limited time frame, the disadvantages of this sample and the 
sampling method are that using only one group of people might lead to its over-
representation and it does not allow us to generalise our findings beyond our samples used in 
the studies (i.e., no external validity).  
Irrespective of the outlined limitations, the present research contributes to the 
understanding of the psychological processes of humiliation and its role in intergroup 
relations. Although, of course, numerous factors would contribute to the onset of intergroup 
conflicts, negative group-based emotions are certainly key role-players (Tausch et al., 2011). 
Results of the present research support the assumption that humiliation is indeed related to 
emotional blends and behavioural consequences that can be damaging to intergroup relations. 
Furthermore, our research implies that one does not even need to be present at the 
humiliating event to feel humiliated and to respond in a harmful manner – a shared social 
identity, which is meaningful to one’s self-concept, is sufficient in setting the implications of 




In recent years social media platforms have become increasingly popular and, therefore, 
we are more often than ever before part of or exposed to “unfiltered” opinions and 
information that do not comply with the professional code of, for instance, journalists as they 
devalue, belittle and insult similar others, different others and ourselves. It is, therefore, 
important that active participants of these platforms understand that when they devalue a 
person in their Facebook posts or Twitter tweets, they are potentially eliciting negative 
emotions in their followers who might respond in a manner that will turn a platform that 
intends to connect people into a battlefield. However, vicarious humiliation seems not only to 
be an increasing problem in the digital but also in the analogue world. More specifically, it 
seems that “identity politics” are actually superseded by the “politics of humiliation”. For 
instance, the humiliating remarks about others regularly posted on social media (e.g., Twitter) 
by the current president of the United States (Shear et al., 2019) do not only antagonise the 
social cohesion in the United States but have the potential to polarise between different 
groups worldwide. As politics of humiliation undermine the right of every individual human 
to be recognised and respected, they do not only challenge universal accomplishments but 
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Instructions and different Facebook posts presented to participants in Study 2 
 
For the participants who selected South African nationality, the instruction and Facebook 
post (see Figure 1) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction 
between a South African and people from other countries who belong to the Facebook group 
"Economic Future of Africa". The South African posted a post commenting on the possible 




Figure 1. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a South African as 




For our female participants who selected gender, the instruction and Facebook post 
(see Figure 2) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between 
a woman and other people, especially men, who belong to the Facebook group "Gender-
based violence". The woman posted a post commenting on possible strategies to stop gender-
based violence; which triggered comments particularly from men”. 
 
Figure 2. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a female as 





For the male participants who selected gender, the instruction and Facebook post (see 
Figure 3) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a 
man and other people, especially women, who belong to the Facebook group "Gender-based 
violence". The man posted a post commenting on possible strategies to stop gender-based 
violence; which triggered comments particularly from women”.  
 
 
Figure 3. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a male as 





For participants who selected Unisa students, the instruction and Facebook post (see 
Figure 4) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a 
Unisa student and students from other universities, who belong to the Facebook group 
"Improving study conditions for students". The Unisa student posted a post commenting on 
possible ideas to improve the study conditions of students; which triggered comments 
particularly from students from other universities”. 
 
 
Figure 4. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a Unisa student as 




For participants who selected neighbourhood, the instruction and Facebook post (see 
Figure 5) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a 
resident from your neighbourhood and residents from other neighbourhoods, who belong to 
the Facebook group "Safer Neighbourhoods". The resident from your neighbourhood 
posted a post commenting on possible ideas to improve the safety in neighbourhoods; which 
triggered comments from residents from other neighbourhoods”. 
 
 
Figure 5. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a resident from the 




For participants who selected taxpayers, the instruction and Facebook post (see Figure 
6) were as follows: “In the following we want you to read an interaction between a taxpayer 
and non-taxpayers, who belong to the Facebook group "Taxes in South Africa". The tax 
payer posted  post commenting on possible ideas to improve the transparency in the tax 




Figure 6. Facebook post used as ingroup identification manipulation with a taxpayer as 
humiliated ingroup member. 
 
